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ABSTRACT

Stephen C. Rowan and the U.S. Navy: Sixty Years of Service

by

Cynthia M. Zemke, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2012

Major Professor: Dr. Denise Conover
Department: History

This thesis is a career biography, and chronicles the life and service of Stephen
Clegg Rowan, an officer in the United States Navy, and his role in the larger picture of
American naval history. The author has utilized mainly primary sources, including a
journal kept by Rowan himself (transcribed from a microfilm copy of a handwritten
journal, 900+ pages), and the Official Records of the United States military branches that
were kept during the course of the Civil War. Rowan’s wartime experiences and the
contributions he made during the Second Seminole War, the Mexican War, and the Civil
War form the framework of this paper. It also covers the interim periods, during which
Rowan participated in other pursuits of the US Navy, including exploration and
diplomatic ventures. It concludes with a brief overview of Rowan’s accomplishments
while serving in the Navy, and his family’s continued military service.
This thesis outlines the larger role played by the Navy in each engagement, with
particular emphasis on the theaters of war in which Rowan participated (the Californian
and Mexican west coast during the Mexican War, and his riverine and coastal services
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during the Civil War). It also examines the broader impact and influence that these
experiences had on Rowan as an individual and on the navy as a whole.

(202 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Stephen C. Rowan and the U.S. Navy: Sixty Years of Service
by Cynthia M. Zemke, Master of Science

This thesis is a career biography, and chronicles the life and service of Stephen
Clegg Rowan, an officer in the United States Navy, and his role in the larger picture of
American naval history. The author has utilized mainly primary sources, including a
journal kept by Rowan himself (transcribed from a microfilm copy of a handwritten
journal, 900+ pages), and the Official Records of the United States military branches that
were kept during the course of the Civil War. Rowan’s wartime experiences and the
contributions he made during the Second Seminole War, the Mexican War, and the Civil
War form the framework of this paper. It also covers the interim periods, during which
Rowan participated in other pursuits of the US Navy, including exploration and
diplomatic ventures. It concludes with a brief overview of Rowan’s accomplishments
while serving in the Navy, and his family’s continued military service.
This thesis outlines the larger role played by the Navy in each engagement, with
particular emphasis on the theaters of war in which Rowan participated (the Californian
and Mexican west coast during the Mexican War, and his riverine and coastal services
during the Civil War). It also examines the broader impact and influence that these
experiences had on Rowan as an individual and on the navy as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION

Fig. 1: Stephen Clegg Rowan, c. July 1862

Stephen Clegg Rowan (Fig. 1) was born on December 25, 1808 in Ireland. His
father, John Rowan, and mother immigrated to the United States when Rowan was very
young. When he was ten, Rowan followed, and joined his family in Piqua, Ohio, where
he was later employed as a clerk in a store. In 1825 he entered Miami University, and on

2
February 1, 1826, received an appointment as a midshipman in the United States Navy.

1

Rowan’s career in the U.S. Navy spanned many decades. He served in overseas
explorations and several military clashes—the most important of which was for the
Union Navy during the Civil War. In the post-Civil War period, Rowan advanced up the
officer ladder, retiring as Admiral in 1889.
Rowan’s naval career, which spanned much of the 19th century, reflected major
trends in United States naval history. Rowan, being an immigrant, was like many other
foreigners who found opportunities in the military and swelled the Navy’s ranks. When
Rowan arrived in the United States in 1818, the nation’s navy had achieved newfound
stability. The War of 1812 (1812-1815) removed the earlier question of whether the US
Navy had a meaningful existence. The Navy was a vital branch of the US military, as the
future American Civil War would clearly indicate.
In writing this thesis, the author has utilized Rowan’s journal as the primary
source of Rowan’s naval career. Much of Rowan's journal is observations and reflections
on places and people, and while he does not write much in his actual journal during the
Civil War, his letter book is included in his papers, and it is overflowing with copies of
letters that Rowan wrote. Most are official, business-only type letters, but there are a few
personal ones included. Owing to space, not everything that Rowan wrote could be
included. For instance, much of the information regarding his record of routine blockade
duty during the Civil War (trouble keeping the ship supplied, sightings of blockade
runners, rumors heard from locals, etc), especially concerning the lengthy blockade of
1

Stephen Cooper Ayres, “Sketch of the Life and Services of Vice Admiral Stephen C.
Rowan, U.S. Navy” (read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, Cincinnati,
Ohio, 1910), 1.
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Charleston, South Carolina, has been omitted.
The first section of Rowan’s journal covers his early naval career, during which
he visited many places, and consists primarily of his observations of people and cultures.
Being a sailor, Rowan was exposed primarily to port cities, which were not always a
complete reflection of a country as a whole. Moreover, he traveled as part of a military
force, with the primary objective of furthering US interests abroad. His writings are
frequently tinged with the prevailing attitudes of the day, especially in regard to ethics
and morality, and this is most obvious in his observations of foreign countries’ forms of
government. His journal also records weather patterns and the speed and location of
ocean currents. Information of this sort dominates the entries while the ship is at sea; as
Rowan himself observes, there is not much else to report.
While at sea, Rowan frequently recorded data regarding their specific location.
He noted the latitude and longitude once a day, and also wrote down anything of
environmental importance, should they be near enough to land to do so—obstacles, the
depth of the water, the state of the ocean floor, etc. With the locations recorded, along
with other pertinent information, this data could be used to make a future journey less
complicated and dangerous. Taken with other records, this information could be used to
predict the time it might take to make a specific journey, and the best time of year to
make the attempt. An example of this data, and an explanation of it, can be found in the
appendix.

4
THE START OF ROWAN’S NAVAL CAREER

In 1825, Rowan entered Miami University; on February 1, 1826, he received an
appointment as midshipman in the United States Navy, owing to the efforts of William
McLean, Rowan’s Ohio congressional representative who nominated him. Rowan was
fortunate to serve in the United States Navy during a period (1815-1860) known as the
“Era of Naval Exploration”. 1 While exploring the world’s geography, the US Navy was
also promoting American commercial interests. Often, the US Navy also supported US
diplomatic objectives. As Historian Beach has written, the “Navy was both an arm and
an avenue of diplomacy.” 2
From the start of his naval career, Rowan participated in these diplomatic,
scientific, military ventures. In August of 1826 he was ordered to the sloop-of-war
Vincennes, commanded by Commodore Isaac Chauncey, for his (and the vessel’s) first
cruise, which lasted three years and ten months. On this cruise, the ship became the first
of the United States Navy to circumnavigate the globe, 3 leaving New York on September
3, 1826, and sailing south around Cape Horn into the Pacific.
Rowan and the crew on the Vincennes visited Brazil, Chili, Peru, Tahiti, the
Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Macau, China, and the Cape of Good Hope. The
Americans’ first stop was Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Rowan’s writing on this city focused on
the oppressive form of government, of which he wrote, “The government is that of an
1

Edward Beach, The United States Navy: A 200-Year History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1987).
2
Beach, 156.
3
Stephen Cooper Ayres, “Sketch of the Life and Services of Vice Admiral Stephen C.
Rowan, U.S. Navy” (read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, Cincinnati,
Ohio, 1910), 1.
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absolute monarchy, and the subjects denied the right of trial by Jury, the lives of the
subjects at the disposal of the Emperor.” 4 Rowan described an incident involving an
entire regiment being executed on order of the Emperor, owing to their rumored
dissatisfaction with the government. 5 Almost certainly this was a rumor, perpetuated by
foreigners desiring to feel morally superior; nonetheless, Brazil at that time was
governmentally unstable, having only recently gaining its independence from the
imperial power Portugal. Rowan witnessed the results of the local justice system,
remarking on the punishments exacted: “For crimes of an inferior kind he [the Emperor]
punishes by transportation or chains them together, and compels them under this burthen
of chains to carry water from the fountain to the Hospital and keep it well supplied.” 6
Rowan believed that some offenders were “transported” to penal colonies on the coast of
Africa, which Rowan noted to be “worse than death, to be slaves to those who they
treated as slaves before captivity.” 7
During the American stay in the harbor, the Emperor issued an “embargo,” stating
that no ships were to enter or leave the harbor. They had been preparing to leave just
before this was announced, and the ship was threatened with military action if an attempt
was made to leave. Rowan recorded the American reaction: the U.S. Commodore
threatened retaliation if any attempt was made to prevent the American departure the

4

Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers, M180”], vol. 1, 10.
5
Ibid., vol. 1, 11.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., vol. 1, 11-2.

6
following morning. Rowan then noted the Brazilian emperor’s reversal of the order, at
least regarding the American vessels. 8
The Americans continued their travels, sailing around Cape Horn into the Pacific
and then cruising along the western coast of South America. In Valparaiso, Rowan
observed that all of the buildings in the town were low to the ground, never over two
stories, due to the earthquakes the area frequently experienced. “Last year this Town was
visited by an Earthquake which destroy’d upwards of 700 hundred Inhabitants and a
proportion of the town.” 9 Rowan wrote that the justice system in the area had improved
substantially over the past few years, according to rumor. “Police of Valparaiso is very
good at present. Six years ago an American can not walk the streets without risk to be
carried by a band of Robbers to some private place and robbed and murdered. Present
such crimes are unknown.” 10 Despite this, Rowan maintained that the Chilean
government required a “complete revolution in the leading persons” 11 in order to
stabilize.
The Americans visited Valparaiso a second time the following spring, and were
there over Easter. Rowan was unsettled by a “religious superstition” of the people there:
“On Good Friday they suspend Judis Iscariott [sic] in effigy at all their public places and
to the lower yards of their Men of War and at sun down… burn him and sometimes tear
him to pieces with yells of revenge and triumph.” 12

8

Rowan noted that, “out of compliment to the Emperor,” they remained another three
days (Rowan, 1.016).
9
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 1, 19.
10
Ibid., vol. 1, 22-23.
11
Ibid., vol. 1, 24.
12
Ibid., vol. 1, 32.
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During their visit to Callao, Peru, on July 14, 1827, Rowan and his shipmates
experienced the after-effects of recent political reform:
“This day the Peruvian Congress convened at Lima and, after numerous
resolutions, proceeded to ellect [sic] a President, Vice President, and other public
officers of the government… Since this congress has convened they have passed a
resolution ordering all the Columbian [sic] Troops (amounting to 3000) out of the
country… (4.037-8).” 13
The Columbian minister to Peru, noted Rowan, was expected to leave Peru in 24 hours or
be treated as a spy. The minister turned to the US commander Jones for protection. Jones
first verified that his interference in the matter would not cause tension between the
government of Peru and the United States, and once being certain of this, he granted the
man protection, accepting him on his vessel, which Rowan does not name, until
arrangements could be made to convey him to his native country. Peru had only recently
achieved independence from Spain, and Rowan stated that unrest there was
commonplace. Also common, observed Rowan, was the poverty of Peru, especially in
Callao, were profitable trade was a foreign monopoly. 14
In June of 1828, the Vincennes was off the coast of Lima, Peru. While exploring
the town, Rowan visited the Basilica Cathedral, and wrote that, even though it had
suffered from neglect and robbery due to the revolution, it was still “the finest building I
ever saw, the ceiling of which is supported by six pillars is elegantly gilt and
ornamented.” 15 He observed in his journal that many of the wealthier families in the area
had fallen on hard times and found it difficult to adapt to a more modest lifestyle. It
seemed to Rowan that some were willing to go to extreme measures to avoid doing so.
13

Ibid., vol. 4, 37-8.
Ibid., vol. 1, 27.
15
Ibid., vol. 1, 62.
14

8
“Nothing can be more shocking to a foreigner than the degraded state of morals of the
City of Lima.” Rowan stated that, due to the governmental unrest and the resulting
rampant poverty, women of these previously wealthy families were “in the habit of
stealing from their houses under cover of night walking the streets until they can fall in
with a fellow with a purse sufficiently heavy to attract their attention.” Rowan was told
that these women were so adept at disguising themselves, “frequently parents cannot
recognize their daughters nor brothers their sisters.” 16 How much of this was hearsay and
how much was observed is unclear, but rumors of this nature were certain to be
perpetuated by sailors who spent much of their time isolated from members of the
opposite gender.
In December of that same year, on their final visit to Lima, Rowan, lured by the
novelty of the opportunity, attended a bullfight. Though he was impressed by the agility
and skill of the matadors, he wrote, “This is a public amusement which can not be
witnessed with pleasure by any refined American, and duly goes to prove the vicious
state of society.” 17
The Vincennes visited the Marquesas Islands of modern-day French Polynesia,
and Rowan was particularly intrigued by the natives of the area. While visiting one of
the islands, Rowan went ashore with others from the crew, witnessing a funeral and an
accompanying celebration. “The contrast was great between the passive thoughtfulness
of those in attendance of the corpse and the gayness of those who were singing songs to

16
17

Ibid., vol. 1, 65.
Ibid,, vol. 1, 67.

9
time beat on two cylindrical drums abt. 6 feet high and two feet in diameter.”

18

He

described the manner in which the men of the family dressed a number of hogs, while
others prepared a pit in which to cook them. They were invited to stay for the meal, but
they were compelled to return to the ship before the food was done cooking. He
observed with great interest the natives’ “War Dress,” and described a headdress covered
in feathers, bracelets made of human hair, necklaces of “small whales teeth,” ear rings,
along with spears or clubs and a sling with a small bag of stones, a combination which
“constitute[s] a warriors full field dress in which they present a most singular and
picturesque appearance.” 19
Rowan was disturbed by the fact that the people of the islands were
“acknowledged cannibals,” though they had “laid aside the practice for some time past,
except in aggravated cases, such as an individual of a different tribe killing one of their
chiefs, or other extreme case.” Still, Rowan noted that “nothing can be more appalling to
the mind of civilized man that man’s eating man.” 20
They visited other islands in the area, including Tahiti. Rowan wrote that the
people of Tahiti and the other Society Islands no longer tattooed themselves as the people
of the Marquesas Islands still did, and that the people in general, but especially the
women, were taller than those of the other islands. “The women are very large it is not
uncommon to see females from 5 feet 10 in to 6 feet in height and well proportioned.” 21
Rowan was struck by the fact that during all of his exploration of the area and all of his

18

Ibid., vol. 1, 71-2.
Ibid., vol. 1, 76.
20
Ibid., vol. 1, 77.
21
Ibid., vol. 1, 83.
19

10
inquiries of the natives, he “was unable to find a person who could tell me his age
exactly. There are but few old men or women among them which leads me to believe
that but few live to see 50 years; there is but one or two persons on the Island who
recollect of Capt. Cook’s first or second visit.” 22 Captain James Cook, a British explorer,
visited the island several times in the 1770s.
Despite being religious himself, Rowan disapproved of many of the religious
influences on the islands. Rowan believed that missionaries to the islands were trying “to
cram religion down [the natives’] throats, before there is any evident change in the
inward man and no preparation to receive it.” 23 He believed the missionaries focused too
much on rectifying what they believed to be deviant behavior, and neglected the spiritual
aspects of the faith they were trying to impose on the people. In particular, the
missionaries in the area were making attempts to do away with the practice of polygamy
among the islanders. Rowan observed that “the influential men disliked to circumscribe
their privileges, having been taught from their infancy that a man had a right to keep as
many wives as his circumstances would permit, and the poor never gave it a second
thought, but consider’d [sic] themselves happy if they could provide for one wife.” 24 He
stated that though the laws of the area had outlawed the practice, some of the men of
higher social standing continued to keep plural wives in secret, unwilling to give up what
they believed their status entitled them to.
The Vincennes returned to New York on June 8, 1830, and at the end of the
summer Rowan was ordered to serve on the revenue cutter Rush. For whatever reason,
22

Ibid., vol. 1, 85.
Ibid., vol. 1, 95.
24
Ibid., vol. 1, 90.
23

11
Rowan did not write in his journal during this time period, or, if he did, the entries have
been lost.

12
ROWAN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR

From 1832 to 1836, Stephen C. Rowan served in the West Indies as Passed
Midshipman and Master in the Schooner Shark and the Sloop of War Vandalia. It was
during his time on the Vandalia that the Second Seminole War broke out. The
relationship between the Seminole Indians and the United States had long been troubled,
and tensions had been slowly mounting over the past few years, until finally coming to a
head on December 28, 1835, when a band of Seminoles attacked Major Frances L. Dade
and his detachment of 108 soldiers, killing all but three at the scene of the battle, with
only two of the survivors making it back to Fort Brooke, from which they had departed.
One of these men, Ransom Clarke, despite a broken arm and collarbone, a wounded leg
and a bullet in one of his lungs, managed to elude a Seminole warrior on horseback—the
same warrior who tracked and killed one of the other survivors, Edwin DeCourcy—and
crawled his way back to Fort Brooke, at last making it on New Year’s Eve. The other
man who managed to escape, Joseph Sprague, arrived the following day. 1
When word was received of the “Dades Massacre,” the Vandalia was in the
harbor of Pensacola. According to Rowan, “the Vandalia in 24 hours from the receipt of
the news had taken in three months of provisions and water and was on her way to
Tampa Bay to the relief of our Troops.” 2 Naval vessels along the coast of Florida were
ordered to seek out and engage the hostile Indians, and it was in light of this order that
1

John and Mary Lou Missall, The Seminole Wars (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2004), 7.
2
Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers, M180”], vol. 4, 274.

13
Rowan, second in command under Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, and Passed
Midshipman William M. Walker readied a boat expedition to begin their pursuit. 3 The
Army, executing an attack on the Seminoles hiding in the swamps, drove the Indians
south along the west coast of Florida. Powell and his crew were ordered to cruise the
coast, watching for any sign of them attempting to escape the Army, and to engage them
if sighted. They spent the day of March 18 patrolling the river Manatee as far upstream
as the depth of water would allow their boats, and finding no trace of the Seminoles they
proceeded the following day to search the islands near the mouth of the river. They
patrolled the area until the morning of March 27, when low provisions and foul weather,
combined with the disappointment of a fruitless search and the exposure suffered by over
a week in open boats, drove Powell and his men to return to the Vandalia. 4
They were not long on board the Vandalia. “Shortly after his return to the ship
another boat expedition to Charlotte harbor, consisting of the launch and the boat
[Rowan] had commanded before, was organized and he again volunteered to command
the Cutter.” 5 Powell manned the launch, and the two boats, bearing forty officers and
men, sailed for Charlotte Harbor. The trip was made on the open sea under sail, Rowan
wrote, and it thus required “the greatest care and watchfulness.” 6 By the time they
reached their destination, Rowan had been without sleep for over two days. After
camping on one of the islands at the northern end of the harbor, the next morning they
headed for Sanibel Island, where the collector of the port resided. Rowan wrote that they
3

George E. Buker, “Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, U.S.N., Pioneer of Riverine Warfare,”
The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jan., 1969): 254.
4
Ibid., 256.
5
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 4, 276.
6
Ibid.

14
sighted some canoes, but when they gave chase, their quarry escaped. They spotted a
large fire on one of the islands, and shortly after this they spotted another canoe. The
people in the canoe saw that they were white, and called out to them in Spanish, telling
them they had come from the fishing rancho on Josefa Island. “The refugees reported
that on the previous evening their settlement had been attacked by a force of about
twenty-five Indians led by Chief Wy-ho-kee.” 7 Rowan wrote that the Indians set fire to
the house of the revenue collector, intending to burn him along with his home, but he had
escaped. 8 The Spaniards, whom Rowan stated were all married to Indian women, fled
the rancho in canoes, and thus they met up with the men from the Vandalia. The women
and children were left in the village, because the Spaniards knew the Indians would not
harm them, since they were of their own people.
The Spaniards led the sailors to their village, where they learned from the women
that the Indians had gone after the collector and his servant, who had escaped in a yacht.
“Learning the dangerous position in which the collector was placed Lieut. Rowan called
his boat’s crew to muster stated the case to them and asked for volunteers to the rescue.” 9
Rowan took a total of twelve men, including at least one of the Spaniards as a guide, and
landed at daybreak on an island on which the guide informed them was a number of
fishing huts where the Indians might be hiding. On marching into the village, the men
were fired upon by the Indians, and they charged into the village, one going to each door
of the huts. There were only four Indian warriors in the village, all in one hut, and in the

7

Buker, “Powell,” 257.
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 4, 275.
9
Ibid., vol. 4, 276.
8

15
altercation that followed, two were killed and two were taken prisoner.

10

Rowan, the

first to enter the hut, sword in hand, prevented all four of them from simply being shot
dead, thinking they could be useful as guides. Of one Seminole warrior, Rowan wrote
that “several attempts were made to tie his hands behind his back with silk handkerchiefs,
the only thing available, but he broke the handkerchiefs like rotten twine.” 11
One of these warriors eventually stated to his captors that a large group of
Seminoles had gathered together just inland from Charlotte Harbor. Major General
Winfield Scott ordered a regiment of Louisiana Volunteers, commanded by Colonel
Persifor F. Smith, to go after them. 12 Lieutenant Rowan landed most of these troops at
the mouth of the river, with the intention of ascending the waterway as far as the boats
would allow, and then, as per Colonel Smith’s orders, continue on foot. 13 The columns of
men, numbering 500 strong, were led by Rowan with forty of Powell’s sailors as an
advance guard, but the going was tediously slow, and when a halt was called at noon, the
volunteers refused to go further. Powell, Rowan and their party of sailors continued,
along with Smith himself and a few other officers, carrying enough provisions for a
week. “Having marched three days into the heart of the country we returned to our boats
having seen signs of Indians but encountering none.” 14
The party had found evidence of passing Indians, and a deserted village that had
been recently occupied, but no indication that the Seminoles had been amassing in large
numbers in the area. Colonel Smith gave the order to return to Tampa Bay, and Powell
10

Buker, “Powell,” 257.
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 4, 277.
12
Buker, “Powell,” 258.
13
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 4, 277-8.
14
Ibid., vol. 4, 278.
11

16
gathered together the Spanish fishermen and their families, numbering around 100
people, and escorted them there. In his report to his Commander, Thomas T. Webb, he
writes of the events of the past month, and ends it stating, “We arrived last night after an
absence of twenty-six days, and although greatly exposed in our open boats, and my
people subjected to much hardship I am pleased to bear witness to the cheerfulness and
industry which marked their conduct." 15
The U.S. military ended their winter campaign at the close of April. They
considered the climate and environment, especially given the diseases the men were
exposed to, too severe to continue campaigning through the summer. The men were
dispatched to summer quarters to wait for cooler weather to set in or, in the case of
Rowan, until their detachments were ordered. "Our ship returned to Pensacola for
supplies and Actg. Lieut. Rowan was detached in May 1836 after a service of nearly 4
years on the West Indian station." 16
Though Rowan was only present in Florida for a brief period of the beginning of
the Second Seminole War, he played a key role in the learning experiences of Lieutenant
Powell, a man who would later be an authority on riverine warfare in the Everglades.
Powell would use his experiences from this part of his service to improve amphibious
techniques for use against the Seminoles, and tactics developed during this period would
survive to be utilized as far into the future as the Vietnam War. 17 The Navy had
experienced riverine warfare during the American Revolution and the War of 1812, but
the lessons they learned were ill-suited for adaptation to the Everglades. “The Naval
15
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forces in Florida from 1835 to 1843 found the challenges of Indian warfare and a semitropical environment reason to improve on the precedents and implement new tactics that
would establish patterns for future riverine warfare.” 18 It was at this time that the Navy
first issued every man on the riverine force a printed tactical document covering combat
concepts suited to their environment.
Despite these advancements, the swampy territory became an almost
insurmountable obstacle throughout the Seminole Wars. The Everglades and the
surrounding area was a labyrinth of narrow, twisting waterways and claustrophobic
marshes. The experience with the Louisiana Volunteers under Powell and Smith refusing
to march any further was an early indicator of the troubles to come. Though the
Seminoles were vastly outnumbered and inadequately armed, the swamp became their
one overwhelming advantage. The Indians had the ability to disappear into the dense
swampland before their opponents could mobilize enough to pursue them, and once on
the move, the trail of the hunted was quickly lost in the trackless wilderness. Arduous on
foot and at times impassible by boat, the Everglades became the Seminoles’ closest ally,
and the U.S. military’s most formidable opponent.
The war stretched into the next decade before it was finally brought to a shaky
conclusion. Both of the last two commanders of the war, Walter K. Armistead and
William Jenkins Worth, realized the futility of continuing a war in which their opponent
was given the entire summer season to rest and rearm, and refused to suspend operations,
fighting year-round. They both used every branch of the military and all of the resources
18
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available to them, and finally managed to wear the Seminoles down enough that most
of them eventually were either killed or captured, or turned themselves in. In August of
1842, the United States finally, after seven long years, declared the war to be over, at a
cost of over 1,500 American lives and over $30 million—an astounding sum, considering
the entire proposed federal budget for 1836 alone was less. Thousands of soldiers from
all over the country returned home suffering from diseases and wounds that they never
truly recovered from. Despite the high cost of the war, only about 4,000 Seminoles were
successfully removed to the reservation out west. A small contingent of Seminoles
continued to hold out, hiding in the Everglades and refusing to leave. The Second
Seminole War went down in history as the United States’ longest, most expensive, and
deadliest Indian war, but it was largely forgotten over the next few decades. 19 Despite a
third Seminole War that resulted in most of the remaining Indians being killed or
removed from Florida, a small number of them, less than 200, remained in the
Everglades. Their descendents live there still.
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ROWAN’S SERVICE BEFORE THE MEXICAN WAR
Rowan was promoted to Lieutenant in the spring of 1836, 1 following his service
in the Second Seminole War. He then served from April 1838 to March 1841 on the U.S.
National Coast Survey, a duty he did not much care for, “in consequence of the head of
our party being a man without system, or firmness to enforce what good ideas he had of
order and subordination.” 2 Though Rowan appreciated the better pay and being closer to
the comforts of home, he desired to return to sea. He applied for duty at sea, finished his
work on the survey, and reported at the Norfolk Navy Yard for duty on the Delaware.
This was to be the flagship of Commodore Charles Morris, and to be commanded by
Captain Charles Stuart McCauley. They left Norfolk on August 28, 1841, bound for
Montevideo and the Mediterranean. Other vessels on the cruise were Decatur, Marion,
Patomac, and Concord.
Before Rowan had left, his wife, seven months pregnant, had hoped that his
orders would not come in before he had a chance to be present for the birth of his child.
“In this as well as many other hopes have I been disappointed,” 3 Rowan lamented. Once
out to sea, however, he had no lack of work to take his mind off what he had left behind.
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Commodore Morris ran an efficient fleet. The men were exercised daily in clearing
the deck, managing the sails, and manning the guns. 4
While anchored in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, on January 14, 1842, the
Delaware was visited by Dom Pedro II, the sixteen-year-old Emperor of Brazil. The
ships in the harbor saluted the royal barge with 21 guns, and he visited each ship in turn.
The Americans held a reception ceremony, during which the young emperor expressed a
desire to see the guns exercised; Commodore Morris ordered it done, including another
21 gun salute “to gratify the child’s curiosity, never having been on board when guns
were fired.” 5 The young Emperor, whose father had abruptly abdicated in 1831, would
eventually become a well-liked leader, and would be referred to as “the Magnanimous.”
By the end of the month, Rowan and the crew were anchored off Montevideo,
Uruguay. Rowan, with a few other officers from the vessel, went ashore to explore.
They found a tavern with no rooms available, but were told by the owner of the
establishment that they were welcome to sleep on the billiard table. 6 Rowan met Dr.
Bryant from the Decatur, and they procured horses for a ride in the country. They met a
few locals on the road, also mounted, and raced them through the countryside. “There is
something in the appearance and manner of life of these men that is fascinating… I was
particularly struck with the bold reckless and independent bearing of these people. They
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make the finest cavalry in the world not excepting the Cossacks.” The next day, he
wrote that the night past was more unpleasant than any other since he had left home.
“I slept on the billiard table…was annoyed to death by fleas and mosquitoes… I
rose at 9 more fatigued than when I retired. After a badly served breakfast I paid
my bill and prepared to return to my ship with a mental oath that I should never
willingly spend an other night in Montevideo (2.056).” 8
In February, Rowan and the crew encountered an English packet bearing several
large bags of mail for the squadron. Despite the rough weather, they sent a boat to collect
the bags for their ship. The men anxiously waited on the deck while the packages were
sorted out. Rowan was pleased to receive a package and two letters from his wife, who
was in “good health and spirits.” 9
A testimony to Rowan’s patriotism can be found in his February 22 journal entry.
He wrote, “The 22nd and the 4th of July are days to be kept sacred, the annals of this or
any other country does not furnish two days from which such important results have
sprung.” 10 It was customary for vessels in harbors to fire salutes in honor of their
holidays, and it was customary for other vessels to return them. They fired a 17-gun
salute in honor of George Washington’s birthday, and Rowan noted that the vessels of
Brazil, Portugal, and Montevideo all returned the salute, but the French and the British
vessels did not. Rowan observed in his diary that the American vessels always honored
the holidays of the British and French, and it was poor etiquette for them to neglect to do
the same.
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On the 2 of April, Rowan made a thirty-mile ride on horseback to a waterfall
above the city of Rio de Janeiro, “thro the most magnificent country eyes ever beheld.
Nothing that I have ever seen can compare with the scenery of this country.” 11 Rowan
particularly enjoyed being on horseback, and he would always avail himself of an
opportunity to do enjoy a ride. Of this trip, however, he wrote a few days later, “I paid
dearly for my enjoyment. I was so much chafed that I have been confined, under the
surgeon’s charge ever since.” 12 Despite this, a little over two weeks later, he could not
resist the opportunity to go again, and he and six other men took a ride along the
aqueduct and up into the mountains to view the botanical gardens of the city from
above. 13
The Americans left the South American coast for the Mediterranean, and on
reaching the strait, they visited the Rock of Gibraltar. The peninsula was impressively
fortified, and Rowan and several others of the crew went ashore to explore. Rowan wrote
that he was “struck with the military air that pervaded the whole island,” 14 and stated that
he passed so many soldiers and sentinels that his hand was in constant motion returning
salutes. While along that coast, they also visited Cadiz, of which Rowan stated, “No
where are more beautiful women to be found than here.” 15
In Naples he visited several places for the purpose of admiring the architecture
and art, including a museum with fresco paintings and other articles taken from Pompeii.
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He wrote that the colors looked “as fresh as though they were done but yesterday.”

16

Another section of the museum was devoted to marble statuary; he was particularly
impressed with “a Colossal statue of Flora found in the baths of Caracalla at Rome.” 17
The next day, his curiosity stirred by his visit to the museum, he took the opportunity to
visit the site of Pompeii with a group of people led by a guide on a tour. They were taken
to an excavation site, where work was being done; Rowan noted that they thought
roughly a quarter of the city had been excavated. 18 He also wrote of several temples and
villas visited, including Nero’s Villa, which had baths with water so hot it “boils an egg
in two minutes.” 19
While off the coast of Italy, King Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies visited the ship,
but because he had “previously signified his wish to be received incognito,” they did not
fire a salute as he came alongside the vessel. He requested to meet all of the officers, and
they were assembled on the deck and introduced. “The yards were manned and a salute
fired on his leaving.” 20
On the way back to the States, Rowan recorded the event of a court martial held
for a seaman and a Marine, who had broken into the Light Room and taken some money.
They were both given lashes, the Marine two hundred and the sailor one hundred. The
court also ruled that the sailor should be deprived of his pay and “sentenced him to be
dismissed from the ship at such a time and place as the Comm’d thought fit.” 21 Rowan
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makes no mention of the sailor’s further fate. They arrived in Norfolk in March 1844,
after a cruise of almost three years.

25
ROWAN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE MEXICAN WAR
On the 20th of June, 1845, Rowan received orders to report for duty on the Marion
for service on the coast of Africa. Rowan requested that he be released from the order,
having no desire to serve on that station. His request was granted, and, instead, he was
assigned to the Cyane (Fig. 2). He enjoyed his remaining time ashore in the company of
his wife, and on July 15th he reported at the Navy Yard. 1 The ship, commanded by
William M. Mervine, with Rowan as its executive officer, got underway on August 10, 2
destined for the Pacific Ocean. Very early in the journey, Rowan, wrote,

Fig. 2: USS Cyane

“I am on the sea where duty calls me, and trusting in that Divine Providence that
guards the fall of a sparrow. I heartily hope to be restored to my country to my

1

Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers M180”], vol. 3, 1.
2
Ibid., vol. 3, 3.

26
family and friends and to the embrace of the dear partner of my joys with honor
to myself and credit to the Corps of which I am a member.” 3
The Cyane, along with several other vessels, had been stationed on the west coast of
Mexico, in light of the tension between the two countries. War was almost certain, and if
it did break out, the Navy would be ready to seize the territory of California. Despite this
knowledge, it was impossible for anyone to fathom the impact the coming confrontation
would have on this nation and its people, nor could Rowan himself have imagined how it
would shape his future.
Mexico, like the United States, had achieved its independence from a European
power; but once they had cast off the yoke of Spain, the country dissolved into political
chaos. The sudden lack of a clear leader made the government prone to upheaval, and the
warring factions seeking to gain control left it vulnerable to hostile takeover. 4 When
Mexico was less than two years old, its very first government was overthrown by the
mere threat of violence from Santa Anna. 5

Between the years of 1836 and 1848, 23

separate administrations had governed Mexico. Several of Mexico’s states, most of them
located in the north, objected to and did not recognize their government. Such instability,
in the eyes of the United States, was asking for invasion, and they feared that England,
France, or another power would take control and use Mexico as a springboard into the
United States. They used this as an argument and a justification for essentially doing it
first.
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The United States was also caught up in its imperialist concept of “Manifest
Destiny,” the idea that it should—and would—occupy the continent “from sea to shining
sea.” This term was coined in July of 1845 by John L. O’Sullivan to justify American
expansion as providential. 6 Tied into this belief that the United States had the right to
conquer other territories was the idea that it was also a duty; the liberty- and justiceloving U.S. citizens could bring freedom and democracy to the people of the lands they
were going to conquer—people who were suffering under oppressive forms of
government. This only thinly veiled the fact that most U.S. citizens had developed the
belief that they were superior to the Mexicans in every way. Many believed the
Mexicans were mismanaging their land and their resources, and it was the duty of the
people of the United States to rectify this problem.
Mexico had allowed citizens of the United States to settle in Texas as a last resort
to colonize the territory. 7 Thousands of settlers poured into Texas, and most of them,
once there, refused to abide by the laws and regulations the Mexican government had laid
out for them. Mexico had previously banked on the U.S. citizens integrating into
Mexican society, but there were too many differences between the cultures for this to
happen smoothly, if at all. By the 1830s, over seven thousand Americans had settled in
the territory, more than double the population of Mexicans. 8 Emboldened by their
numbers, the U.S. citizens became more and more rebellious, until, desperate to maintain
control of the territory, a Mexican army led by Santa Anna crushed U.S. forces in Texas
6
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in several battles. But Santa Anna met his match in Sam Houston, whose army
soundly defeated Santa Anna's in 1836, and the Mexican general was forced to sign a
treaty recognizing Texas as an independent state. 10 Mexico justifiably blamed this loss of
their territory on the United States.
Mexico refused to recognize the treaty that Santa Anna had signed, claiming that
it was invalid because he had signed it while being held as a prisoner of war. The fact
that Mexico disputed Texan independence was well known. 11 As a result, when Texas
accepted an annexation offer from the United States in 1845, Mexico, holding that the
States had accepted territory that rightfully belonged to them, severed diplomatic
relations with the United States.
When the war with Mexico broke out in April 1846, it was over this land dispute
regarding the territory of Texas, but the United States saw no reason to not include
California in the argument as well. While achieving and maintaining Texas was one of
the main goals for the United States, it was also a means to an end. President James K.
Polk of the United States had won the vote on an annexation platform, promising the
Westward-looking American people that he would secure for them Texas and other
territory. 12 While Texas was indeed a prize he sought to gain, he was also looking still
farther west. Equally important to him, and perhaps even more so, was the goal of
California, whose ports would give the United States easy access to the Pacific without
having to sail around Cape Horn. Through the shipping businesses based in New
9
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England, the United States had already tasted the fruits of Chinese trade, and was keen
to tap into it further. 13
Adding to the eagerness of the U.S. to take California was the activity of the
British Navy in the Pacific. Fear that the British would take California before they had
the opportunity encouraged the United States to action. Andrew Jackson, in 1835, had
offered Mexico half a million dollars for the port of San Francisco, but they had
vehemently declined—the idea of selling any of their territory to the United States was
abhorrent to them. Polk’s original goal was to “acquire California by infiltration and
subversion,” 14 much the way the United States had taken Texas. When it became clear
that the United States would not get California without a fight, however, Polk switched
gears and went for a more aggressive approach. He did not seem to much care how he
acquired California, as long as he did.
Enthusiasm to take California had even led U.S. Navy Commodore Thomas ap
Catesby Jones to preemptively seize the port of Monterey, then the capital of California,
in 1842 and claim California as United States territory after the rumor that war had
broken out between the nations reached him. 15 Commodore Jones was relieved from his
duty in 1843, only to be reinstated to the same post after the end of the actual war. At the
time, apologies from the U.S. government were only grudgingly accepted, and Mexico
saw the action for what it foreshadowed: the United States wanted California, and they
would achieve it any way they could.
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The East coast of Mexico was blockaded in short order at the outbreak of the
war, with Commodore David Conner effectively securing the ports of Matamoros,
Tampico, Alvarado, and Veracruz. Throughout the course of the war, no Mexican vessel
would be able to put to sea under Conner’s watchful eye. 16 The West coast took a little
longer to secure. Mexican California consisted of two separate parts: the Baja peninsula
and upper, or Alta, California. Alta California was what the United States was after, and
unfortunately for Mexico, it seemed inevitable that it would fall. The territory was
distant enough from the Mexican capital that the government’s control over it was weak,
and this coupled with its location on the coast meant that many foreigners had settled
there regardless of Mexico’s claims to it. The population before the outbreak of the war
was about twenty-five thousand, and only a small percentage of that number was loyal to
the Mexican government. 17 Mexico had soldiers garrisoned at several of the key ports,
including Monterey, San Francisco, San Diego and Santa Barbara, but they would prove
little match for the onslaught of the U.S. Navy.
The Cyane arrived at Mazatlan in January 1846, and joined several other
American vessels in the harbor. They remained there for thirty days, conducting needed
maintenance and repairs and supplying the ship with provisions and water for six
months. 18 On February 22, Commodore John D. Sloat, Commander of the Pacific
Squadron, sent the Cyane to Monterey, bearing Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the
United States Marine Corps. Gillespie had arrived at Mazatlan on the 9th of that same
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month, bearing dispatches for Captain John C. Freemont.

19

Gillespie said very little

about what information the dispatches contained, only that it was urgent, and that he must
be given passage to California as quickly as possible. The English Navy had several
ships in the area, due to the tension between the United States and Britain regarding the
territory of Oregon, and they were watching all with keen interest. In light of this, Sloat
sent the Cyane to take Gillespie to Monterey, but “to blind [the English] as to the
destination of the Cyane she was ordered to touch at the Sandwich Islands en route.” 20
In the Pacific, the United States Navy was at an extreme disadvantage in
comparison to the squadron in the Atlantic. While supplies in limited quantities could be
purchased from the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) and along the Mexican coast, many of
them had to come from South America or from the eastern United States. Orders, also,
had to make the long and arduous journey from Washington. Messages and supplies
alike had to travel all the way around the southern tip of South America, or else be
carried across Panama. Either way, it was a trip of some four to six months. To ship
anything overland could have taken even longer and would have been more costly. This
meant that the Navy in the Pacific was largely on its own when it came to orders—news
traveled far too slowly to wait for direct orders in regard to action that needed to be taken.
The matter of naval stores was an even more pressing one. By the end of January 1847,
many of the ships were down to less than two weeks’ worth of salt provisions a man, and
most of the men were without shoes. Chaplain Walter Colton, the alcalde of California,
wrote in February that, “Our ships, as far as sea-service is concerned, are of about as
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much use as so many nautical pictures. They look stately and brave, as they ride at
anchor in our bay; but let them go to sea, and they would carry famine with them. It is a
strange policy that keeps a squadron on this coast in such a disabled condition. One
would suppose the Department had concluded men could live at sea on moonshine.” 21
Due to the distance between Mazatlan and Hawaii, and from there to Monterey, it
was not until April 17 that the Cyane reached her destination in California. By that time,
Fremont, who had been at Monterey shortly before, had already departed from the area,
headed for Oregon. 22 Fremont had left the California territory before Gillespie caught up
to him.
The Cyane remained in the bay at Monterey through July, expecting daily to hear
news of the outbreak of war and orders to take the town and raise the American flag.
Commodore Sloat, who had said he would be close behind the Cyane when they left
Mazatlan, did not arrive at Monterey until July 2nd, and once there, he hesitated another
five days before making a move. 23
Rowan’s reflections on the area and the people are telling. Monterey, despite the
fact that it was regarded as the capital of California at the time, was a small port and
offered little in regard to supplies. Rowan, expressing the attitude of many Americans,
wrote in his journal that, “This however will no longer be the case when industrious
people get possession of the soil and commerce and demand increases.” 24 The
Californians, or the “Calafornios,” as the people living in the territory were referred to by
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many, were a conglomeration of people of mixed Mexican and Spanish decent and a
collection of foreigners from across the globe—including Americans—who had settled
on the California coast. The territory of Alta California was far from its seat of
government, and was, for the most part, largely indifferent to Mexican authorities, and, as
was frequently the case, even rebellious against them—except when it served their
purpose. Of this land and these people, Rowan wrote in his journal: “This country is
nominally attached to Mexico and is under Mexican laws when the laws are executed or
there is power in the civil or Military department to enforce them. Mexico has sent
troops and Generals to Calafornia (sic) repeatedly to protect them from the Indians and to
assist the civil authority but the instant the native Calafornians think themselves secure
from Indian depredations they commence intriguing to rid the country of the Mexican
Gov't and his troops.” 25
The American Consul, Thomas O. Larkin, who was then residing in
Monterey, believed that California was anxious to sever its ties with Mexico and to rid
itself completely of interference from its government, and that the Californians would
soon declare themselves independent from Mexico and ask the United States for
protection against their former government. Despite the fact that Rowan believed that the
Californians had no real respect for the authority of the Mexican government over them,
he wrote in his journal, “I doubt his conclusions while at the same time I am under the
impression that emigrants from our country will shortly revolutionize the country and
erect themselves into an independent republic and in course of time “Annex” themselves

25

Ibid., vol. 3, 22-23.

34
as did Texas.”
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Rowan was certainly not the only person who recognized this distinction. There
were already many American emigrants in the territory, and they were not above stirring
up trouble. Many men of the Navy looked on them as rabble-rousers, and some were of
the opinion that if it had not been for these troublemakers, there might have been a
peaceful resolution to the conflict between the United States and Mexico over the
question of California. Rowan certainly believed they were not doing their country any
credit, and called them “insurgents.” Captain John C. Fremont, who was the head of a
party exploring the area, was himself a bit of a rabble-rouser, and was instrumental in
stirring up the “Bear Flag Revolt” in Sonoma. Far from being a “California” uprising,
the “Bear Flaggers” were a small group of mostly American foreigners, who took it upon
themselves to declare California’s independence from Mexico on the 4th of July in 1846.
Some weeks before, the same group of men had attacked Sonoma in the middle of the
night and captured the Mexican General Mariano Vallejo and two other Mexican officers
and held them for some weeks at Sutter’s Fort. Rowan portrayed these men in a very
unfavorable light: “Not a man of these conspirators had been in the Country over twelve
months, and because the Mexican government did not permit them to take real estate
from its legitimate owners and appropriate it to their own uses a cry of persecution is
raised and they take up arms and hoist an independent Flag with a ‘Bear and Star’ on a
white field edged with red.” 27 The revolt received little local support. A few days later
news regarding the outbreak of the war reached the area, and the new flag was pulled

26
27

Ibid., vol. 3, 25.
Ibid., vol. 3, 6-7.

35
down and the American Flag was raised in its place.
Despite all of the rumors, there had been no official confirmation of war from
Washington. Commodore Sloat was a cautious officer, and hesitated much longer than
most officers would have before taking action. His hesitancy was born of thirty years of
what basically amounted to peacetime service, and of his fear of being formally
reprimanded as Jones had been for his preemptive seizure of Monterey—the same port
his ship was then anchored off the coast of. Having been given the orders to preserve the
peace until war was unmistakable, Sloat was naturally wary of acting prematurely. News
that Fremont had been engaging in skirmishes inland had reached the Commodore,
however, and he assumed that the other officer must know something he did not. Using
the assumption that Fremont was under orders that justified the initiation of military
action, Sloat ordered the town be taken.
On July 7, 1846, Captain Mervine of the Cyane landed a party consisting of 140
seamen and 85 Marines and took Monterey without any opposition from the Mexican
forces stationed there. 28 Lieutenant Stephen C. Rowan was among them, and he was
immediately ordered to put up earthworks, and a blockhouse and stockade to house 100
troops. This was done, under Rowan’s direction, by the sailors from the Cyane, and
despite not having much experience with such enterprises, it was done satisfactorily and
in short order. 29 Rowan would remember this work with pride decades later: “The
successful accomplishment of this piece of field engineering so exceptional in the
experience of a naval officer was a source of pride to him as long as he lived and he
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referred to it with much satisfaction.”
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Two days later, Commander John B. Montgomery of the sloop Portsmouth landed
a party and took both San Francisco and Yerba Buena. They too were unopposed. 31 It
appeared that many of the inhabitants of Alta California did not care much which country
their territory “belonged” to, provided their own personal interests were preserved. On
the same day, Lieutenant Joseph W. Revere, also of the Portsmouth, left Monterey and
rode to deliver American flags to Sonoma and Sutter’s Fort, and to inform Fremont of the
seizure of Monterey. 32
Commodore Robert F. Stockton arrived at Monterey in the Congress on July 15th,
and was greeted with relief by Sloat, who intended to hand over command of the
squadron to him in the near future. 33 Four days later, Fremont and his men rode into
town. Bauer notes that their arrival was cause for alarm, since the state of their clothing
and hair, combined with the manner in which they were armed, “gave them the
appearance of savages.”

34

Rowan referred to them as a “gang of outlaws,” 35 and noted

that they had been “filibustering” 36 in the area.
Sloat and Fremont met immediately upon the latter’s arrival, and Sloat was
horrified to learn that Fremont was under no instruction from Washington to initiate
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hostilities.
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Though President Polk had signed the declaration of war almost two

months before on the 13th of May, official news of that momentous occasion had still not
reached the Pacific coast. Soon after this event, Sloat relinquished his position and
headed for home. His failing health, combined with the stress of the situation in the
Pacific, was more than he cared to bear. He gave the command of land operations to
Stockton on the 23rd of July, though he did not transfer the entire command to him until
the 29th, on which date he sailed for home.” 38
Stockton wasted no time picking up where Sloat left off, and he did so with much
more enthusiasm—and much less tact—than his predecessor. On the 25th of July, he
ordered Commander Samuel F. Du Pont to take Fremont and his men to San Diego in the
Cyane. 39 Rowan wrote that the goal was “to seize horses and mount [Fremont’s] men
and make a diversion in favor of a movement to be made by the Commodore from San
Pedro to capture Los Angelos (sic) the Capital.” 40 Upon their arrival, Du Pont sent
Rowan at the head of a group of sailors and marines from the ship to the town. Rowan
marched the men the five miles to San Diego, which they entered unopposed; 41 the town
was secure before Fremont’s men were even ashore.
On August 4, 1846, Santa Barbara was taken by a landing party from the U.S.
frigate Congress, flagship of the Pacific Squadron, under Commander Samuel F. Du
Pont. 42 Two days later, First Lieutenant Jacob Zeilin from the same ship led a group of
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38
marines to San Pedro and occupied it. Both cities were taken without resistance.
From San Pedro, Stockton landed a naval brigade of 360 men with the intent of
capturing Los Angeles. 43 The situation was a unique one; the Commodore was preparing
to lead a large-scale land campaign with a force made up almost in its entirety of sailors.
“Only 90 of his 360 men carried muskets: the others carried carbines, pistols, swords, and
boarding pikes—a sorry collection of weapons with which to fight the Californians’
favorite weapon, the cavalry lance.” 44 The other American forces were in a similar
situation.
On August 7th, the Mexican commander at Los Angeles, General Castro, sent
Captain Jose Maria Flores and Pablo de la Guerra with a message to Stockton at San
Pedro asking for a negotiation. Stockton replied that he would not negotiate with Castro
until California had declared itself independent of Mexico and under American
protection. This would have left Castro with nothing to negotiate for, and so,
overestimating the American force and recognizing his own limitations, he decided to
flee California, “but, to cover his flight, on 10 August he wrote Stockton a letter
announcing that, in view of Stockton’s ‘insidious’ response to his request for a
conference, he would fight.” 45
Prepared to meet him in battle, Stockton and his force marched on Los Angeles
on August 13th, but took it with no opposition.46 Fremont and his battalion of California
volunteers arrived once again too late to see any action. They had taken a separate route,
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and arrived only an hour after Commodore Stockton had taken the city. Du Pont had
been ordered to bring the Cyane up the coast and join them, but due to the lack of wind,
they were unable to arrive in time. Rowan wrote that by the time they arrived, “Stockton
had quiet possession of the Capitol.” Rowan was shocked that Castro had not stood his
ground, and called him a coward for running away. Rowan and the men of the Cyane,
however, had been under the impression that Castro had been “at the head of six or seven
hundred Calafornians,” 47 when in reality his army had dwindled to only about one
hundred men. 48
The day after Los Angeles was taken, the Mexican forces in California
surrendered; California was under the control of the United States. 49 This string of easy
victories must have lulled the U.S. Navy into a false sense of security. Stockton in
particular had a low opinion of the Californians, and this led him to make several bad
judgment calls about them, including underestimating their ability to reorganize and
execute an effective counterattack. Whether or not Stockton believed that maintaining
control of their captured targets would be as easy as taking them had been, the Mexicans
did not stay down for long, and little more than a month later, California rose in revolt.
During the interim, the Navy turned its eyes south. While small forces were left
behind to hold their captured ports, the Navy sent ships south to attempt to take the rest of
the Mexican west coast. 50 On August 19th, Stockton proclaimed the west coast of Mexico
to be under blockade. Stockton, however, did not have enough ships to proclaim a legal
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blockade, and the ships he did have were undermanned and undersupplied.

51

A few

days later, Rowan wrote that “the Cyane and the Warren were ordered down to
promulgate Stockton’s celebrated paper blockade.” 52 The Cyane was sent to San Blas
and the Warren to Mazatlan. On the way to San Blas, the Cyane intercepted two small
Mexican vessels, a sloop called the Solita and a brigantine called Susana, and captured
them. Du Pont deemed the former fit to preserve, and sent it to La Paz, but had the
Susana scuttled. 53 The Warren, on the way to Mazatlan under Captain Hull, captured
another vessel, this one a brig called the Malek Adhel. Bauer notes that Lieutenant
William Radford and sixty-nine men were ordered by Hull to take the vessel while her
Mexican crew was at siesta, and that they “had boarded the brig and fastened her hatches
before her snoozing crew realized what was going on.” 54 The ship was taken into U.S.
service and was manned by the Navy. 55
The Cyane continued to San Blas, a small port south of Mazatlan, which despite
its size was heavily equipped with 34 cannon. 56 On September 2, a landing party led by
Lieutenant Rowan rendered these cannon useless by spiking them, 57 an act of sabotage
accomplished by driving a spike into the touchhole, the vent in the breech used to ignite
the powder inside. After the action at San Blas, the Cyane sailed north up the Gulf of
California toward La Paz, Rowan wrote, “in hopes of Capturing the Mexican Schooner
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Julia.”

58

The Julia was indeed in the harbor at La Paz, and Rowan, accompanied by

Lieutenant George L. Selden, captured the vessel with the launch from the Cyane. There
were eight other vessels in the harbor also, and all were captured by the crew of the
Cyane.
Du Pont, having learned that there was a Mexican gunboat further up the Gulf of
California, pressed northward, intent on declaring the blockade to other ports in the area.
They anchored “off the Church Mission of Loretto (sic),” 59 and Rowan was sent ashore
to inquire there if anyone had seen the Mexican gunboat. Rowan wrote that they learned
that there were in fact two gunboats, the Anahuac and the Sonorense, and that “they were
either at Muleje or Guaymas.” 60 After checking at Muleje and finding nothing, they
headed for the port of Guaymas, which they reached around sunset. “We saw some
troops of the line drawn down and evidently much excitement amongst the people; the
women and children all fled and lined the faces of the surrounding hills. We found both
Gun Boats in the harbour, one was dismantled and hauled up on the beach, the other was
partially so.” 61
The next morning, Rowan went ashore with a flag of truce to meet with the
Mexican commandant, carrying a letter from Du Pont which demanded the surrender of
the gunboats, and threatened to fire on the town if the demand was not met. A message
was sent to Du Pont the next day from the Mexican commander, “stating that he could
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not with honor as a soldier give up the Boats.

62

Several people on shore had requested

of Du Pont some time to remove their property from the area so that it would not be
damaged by fire from the Cyane. Rowan wrote that “Our gallant Captain gave them one
hour and no more,” 63 but soon after they were given this answer, the Cyane was fired
upon by the town. The guns from the town were silenced by those of the ship, and a
small crew was sent in to fire the two gunboats. Du Pont sent another message ashore,
stating that the town would be left alone if he was not further provoked, and they were
quiet for the rest of the Cyane’s stay in the harbor.
Soon after this, Du Pont sailed for Mazatlan, where they remained into the month
of November. They had expected a store ship from New York to bring them supplies, but
no such vessel had been sighted. Rowan wrote that despite this they remained at
Mazatlan until “we were reduced to 8 ounces of bread dust and that destroyed by weavels
(sic), with a corresponding short allowance of other parts of the ration and only forty days
at this reduced rate and fifty days water.” 64 The average passage from Mazatlan to San
Francisco, the nearest port at which they could expect to be supplied, was thirty days. It
was with this in mind that Du Pont reluctantly raised the blockade in the Gulf of
California and sailed for San Blas, where they hoped to meet the Portsmouth. Finding no
other American ships there, they returned to Mazatlan, where they learned from a French
Corvette that had sailed from San Francisco that the American forces stationed at Los
Angeles had capitulated to the Mexicans. 65
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Du Pont assumed that this uprising was the reason for the lack of supplies, and
decided to continue to San Francisco. They stopped in San Jose, where they met an
American merchant who had been run out of Mazatlan, who informed them that “the
people of Lower Calafornia were friendly and would supply us with fresh Beef and
Vegetables.” 66 They accepted the offer gratefully, and once they had taken on fresh
water and food enough for ten days, they continued on to San Francisco.
To the north in Upper California, Jose Maria Flores, a captain in the Mexican
army, had collected a band of native Californians and led them in a revolt against the
occupational forces of the United States in September. The U.S. forces were small in
number and scattered along the coast, due both to Stockton’s underestimation of Mexican
zeal and strength and to a lack of manpower. Los Angeles, which would prove one of the
most difficult cities to maintain control of, was the site of the first battle between
Mexican and U.S. forces during the revolt. Captain Flores clashed with Lieutenant
Archibald H. Gillespie of the United States Marine Corp, who had been ordered to hold
the city with a 48-man garrison from the battalion of Californian volunteers led by
Fremont. 67 Gillespie was left with no option but surrender, but Flores allowed Gillespie
and his men to withdraw a few days later. The city of Santa Barbara was also abandoned
by the U.S. forces soon after Los Angeles fell.
Historian K. Jack Bauer blames the loss of Los Angeles on Stockton: “his policy
of stationing small garrisons in the midst of highly inflammable, recently conquered, and
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disgruntled populations was as unwise psychologically as it was militarily.”
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This

blunder was due as much to a lack of manpower than anything else, but it pales in
comparison to the accusation that follows it. Stockton’s choice of Gillespie, an officer
with a reputation for being overbearing and completely lacking in diplomacy, to head the
troops left there was “inexcusable,” and the choice of men to leave under his control even
more so. “Had Stockton garrisoned Los Angeles with Marines or sailors, however poorly
they might have been suited to the task, there would not have been the friction that the
strutting and drunken Bear Flaggers created.” 69
The first attempt to retake Los Angeles failed miserably. Captain William
Mervine, who had come from San Pedro with 225 men from the frigate Savannah when
he heard of the revolt in Los Angeles, joined forces with Gillespie and made an attempt
on the city. They were repelled by a cavalry force that was equipped with a cannon—a
luxury that Mervine and Gillespie did not enjoy. 70 Rowan states that Mervine was aware
of the fact that the Mexican forces were equipped with artillery, and made a conscious
decision to not take any of his own. The officers asked him to take a field piece, but he
refused, saying, “We will surround their artillery and take it.” 71 The Mexican forces,
being mounted, were much more mobile than the Americans, however, and in the end
Mervine’s men were so harangued by the cavalry that they turned back. Rowan states
that as soon as he was back on his ship, “off he went with his tail between his legs like a
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well whipped dog.”

72

He wrote that he believed Mervine was a brave man, but lacked

common sense. A few days later, the Congress arrived, bearing Commodore Stockton,
who was so displeased with Mervine’s conduct “that he ordered him to San Francisco to
prepare for home.” 73
After having such an easy time capturing Los Angeles the first time around, the
ease with which the U.S. troops were driven back by the Mexicans shocked them. The
next attack on the city would not be so assuming. Commodore Stockton planned an
attack on Los Angeles that would bring the United States forces down on her from two
directions. Fremont, at the head of his battalion, moved south from Santa Barbara while
Stockton moved north from San Diego. Accompanying his naval brigade was also a
force led by Colonel Steven W. Kearny, which had marched overland all the way from
Kansas. Together, the force amounted to over 600 men, and was equipped with four
cannon. Lieutenant Rowan, who had marched 110 men from the Cyane inland to join
their forces, was appointed acting Major of the battalion of sailors and Marines that made
up a large part of the force. 74
The Californians under Flores at Los Angeles numbered 450 men, and had two
cannon in their possession. Flores sent a messenger to Stockton, bearing a letter in which
he signed himself “Commander in Chief and Governor of Calafornia” and demanding
that Stockton withdraw from the field. Rowan wrote that the letter also stated that “he
and his troops would be buried in the ruins of their country sooner than submit to the
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tyranny of the agents of the United States.”
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The Commodore replied with his own

message, “denouncing Flores as a rebel in arms and that if he caught him he would shoot
him, promising at the same time pardon to all others who came in and delivered up their
arms and promised to be quiet in the future.” 76 Flores made no reply, and both forces
readied themselves for what would be one of the most decisive battles during the war in
California, 77 the Battle of San Gabriel, which took place on January 8, 1847.
Flores had intended to intercept Stockton’s force at La Jaborneria Ford on the San
Gabriel River, but scouts sent out by the Commodore discovered their planned ambush,
and they moved to cross at Bartolo Ford instead. 78 Flores discovered their plan quickly,
however, and the Mexican cavalry were in place to meet them before they even began to
cross. He placed his field pieces on some hills overlooking the river, spread his cavalry
out, and waited.
The American forces were formed in a hollow square, Rowan noted, with the
baggage, and ammunition wagons and livestock inside, a formation Rowan called a
“Yankee Corral.” 79 Flores made an attempt to break the formation, but it failed. 80 He
also directed his artillery to fire on the Americans as they prepared to cross the river.
Had their ammunition been better, this could have been devastating, but their powder was
of poor quality and their cannonballs even worse—most of them did not even fit the
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barrels of the guns.

81

As the Americans neared the river, they noted the positions of the enemy’s forces,
and Stockton made the somewhat rash decision to ford the river despite Flores’
advantageous position. Stockton ordered Rowan to “bring a company from the rear for
the purpose of dragging our artillery across,” 82 and then Stockton ordered the entire force
across the river without arranging any covering fire. 83 Despite the sandy river bottom
(and the lack of horses, requiring the men haul the guns) and the enemy fire, the first
guns were quickly across and were brought to bear on Flores’ forces on the hills. “One of
the enemy’s guns was soon disabled and their fire appeared to slacken…two other pieces
were added to our park which compelled the enemy to withdraw their artillery to avoid
losing them.” 84
Once the whole force was across, it advanced in formation onto the plain. Flores’
cavalry attacked from two directions, Rowan wrote, but the formation held, and Stockton,
who was commanding the guns, drove them back with the heat of his fire. Flores was
driven from his vantage point by the American riflemen, and Stockton ordered the force
forward to take the position. 85 Flores attempted a few more half-hearted attacks on the
American force’s flanks, but eventually withdrew toward Los Angeles.
Rowan wrote with pride of the steadiness of the men, despite the heavy enemy
fire and the repeated cavalry charges. He also noted that “between the columns of the
main body we had 16 ox carts, four oxen in each, 40 pack mules and 200 head of cattle,
81
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and we did not allow one to escape.”
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The Americans, Rowan continued, camped that

night on the position Flores had held as they forded the river.
Stockton’s battle-plan, despite its success, showed his lack of tactical experience
on land. He was a naval commander, and he had little experience leading land assaults.
His force was primarily one of sailors who were also more accustomed to war at sea.
The casualties suffered by the American side numbered only two killed and nine
wounded, but given the situation it could have been far worse. Bauer cites his decision to
force his way across the river in the face of the enemy as his greatest mistake, due to the
fact that his men were incapable of returning fire until they were all the way across,
leaving them vulnerable. “Had the Californians been able to deliver accurate fire, they
could have wrought havoc among the American infantry as it forded the river.” 87 To his
credit, however, Rowan maintained that Stockton himself had waded into the water and
had helped to drag their artillery across the ford. 88
The following day, the Battle of La Mesa took place, named for the plain on
which it was fought. Though Flores had lost few men at the battle the day before, many
had since deserted. 89 Stockton advanced his men across the plain, choosing to have his
men parallel the main road instead of marching on it. A ravine ran along the plain, and
Flores had positioned his army to take full advantage of it. He had his artillery spaced
out along the ravine, and when Stockton’s force was within range, they opened fire. “At
10 OC AM the enemy appeared on our right, and soon opened three pieces of artillery on
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us from different position in gulches. This fire retarded our movements very much,
and as fast as we dislodged the enemy from one position he would by means of his fine
horses gallop off with his cannon and place it in other desirable positions.” 90
They continued to press forward, driving Flores back as they went, returning fire
as they were able. Flores ordered his artillery to take up a position across the road as
Stockton’s force approached, and concentrated his fire on the front of the square.
Stockton called for a halt, and positioned his own guns forward in response, and kept up a
heavy fire until Flores was forced to retreat about fifteen minutes later. 91 At that point,
Flores was almost completely out of powder, rendering his guns useless, and ordered a
cavalry attack on the square, but Stockton suffered no such lack of firepower, and
dispersed the charge when they were within eighty yards. 92 Recognizing the futility of
continued resistance, Flores retreated. Stockton’s force camped that night in full view of
Los Angeles. 93
During the Battle of La Mesa there was only one death among the American
forces, and five wounded, one of whom was Rowan, who was caught across his right
shoulder blade by a musket ball. 94 The wound disabled his arm for about a week, and he
was fully recovered within a few weeks without having gone off duty. 95
The following morning, as they approached Los Angeles, a rider met them from
the town bearing a flag of truce, and said they were prepared to surrender if Stockton
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would give his word that their lives would be spared and their property unharmed.

96

Stockton accepted the terms and the American forces again occupied Los Angeles, and
“with his own hands, Gillespie raised over the Government House the flag he had hauled
down when he surrendered almost four months previously.” 97 Three days later, what
remained of Flores’ army came upon Fremont’s forces as the latter rode, once again too
late to help, to Los Angeles.
The Treaty of Cahuenga was drawn up between the parties and signed by
representatives from both the United States and the defeated Californians. 98 Though the
treaty’s terms were virtually identical to ones that Stockton had earlier refused, and the
treaty itself could have legally been declared unbinding, Stockton and Kearney had no
choice but to honor it, since by the time word of it reached them its conditions were
already being put into practice by the Californians. Regardless of the treaty’s somewhat
abnormal origins, the war in Alta California was over—and the United States had won.
Soon after this, the difficulties between Commodore Stockton and General
Kearney, which had been previously concealed by the need to cooperate, became
unmistakable. They quarreled over who was in supreme command, with Stockton
claiming he had been longer on that station and had established the civil government, and
Kearney claiming his express orders from Washington overruled all else. 99 In the end,
Kearney decided to leave Los Angeles and headed for Monterey, leaving Stockton in
charge in Los Angeles. Just before Kearney left, Stockton asked Rowan if he would
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travel back to the United States overland as a bearer of dispatches, and, “believing it to
be service of importance combined with novelty and adventure as well as attended with
some danger, I thoughtlessly accepted.” 100 He was to accompany the infamous Kit
Carson, and would depart from San Diego.
Rowan regretted his agreement, however, when Stockton then ordered the Cyane
to take General Kearney to Monterey, and Rowan was left behind. “The day the Cyane
left I never regretted any act of my life more than the hasty step I had taken in leaving a
ship where my association was of the most agreeable kind and a commander who is the
most agreeable gentleman I have ever been associated with. I felt deep melancholy when
the little Cyane disappeared.” 101
The trip overland was delayed, and Rowan, having reconsidered, asked Stockton
to withdraw his orders to head back to the states overland, and return him to the Cyane.
Stockton granted the request, and a replacement for him was easily found. Rowan
remained in San Diego until May “without being able to communicate with Capt. Du
Pont or learn whether my situation in the Cyane had been permanently filled or not.” 102
Soon after Stockton revoked his orders, Commander W. Bradford Shubrick arrived with
orders to relieve Stockton. In May, Shubrick sent for Rowan and asked him if he would
bear dispatches from San Diego to Commodore James Biddle in Monterey. 103 Rowan
quickly accepted, hoping to reunite with his crew from the Cyane.
Shubrick gave him the necessary documents, and Rowan left on May 13, 1847.
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Rowan overtook a party at the Mission of San Buenaventura which was also headed
for Monterey and which included Lieutenant Colonel Fremont, and they traveled most of
the rest of the way together. 104 The day they were to have reached Monterey, they
stopped for a late breakfast at a mission farm some 45 miles from their destination, and
Fremont decided to remain there until the next day. 105 Rowan desired to reach the port as
soon as possible however, and so he left Fremont and his party early in the afternoon and
pressed on. “After very hard riding I found myself on the wharf in Monterey half an hour
before sun down. I took advantage of the first boat and went on board the Flag Ship
Columbus, Commodore Biddle, who received me in his cabin and having read my
dispatches, we entered into conversation, he took me for a Volunteer officer.” 106 The
date was May 19; Rowan had made the journey from Point Lomas, outside of San Diego,
to Monterey—a journey of 650 miles—in seven days. This was accomplished by
relaying his mounts. Horses were plentiful along the coast of California, and the
Californians were friendly to travelers. Whenever his mount began to flag, he would
trade it for a fresh one.
Biddle assigned Rowan to temporary service on the Warren under Captain Hale
until the Cyane returned to Monterey. “I found the Warren in the most dilapidated state,
but succeeded in putting her in better trim in a short time.” 107 He was thus engaged when
Stockton arrived and, having decided to return to the states overland himself, he applied
to Biddle to take Rowan with him. Biddle granted the request, but rescinded when he
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learned of Rowan’s desire to rejoin the Cyane.

108

The Cyane anchored in the harbor of

Monterey on July 27, and the following day Rowan rejoined his vessel. 109
Though they had effectively lost both Texas and California, Mexico was not
about to admit defeat. Upper California had capitulated, but not so Baja. Though
Stockton had taken measures to ensure that the peninsula was included in the blockade, it
had otherwise been virtually ignored by the U.S. Navy. Now, with Alta California
defeated, Stockton turned his eye on the peninsula. Though he was relieved by Shubrick
before he could put any plans into play, Shubrick continued naval operations along the
coast. On February 17, 1847, he sent the Portsmouth to reestablish the blockade of the
Mexican coast at Mazatlan. 110 On March 30, the port of San Jose del Cabo was occupied
by Lieutenant Benjamin F. B. Hunter and a landing party from the sloop Portsmouth
consisting of 140 men. The men from the Portsmouth then sent a marine detachment to
occupy the village of San Lucas on April 3, and Lieutenant John S. Missroon led a
landing party north to take La Paz, the capital of Baja California, on April 13. 111
Later that same month, the Cyane and her crew returned to their duties on the
blockade in the Gulf of California. They were stationed at the mouth of the Gulf, sailing
back and forth between Mazatlan and San Jose del Cabo, and for some months, the
Cyane was the only vessel on blockade in that area. 112
Action in Baja was limited for the next few months, but the U.S. struck again at
the beginning of October. On the first of the month, Lieutenant T.A.M. Craven and a
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party of 50 men landed from the sloop Dale, commanded by Thomas O. Selfridge, and
occupied the village of Muleje, which held a Mexican garrison. Four days later, Craven
and his landing party seized three cannon and other arms and ammunition from the
village of Loreto. 113
In an effort to strengthen the American foothold in the area, on November 4
Shubrick announced the intention of the United States to keep the territory of Baja
California once the war was over. As a result, many Mexican citizens cooperated with
American forces. When the war was over and the United States made no claim on Baja,
many of these people were force from their homes and had to flee to the United States. 114
Later that same month, Mazatlan, Mexico’s most important and powerful western
port, fell to the United States. Captain Elie A.F. La Vallette of the Congress led a
landing party consisting of men from his own ship, those of the Independence, and of the
Cyane, altogether amounting to 730 men, into the Pacific port. Rowan, under the
command of Du Pont, helped land a field piece from the Cyane and commanded the left
wing of their company. 115 The combined force occupied Mazatlan without much
trouble. 116
Though the city remained in U.S. hands for the duration of the war, multiple
skirmishes occurred near it. Lieutenants Stephen C. Rowan and George L. Selden landed
parties near Urias, about ten miles south of Mazatlan, just before dawn on November 20.
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Rowan’s party landed within one hundred yards of the enemy’s sentinels,

117

and

together the two parties attacked and defeated the Mexican company in Urias at first
light. 118 A little less than a month later, on December 12, Lieutenant Montgomery Lewis
attacked and dispersed another band of Mexicans just after nightfall. The very next day,
the last engagement in the area occurred when Lieutenant William W. Russell, leading a
patrol of 20 marines, came upon a group of Mexicans at Palos Prietos and scattered
them. 119
On the same day that Mazatlan fell, Captain Manuel Pineda of the Mexican army
headed a revolt in Baja. He and his men attempted an assault on the garrison at La Paz,
but were unsuccessful. They attempted again less than a week later, but were once more
repelled. On the 19th, after their two failed attempts on La Paz, Pineda turned his forces
south and attacked San Jose del Cabo. A garrison of U.S. marines commanded by
Lieutenant Charles Heywood had been stationed there barely ten days before by
Shubrick, just before he left to move on Mazatlan. They were besieged by Pineda and his
men in a mission compound, and most likely would have been compelled to surrender,
had it not been for two whaling ships that were sighted on the horizon by the
Mexicans. 120 They incorrectly assumed the vessels were U.S. warships coming to
relieve Heywood and his men, and retreated.
Pineda again attacked San Jose del Cabo the following January. Though
Heywood’s forces had been supplemented by the addition of almost thirty more men, the
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attacking Mexicans were still able to lay siege to the garrison a second time

121

. It was

not until mid February that the siege was lifted, when Commander Du Pont, aboard the
Cyane, arrived with reinforcements. They arrived too late in the day to land their forces,
but they lowered their boats and armed them during the night, and at daylight the next
day Du Pont landed a party of 110 men, under the immediate command of Lieutenant
Rowan, at daybreak. They marched the better part of a mile before the enemy opened
fire on them, but, Rowan notes, they were “concealed on the chaparral and sugar fields
and overshot us in [their] desire to avoid exposure.” 122 As they neared the garrison,
Lieutenant Heywood at the head of about thirty of his men came to meet them, and after
the enemy had withdrawn, “the two little forces united to exchange congratulations.” 123
Rowan wrote that when they arrived, the supplies of the besieged men had dwindled to a
scant eight days’ worth, and that Heywood had begun to make preparations for
destroying anything of military value preparatory for a surrender. 124
Very little resistance was offered to American forces on the west coast after these
events. The Cyane continued in her duties on the blockade, awaiting news of the end of
the war. At the beginning of May, Rowan wrote, “Kept our water filled and provisions
full in hopes that we should receive orders from home. Our men’s times s expiring daily,
but as yet not a murmur has escaped them.” 125 The war had technically been over for
months, but word had not yet reached the Pacific Squadron. It was not until early June,
while the Cyane was off San Blas, that they finally received news of the end of the war
121

Ibid., 349.
Rowan Papers, M180, vol. 4, 283.
123
Ibid., vol. 3, 82.
124
Ibid., vol. 3, 83.
125
Ibid., vol. 3, 90-1.
122

57
and were ordered home.

126

At the beginning of February, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo was ratified by
the United States Senate. On March 10, representatives for both the United States and
Mexico signed the treaty in a village outside of Mexico City. 127 Mexico recognized the
boundary of the U.S.-Mexico border as the Rio Grande, conceding Texas as United States
territory. In addition to this, however, the treaty also ceded to the U.S. a substantial
amount of territory outside of Texas, including all of what is now California, Arizona,
Nevada, and Utah, plus parts of New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. The United
States was required by the treaty to pay Mexico fifteen million dollars—an amount they
had once offered Mexico for California alone—and agreed to forgive all financial claims
of American citizens against the Mexican government. Historian Otis A. Singletary
notes that many people at the time (many still do) referred to this as “conscience money,”
and stated that it “seemed to confirm the ugliest charges of those who had denounced the
war as a cynical, calculated despoiling of the Mexican state, a greedy land-grab from a
neighbor too weak to defend herself.” 128
In a war that was arguably unprovoked, the United States had acquired nearly half
of one of its neighbor’s territory, adding greatly to its own “empire.” In its bid to lay
claim to enough land to satisfy—at least temporarily—its desire to “manifest its destiny,”
the United States had waged a war against a country that it should have been able to
sympathize with. After casting off the yoke of Spain, Mexico was in a situation
comparable to that of the States only a few decades before. The United States, however,
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was intent on preserving its own interests, and that included acquiring the fertile lands
of Texas and the Pacific ports of California. Though opposition to the war was voiced
within its own capital, the war garnered enough support that it was fought almost entirely
with volunteers.
The United States acquired a little more than they had bargained for, however.
The question of whether or not slavery would be legalized in the new territory was one
that had political factions at one another’s throats. This new dimension to an already
bitter argument would serve only to accelerate the inevitable end of civil war. Ulysses S.
Grant, who fought in both the Mexican and the Civil Wars, characterized the former as
“one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation,” 129 and viewed
the latter as a kind of divine retribution for it. “Nations, like individuals, are punished for
their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war
of modern time.” 130
The role of the U.S. Navy in the Mexican-American War is often downplayed,
sidelined in favor of Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. Most schoolchildren will at
least recognize the name of Santa Anna, but how many would recognize Robert F.
Stockton’s or David Conner’s? Numerous historians have claimed that the Navy’s role in
the war was negligible, and that the United States could have won the war even had the
Navy done nothing. A closer look at the role the Navy did play, however, reveals it to be
of great value. While there is no way to prove that it was integral, it is certainly clear that
the Navy helped the US to a speedier victory than it otherwise would have had. At the
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very beginning of the war—before, in fact—the Navy was ready to move on Mexico.
Very quickly after the outbreak of war, the Navy had blockaded most of the
important ports on the East coast, and the West coast also soon fell under its advance. In
addition to preventing the Mexicans from using their ships to transport troops and
supplies, the Navy also participated in the war on land, joining forces with the Marines
and the Army. Much of the action that took place along the west coast and in inland
California was fought primarily by naval forces, despite their lack of experience and
expertise in such campaigns. It would have been much easier for Mexico to field a
sizable army against the U.S. forces in Texas had it not been fighting battles along its
coasts, and men and supplies would have been much easier to move from place to place
had not their ports been blockaded. California could very likely not have been a part of
the equation at all at the end of the war, had not the Navy played such a vital role in
securing the ports along the length of her coast. The Navy also helped the small army
contingent in its engagements inland—aid that was sorely needed. The capture of so
many cities—Monterey, San Francisco, San Diego, Mazatlan—along the western coasts
of California and other Mexican territories, not to mention the role the Navy played in the
Gulf of Mexico, should not be overlooked so easily.
By the time Rowan returned from the Mexican War, he had spent the past two
decades in the service of the Navy, almost all at sea. After the Mexican War, starting in
February 1849, Rowan’s career took a new direction. He served as the Assistant
Inspector at the Navy Yard in New York for three years. The US Navy during the period
between the War of 1812’s end and the Mexican War’s conclusion had experienced not
only the age of geographical exploration but also the era of technological innovations.

60
Owing to the Industrial Revolution, technological change was the order of the day.
Steam and more powerful armaments were but two advances which would shape the US
Navy in the years before (and during) the American Civil War.
In little more than a decade after the Mexican War, the consequence of the US
defeat of Mexico—annexing nearly one half of Mexico—would lead to bitter regional
conflict. But until the momentous events of 1860-1861 divided the country, Rowan
continued his travels abroad. In 1854, Rowan sailed on the Relief to Rio de Janeiro
twice. His journal entries are reduced to record keeping regarding the weather and the
state of the current, along with details on specific location, giving latitude and longitude.
Having had previous experiences on the same route, he made observations on the best
route to take at specific times of the year. On reaching Brazil on the first trip, he wrote in
his notes that they “anchored in Rio de Janeiro in 46 days from New York, which was
considered a fine passage for so dull a ship as the Relief.” 131
Upon their return to New York, he was granted leave and hastened to Fort Wayne,
Indiana, to be with his wife, who was pregnant. He arrived there in early April, worried
that he would be called back for service before the birth of his child “but thank God I was
there and all went well and she is now the happy mother of a fine Boy.” 132 His wife gave
birth on the 25th to their first and only child, a son they named Hamilton, after having had
three miscarriages. Less than a week later, Rowan received orders to return to New
York, and he left his wife and son on May 2nd, to make another trip to Rio. He ceased to
write in his journal until the beginning of the Civil War.
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THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR

At the beginning of the Civil War, the United States Navy was not in any position
to enforce a blockade the likes of which President Lincoln very quickly declared. In
March of 1861, the navy had only 90 ships, most of which were in laid up in the Navy
Yards, unserviceable, or serving as receiving ships. Only 42 were actually in
commission. Of these, nineteen were wooden sailing vessels, relying solely on wind
power, and some were very old—more than a few had served in the War of 1812. The 23
remaining were steamers. Thirty of the ships in commission were showing the flag in
foreign waters, scattered across the globe in Africa, Asia, and South America. Four were
off the coast of Florida, one confined to the waters of the Great Lakes. Of the seven
remaining, only four were in Northern waters at the outbreak of the war, three at New
York and one at Washington. 1 When Lincoln declared a blockade to be in place on the
Confederacy, the South—and the nations of Europe—justifiably responded with scorn.
The rebellious states had a coastline of over 3,500 miles; it would have been impossible
even if all of the Navy’s ships had been available.
Most of the officers were long past their prime, moving up through the ranks with
a system that based promotions on seniority—if a man served long enough, he was
promoted whether he was a good officer or not. Resources were limited; consequently
officers, instead of working together for the greater good of the service, were more often
than not pitted against one another, seeking to fulfill their own agendas, which
unfortunately were frequently more about personal promotion than anything else.
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Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, would encounter many obstacles in
his endeavor to provide Lincoln with the Navy the President needed. Conflicting
commands and presidential orders caused confusion and delay in the opening phase of
the conflict, as seen in the events leading up to the firing on Fort Sumter.
The lack of vessels was rectified much more quickly than anyone thought
possible; several ships were called home from foreign service, and the ones that were
having work done on them in the navy yards were quickly turned out, including five
modern steam frigates, all less than a decade old, which were among the most powerful
vessels in the world. These included the USS Minnesota, which mounted 47 guns. "In
the war's first months, anything that could float, move, and carry a cannon without
capsizing was bought and pressed into service: yachts, Staten Island ferry boats, tugs,
fishing craft, whalers, even garbage scows.” 2 The strange conglomeration of vessels may
have appeared a bit ridiculous, but it served its purpose.
When Abraham Lincoln was elected to be President of the United States on
November 6, 1860, Rowan wrote in his journal of the sentiments in the South, and noted
that many states were on the verge of seceding from the Union because of Lincoln’s
stance as an abolitionist. 3 In the months leading up to the outbreak of the Civil War,
many officers from Southern states requested positions on foreign waters;
“That class of officers who at such a time sought duties in the Pacific and on
foreign stations were considered, prima facie, as in sympathy with the
2
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Secessionists, but yet not prepared to give up their commissions and abandon
the Government. No men were more fully aware that a conflict was impending,
and that, if hostilities commenced and they were within the call of the
Department, they would be required to participate. Hence a disposition to evade
an unpleasant dilemma by going away was not misunderstood.” 4
Rowan feared that war was inevitable, and desired to serve his country if it came
to that. Thus, on January 8, 1861, Rowan wrote to Welles, requesting to be considered
for sea service, and specifically for the command of the USS Pawnee (Fig. 3), whose
pervious commander had applied to be relieved. 5 Welles granted him the command of the
Pawnee and ordered him to the Navy Yard at Philadelphia to report to Captain Du Pont
for command of that ship. Rowan wrote to Welles on Jan 18, reporting his arrival at the
Navy Yard. Owing to the concern that Southerners might attempt to prevent

Fig 3: USS Pawnee
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Lincoln’s inauguration, plans were made to have at least one vessel on hand at the
Washington Navy Yard for the ceremony. 6 Rowan was selected to perform this duty. 7
Welles wasted no time in scraping together resources for his Navy. He was
competing with other braches of government and the military for funds and supplies, and
often butting heads with the Secretary of State, William Seward. Seward believed that
the new president, inexperienced as he was in high-ranking politics, needed help
assigning duties and giving orders to the other cabinet secretaries, including Welles. He
also believed that as Secretary of State, it was both his duty and his right to do so. “The
secretary of state, always confident of his own judgment in any realm, viewed Welles as
a ponderous bumpkin and believed that his interference was justified.” 8
Lincoln and Seward agreed on many things, but their policies on how best to deal
with the rebellious South differed greatly. Before the outbreak of war, Lincoln had done
his best to mollify the southern states without abandoning his principles, and had avoided
doing anything that would seemingly justify their secession—or give the undecided
border states reason to leave the Union. Lincoln had vowed that if war were to break out
over the issue, he would not be the first to shed blood. But as historian David Donald
writes, Lincoln had also vowed that he would not surrender the forts. The South was not
prepared to compromise on what they believed to be their rights, however, and so they
had vowed to retain the forts. “The only resolution of these contradictory positions was

6

Ibid., vol. 3, 131.
Ibid., vol. 4, 284.
8
William M. Fowler, Jr., Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil
War (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2001), 37.
7

65
9

for the confederates to fire the first shot;” they did just that. It appeared that there was
no road left save war, and the South would have to be the aggressor.
Much of Lincoln’s staff agreed with him on the issue of the South, although some
believed that Lincoln was acting too firmly to ever allow reconciliation without
bloodshed. Seward believed that more delicacy was needed in order to pacify the states
that were still wavering between the two sides. He was also openly opposed to the idea
of war and believed that, with diplomacy and tact, it was possible to bring the Southern
states back into the Union fold. While Lincoln agreed that it was a sensitive situation, the
issue of slavery was not one that he was willing to sidestep. Seward made efforts to
“bring the president around to his way of thinking,” and one in particular was, essentially,
an attempt “to subvert Welles’ position in the Navy Department.” 10
This became inescapably clear to Welles when, on the night of April 1, 1861,
Lincoln’s personal secretary brought him an executive order bearing the president’s
signature regarding the creation of the Bureau of Detail and the assignment of Captain
Samuel Barron as its head. 11 The filling of this position effectively reduced Welles’ role
to a mere advisor, and Welles was understandably upset. Upon questioning the president
on the order, however, it was revealed that Lincoln had no memory of giving the order
for the creation of a new naval bureau, let alone assigning someone to head it. He
admitted to Welles that earlier in the day he had signed a stack of papers submitted to
him by Seward without reading them. Welles, of course, believed Lincoln when the

9

David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 293.
Stephen R. Taafe, Commanding Lincoln’s Navy: Union Naval Leadership During the
Civil War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 5.
11
Welles, 27.
10

66
president told him that he would never seek to undermine the authority of a man he
trusted and respected as he did Welles, and Lincoln revoked the order without hesitation.
Seward’s belief that he had the authority to give the other cabinet heads orders
without consulting with Lincoln fostered resentment in many of the other staff. Welles
was no exception. The attempted relief of Fort Sumter further divided Seward and
Welles.
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ROWAN’S OBSERVATIONS ON EVENTS SURROUNDING FORT SUMTER

Lincoln, in his inaugural address, professed to the nation his intention of retaining
the properties in the South that were owned by the Federal government—including the
military forts and bases. The South objected, having already occupied several of these
places and fortifying them further. Major Richard Anderson, a Union Army officer
commanding the forces at Charleston, South Carolina, had been forced in December to
abandon Fort Moultrie and move all of his forces to Fort Sumter, which was located on
an island in the harbor. 1 When Major Anderson notified the government that he was
running low on supplies and would eventually have to surrender the fort, initial responses
were varied. An attempt was made in January to get reinforcements and supplies to Fort
Sumter, but failed when the little chartered steamer Star of the West was fired upon by
South Carolina forces on Morris Island. 2 The steamer returned to New York still bearing
the supplies and soldiers. The legislature of South Carolina announced less than a week
later that any further attempt by the U.S. government to reinforce or supply Fort Sumter
would be regarded as an act of war. 3
Many believed that an attempt to hold Fort Sumter would fail, including several
high-ranking military officers such as Winfield Scott. The idea of simply surrendering
the fort to the rebels, however, was abhorrent to Lincoln. As a result, when Gustavus
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Fox, a former naval officer and future assistant secretary of the navy, came forward
with a plan of attack that just might work, Lincoln approved of his plan and began
attempting to sway others in favor of the enterprise. Fox, who had participated in the
U.S. Coast Survey and knew the area, proposed landing 300 men from armed transports
at night, and having them carry supplies into the fort. The landing would be covered
from the harbor by Navy warships. 4 After delaying a decision until April 4, 1861,
Lincoln notified Fox that the expedition was to take place, and that he was being placed
in command. They had to move quickly, because Major Anderson had notified the
government that he would run out of supplies and be forced to surrender the fort on the
15th of April. 5
Welles had believed that the mission would be approved, and he had already set
himself to finding the ships and officers best suited (and most available) for the endeavor.
On March 29 Lincoln sent a message to Welles, ordering “The Pocahontas at Norfolk,
Pawnee at Washington, and revenue cutter Harriet Lane at New York, to be ready for sea
with one months (sic) stores.” 6 No mention is made of the Powhatan, the ship that would
lay at the heart of the conflict. Welles made the necessary orders to the heads of the
Navy Yards, and also telegrammed the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard to “Fit
out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment,” 7 overriding his previous
orders taking her out of commission. On the 30th of March, Lincoln gave permission to
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Fox to begin preparations, “but to make no binding engagements.” On the 5 of
April, Welles wrote to G.J. Pendergrast, Flag Officer and commander of the Home
Squadron, notifying him that the Powhatan, Captain Samuel Mercer, the Pawnee,
Commander Stephen C. Rowan, and the Pocahontas, Commander J.P. Gillis, were being
temporarily withdrawn from the Home Squadron and from his command for special
service by order of the president. 9 Welles wrote to Captain Mercer, giving him orders in
regard to the expedition and placing him in command of the naval forces under the
supervision of the War Department and Captain Fox.10 Welles asked Lincoln to review
the orders, which the president approved immediately before Welles sent them to
Mercer. 11 Welles wrote also to Commanders Rowan and Gillis, but their instructions
were much more abbreviated. They were to leave from the Navy Yard in time to reach
Charleston Bar, ten miles due east of the lighthouse, on the 11th of April, and report to
Captain Mercer. If he was not yet there, they were to await his arrival. 12
On the 1st of April, unbeknownst to Welles, confidential instructions were sent to
David Porter, U.S. Navy, from President Lincoln at the recommendation of Seward,
ordering him to take command of the Powhatan “or any other United States steamer
ready for sea which he may deem most fit” 13 and prepare to go to sea. An executive
order that the commandant of the New York Navy Yard received on April 1, 1861, read:
“SIR: You will fit out the Powhatan without delay. Lieutenant Porter will relieve
8
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Captain Mercer in command of her. She is bound on secret service, and you will under
no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department the fact that she is fitting out.” 14
The order was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. Another order, also bearing the
president’s signature, was delivered to Captain Mercer, informing him that he was being
detached from the Powhatan so that it would be available for special service. 15
The two sets of contradictory orders threw the operation into confusion, especially
since one set stated that the individual giving the other set of orders was not to be alerted
to the fact that contradictory orders had been issued. The commandant of the Navy Yard,
Commander Andrew Foote, continued to prepare the Powhatan, uncertain which set of
orders would take precedent and who would be in command of the vessel. Despite the
orders that he was not to hear of Porter taking control of the Powhatan, Welles sensed
that something was not quite right, despite having met with Lincoln on the 4th, and on the
5th he ordered the Powhatan to remain in the Navy Yard until clear orders were given . 16
Lieutenant David Porter, ordered by President Lincoln to take command of the
Powhatan, became aware of the orders made to Mercer. On the same day Welles ordered
the Powhatan to remain in the Navy Yard, he sent a letter to Commander Foote, asking
whether or not Foote believed Welles would “dare to countermand an order (written
order) of the President? Meigs and myself… think it impossible.” 17 He concluded that
he would remain overnight telegraphing in an attempt to get to the bottom of the matter,
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since “[s]o much depends on having no mistakes made in this matter.” He also noted
that he and Captain Meigs, in their attempt to determine what was to be done, had been
telegraphing with Seward.
On the morning of the 6th, the Powhatan was ready to sail, and awaited only
official orders declaring who was to take her, and where. Captain Mercer was standing
by in case he was to take her to Charleston, but when Porter appeared with orders given
to him directly from President Lincoln’s hand, it was decided that his must have
precedent over any others—including Welles’ orders for the ship to remain in the yard.
Porter could say nothing about the orders that had been given to him, as they were
confidential, but that Lincoln himself had given them, and that they were “too explicit to
be misunderstood.” 18 According to Footes’ letter to Welles, “Captain Meigs, Lieutenant
Porter, and Captain Mercer, after consultation, concluded that Lieutenant Porter should
go out in the Powhatan, as the arrangements were vital to success; at least so I was
informed.” 19 Thus Porter left the Navy Yard with the Powhatan.
On the night of the 6th, in the hour before midnight, Seward and his son Frederick
paid Welles a visit, bearing a telegram from Captain Meigs in New York, “stating in
effect that the movements were retarded and embarrassed by conflicting orders from the
Secretary of the Navy.” 20 At first Welles was confused, not understanding why Seward
would bring the telegram to him. When Seward told him that it was about Lieutenant
Porter and his command of the Powhatan, “I assured him that he was mistaken, that
Porter had no command, and that the Powhatan was the flagship, as he was aware, of the
18
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Sumter expedition.”

21

Seward suggested that perhaps Lincoln had discussed the matter

with Commodore Silas Stringham, and that the naval adviser had never mentioned it to
Welles as he ought to have done. Upon consulting with Stringham, however, it was
revealed that he knew nothing of Porter’s supposed command of the Powhatan, either.” 22
Knowing the matter must be solved at once, Welles insisted that they pay the president a
visit. Despite the late hour, Lincoln was still up and attending to business when the four
men arrived at the White House; he was surprised to see them. Upon learning the reason
for their visit, he was even more surprised, and after listening to both men, he asked
Welles if he might not be mistaken about the flagship of the Sumter expedition. Welles
reminded him of the orders to Mercer, which he had read and approved, and Lincoln
agreed that he had read them and consented to them, but had not remembered that the
Powhatan was the ship involved. Welles produced a copy of Mercer’s orders, and
Lincoln, “turning promptly to Mr. Seward, said that the Powhatan must be restored to
Mercer, that on no account must the Sumter expedition fail or be interfered with.” 23
Seward objected, on the grounds that the expedition to Fort Pickens was of equal
importance, and Lincoln insisted that Fort Pickens “had time and could wait, but no time
was to be lost as regarded Sumter.” 24 Lincoln ordered Seward to telegraph the Navy
Yard and have the command of the Powhatan returned to Mercer, and Seward again
delayed, arguing that it would be difficult to get a message through to the Navy Yard at
that late hour. Lincoln insisted, and Seward agreed to send the telegram. When it was
21
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sent, however, it bore Seward’s name, not Lincoln’s; Seward had already proven
himself willing to procure the President’s signature in dishonest ways, but now, when he
had Lincoln’s authorization and order, he did not issue the order in the President’s name.
It is possible that he deliberately placed his own name on the telegram, knowing that
Porter would place more weight on the previous order given to him by the president
himself. Foote stated that he sent Lieutenant F. A. Roe to attempt to overhaul the
Powhatan and give the message to Porter. 25 By the time Roe managed to run the ship
down, Porter noted Captain Mercer was no longer on board, and it was too late. Porter
continued to Fort Pickens in the Powhatan.
Welles wrote of the officer in his journal:
“Although Lieutenant Porter had gone with the Powhatan to Pensacola, there was
no order on record in the Navy Department of the facts. He was absent without
leave; the last sailing-orders to the Powhatan were [sent to] Mercer. The whole
proceeding was irregular and could admit of no justification without impeaching
the integrity or ability of the Secretaries of War and Navy.” 26

Despite the fact that Welles knew the ship had left for Florida, and that catching
up to her might not be possible, no attempt was made to inform Rowan or Gillis, and both
officers left for Charleston on the 10th, having been delayed by bad weather, with no
knowledge of the probability that the officer to whom they were supposed to report
would not be at the rendezvous point. Mercer had stated to Foote that he had given a
copy of the orders he had received from the department to Captain Faunce of the Harriet
Lane, and ordered him to continue on the Charleston. Once there, Faunce was to report
to the senior officer present and deliver the orders. Mercer relayed this information to
25
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Welles, who possibly then assumed that knowledge of the change of plans would be
apparent to everyone involved; perhaps this is the reason for the oversight.
Unfortunately, it was apparently not made clear to Faunce that, though Mercer himself
would not be coming, neither would the Powhatan. Even more confounding, no effort
was made to inform Fox himself, who was overseeing the entire endeavor, that the
Powhatan—the flagship for the operation, and the ship which was to have been carrying
300 sailors and to have provided several of the transport vessels for the men and
supplies—would no longer be at his disposal, though he also was delayed in leaving the
Navy Yard until the 9th of April.
The day after his embarrassing midnight visit to the White House, Seward sent a
particularly incriminating message to Judge Campbell, a Supreme Court Justice from
Alabama. Campbell was opposed to the idea of war, and after his state seceded he
remained in Washington, and encouraged other Southern officials to do the same, in
hopes of preventing its outbreak. He was accused on more than one occasion, however,
of having Northern leanings, due to his opposition to slavery, which he believed to be “an
outmoded and inefficient system that was economically detrimental.” 27 Campbell was
also outspoken in his stance toward the radical abolitionists, whom he believed had no
regard for states’ rights, and was wary of the political tinderbox that was Fort Sumter.
Several times Campbell wrote to Seward, who informed him each time that there were no
designs to reinforce the fort and that Lincoln would soon withdraw all Federal troops
from that place. Campbell, of course, relayed this information to the government of his
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home state (most likely through the Confederate Commissioners, Forsyth and
Crawford, with whom he was in contact), as Seward must have known he would do.
Weeks passed, however, and no move was made to remove the troops stationed there,
and tension began to mount. When Campbell heard a rumor that Federal warships were
preparing to move on the fort, he wrote again on the 6th of April to Seward, who
responded on the 7th with a message: “Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see.” 28
Rowan left the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 9th of April, but did not make it out to
sea until the 10th due to inclement weather. 29 On the morning of the 11th at 7:00 AM he
arrived off Charleston Bar “as near the position assigned me as the badness of the
weather would enable me to judge,” 30 to await Captain Mercer, whom Rowan fully
believed was on his way.
Captain Faunce of the Harriet Lane came aboard to deliver to Rowan the
communication addressed to the senior naval officer present, and Rowan opened it,
finding enclosed a copy of the orders that had been given to Captain Mercer, and a
notification from Mercer himself that he had been detached from the command of the
Powhatan. There was no indication, however, that the Powhatan herself was not coming.
Captain Fox, in command of the Baltic, came aboard the Pawnee to converse with
Captain Rowan, who showed Fox the copy of orders and the letter from Mercer. Rowan
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expressed his uncertainty over whether or not the Powhatan was coming, but Fox
insisted she was. 31
Fox showed Rowan his instructions as to the attempted relief of Fort Sumter, but
Rowan, uncertain whether his commanding officer was on his way or not, was hesitant to
leave the post to which he had been ordered to remain. He readily supplied a launch and
a cutter from his ship to help with Fox’s efforts, but he resolved to remain and await the
Powhatan. Fox and Faunce, commanding the Baltic and the Harriet Lane, respectively,
sailed in closer to Sumter to assess the situation. 32
Fox, in his report a few days later to Welles, wrote: “As we neared the land heavy
guns were heard and the smoke and shells from the batteries which had just opened fire
upon Sumter were distinctly visible.” 33 Fox sailed out to inform Rowan what was
happening, and met him coming in. In his report, Fox wrote, “[Rowan] hailed me and
asked for a pilot, declaring his intention of standing in to the harbor and sharing the fate
of his brethren of the Army.” Fox went on board the Pawnee and convinced Rowan that
no such sacrifice was expected of him from the government, and that they should go
ahead with the attempt to get supplies and men into Fort Sumter. In this, their orders had
been clear: if the Confederates would let them land supplies for Sumter peacefully, no
attempt was to be made to reinforce the fort with men. If any opposition was made, the
attempt to land both supplies and soldiers was to be made. President Lincoln had sent a
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message ahead to the authorities in Charleston, giving them prior warning of what was
going on (as he had previously promised them he would do). Fox assumed that any
attempt to land supplies under the current circumstances was surely to be met with
opposition. This was a moot point at that moment, since neither the Pawnee nor the
Harriet Lane was equipped with the boats necessary to land supplies or men in the heavy
surf—the vessels that Fox had planned to use to land men and supplies were with the
Powhatan, as were, Fox assumed, the supplies themselves. Fox had chartered three tugs
to help with landing men, the Freeborn, the Uncle Ben, and the Yankee, all of which were
supposed to meet them there with the naval forces. However, they had yet to arrive. Fox
would find out later that the Freeborn had never even left New York, and the Uncle Ben
had run afoul of the weather on the way, and had been driven into Wilmington and
captured. The Yankee would not make it to Charleston until the action was over. 34
The naval officers had successfully met up with the men from the Army that were
supposed to be transported into Sumter, led by First Lieutenants [E. McK.] Hudson and
C. W. Thomas, and Second Lieutenant Robert O. Tyler, but without the means of landing
them, Fox was at a loss as to what should be done. He was still confident that the
Powhatan was coming, however, since he had seen her leave the New York Navy Yard
on the 6th. Convinced the vessel would arrive that night, he “stood out to the appointed
rendezvous and made signals all night,” 35 leaving Rowan in the Pawnee to keep watch
over the happenings around Sumter.
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Early the next morning, a schooner was seen attempting to make its way into
Charleston Harbor, and Rowan, after firing “three or four shots across her bows” 36 in
warning, brought her to anchor alongside the Pawnee. He had feared that it was a
Confederate vessel and had passed so close to them to ascertain what they were doing,
but she proved to be a shipping vessel laden with ice. Rowan immediately determined
that the schooner would be ideal for transporting what supplies they had along with the
men of the Army, and presented his idea to Fox. The latter agreed that, in light of the
Powhatan’s absence, it was the best course of action. Lieutenant Hudson of the Army,
along with several naval officers and volunteers, were to man the vessel and go in with
Fox that night, to land under cover of darkness. Fox noted that the guns from Sumter had
scattered any naval forces the Confederates could field, with the exception of only a few
guard boats, and he maintained that “with the Powhatan a reenforcement [sic] would
have been easy.” 37
Fox and Rowan had only just determined to use the schooner to land men and
supplies when “dense smoke issued from the weather side of Fort Sumter.” 38 The guns
from inside the fort were still firing away, and “most of our military and naval officers
believed the smoke to proceed from an attempt to smoke out the garrison with fire
rafts.” 39 Within two hours, flames could be seen coming from the opposite side of the
fort from their location, and around noon “a body of flames curled far above the
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ramparts.”

40

It was clear by that time that the fort itself was on fire, and all of them

feared for Major Anderson and his men.
At around 2:00 in the afternoon, the Pocahontas finally arrived, and Captain
Gillis went aboard the Pawnee to converse with Rowan and Fox. They related to him the
circumstances, and their plan for getting supplies into Sumter. Rowan handed over the
copy of Mercer’s orders and the letter which he had received from that officer, and placed
himself under Gillis’ command as senior officer present. 41 But, as they still had no
launches fit to land in the rough water, their only option was to wait for nightfall, and
proceed with the plan to land men with the schooner, accompanied by boats and crew
from the ships if able.
Shortly after this “the flag staff on Fort Sumter was shot away and we witnessed
the sad spectacle of the fall of our flag which we were so impotent to assist.” 42 The firing
soon after this ceased, and Gillis had Rowan send an officer ashore under a flag of truce
“to communicate to the commanding officers of the batteries on shore, expressing our
desire to take off the heroic and patriotic Major Anderson and his command if they had
survived the conflagration in Fort Sumter.” 43 The officer (Lieutenant Marcy, according
to Rowan 44) returned with the reply from General Simons, in command at Cummings
Point, that Fort Sumter had surrendered, and that an answer to the request to transport
Major Anderson and his men away from Sumter would be sent the following morning to
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Cummings Point.

45

The next morning Gillis was prepared to go ashore himself and

receive it. Before he could embark, however, a steamer from Charleston approached the
Pocahontas bearing a flag of truce, and asked to communicate with the commanding
officer. Gillis asked him to come aboard, and he did so, bringing with him Lieutenant
Snyder of the U.S. Army, bearing a message from Major Anderson, “and imparted the
decision of Major Anderson to evacuate the fort, it being no longer tenable.” 46
Gillis reported the men of Anderson’s command “fought like brave men, long and
well and even in their desperate condition no surrender was made, but a highly honorable
evacuation.” 47 When Major Anderson finally agreed to evacuate the fort, he sent his
sword to General Beauregard in surrender, but it was returned to him; the General said he
“would not receive it from so brave a man.” 48 The Confederate General allowed
Anderson and his men to not only retreat with all the honors of war, but also to remove
with them all public and private property, and to fire a salute to the United States flag.” 49
General Beauregard recognized that though they were technically at war, owing to the
Union’s attempt to provision the fort and to his forces firing on the fort, war had not
officially been declared. Thus, Beauregard treated the situation as though he was not
conducting a war. He did not seem to care much whether the event was called an
evacuation or a surrender; he had succeeded in his goal, which was to force the Union
Army out of a position of military value that he regarded as the lawful property of the
45
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State of South Carolina—which was no longer a part of the Union—and essential to
that state’s defense.
Sumter was evacuated on the 14th of April, the day before the troops stationed
there would have run out of supplies. Captain Gillis visited the fort as it was being
evacuated, to encourage the men and to survey the damage that had been done, and
“found the fort a complete wreck, the fire not yet all extinguished. Its shattered
battlements, its tottering walls, presented the appearance of an old ruin.” 50 Gillis
mentioned to Anderson the plan hatched to provision and reinforce the Fort had they not
been forced to evacuate. Anderson replied it was very providential that they had never
been given the opportunity to try, as any such endeavor would have had no chance of
success due to the strength of the rebel forces and the number of guns that would have
been ready to prevent it.
The Union forces were taken on board the Charleston steamer Isabel to be
transported to the anchorage where their vessels waited; the Fort Sumter evacuees and
their possessions were loaded onto the Baltic. The Union ships departed from the area
that evening, leaving Fort Sumter in the possession of the Confederacy. The captains of
the vessels wrote their reports for the Secretary of the Navy, as did Fox, who also wrote a
letter to the Secretary of War on the 19th, after he had returned to the Navy Yard and
learned that the Powhatan had been reassigned. He demanded an explanation as to why,
after the ship had been withdrawn from his expedition, “I was permitted to sail on the 9th,
the Pawnee on the 9th, and Pocahontas on the 10th, without intimation that the main
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portion, the fighting portion, of our expedition was taken away.”

51

After his return to

Washington, he received a letter from President Lincoln reassuring him that despite the
disappointing outcome of the recent expedition, the attempt had furthered the Union
cause and he should feel no guilt in the attempt. Soon after this, Fox was appointed
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 52
After the end of the war, Fox was still attempting to discover what exactly had
occurred during the time of his expedition. He was disturbed by the thought that Rowan
might have known that the Powhatan had been assigned to duty off Pensacola, and wrote
to him. Rowan reminded him of the fact that he had shared with Fox all of the
information he knew and had showed him the letter from Mercer and the copy of his
orders. Rowan further noted that all information intimated that Mercer had been relieved
of the command of the ship, and no mention had been made of the fact that the ship had
been given a completely different assignment. He also reminded Fox that, at the time, the
orders given to Porter were completely confidential, requiring Porter to keep his
destination a secret until his arrival there and under no circumstances to reveal it to
anyone. Therefore, even Captain Mercer would have been in ignorance as to the new
destination of the ship. Rowan also noted that if he had known the Powhatan had been
reassigned, “I cannot conceive it possible for me to have kept you in ignorance of the
fact, to have discussed with you the probability of the vessel’s arrival, and to have
passively allowed the Baltic to steam out to the offing and burn signals all night for a ship
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I positively knew (Rowan’s emphasis) had been assigned to other duty.”

53

So certain

had Fox been that the Powhatan was coming, despite Mercer’s detachment from it, that
Rowan had been convinced of it as well. Gillis, who had also seen the orders given to
Mercer and the letter Mercer had written—all the information Rowan had been given—
had also been unaware that the Powhatan had been given other orders, as evidenced by
the report he made to Welles directly after the events surrounding the fall of Sumter, in
which he remarks that “the Powhatan has not been here.” 54 Rowan also assured Fox that
he was convinced that Fox’s plan had been “perfect in all its details,” and no doubt
“would have succeeded if the Powhatan had not been sent elsewhere.” 55
Despite Rowan’s assurances to Fox, in the end, the presence of the Powhatan at
Charleston might have changed absolutely nothing. The forces that were there were
prevented from doing much at all to help the men in Sumter owing to the horrible
weather which prevented them from landing any men or supplies. Though the Powhatan
would have had larger and heavier boats that might have been capable of battling through
the rough waves to land near the fort, it is probable the evacuation would have been
forced before the attempt could have been made. If Major Anderson’s remarks to
Captain Gillis during the evacuation are to be believed, an attempt could also have
resulted in only a large number of casualties.
Most troubling was not the failure of the attempt to supply Fort Sumter, but the
deliberate intervention by Seward which prevented success. Either Seward had obtained
Lincoln’s signature on orders for Mercer and Porter without the President reading them
53
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(which he had already proven himself capable of and not above doing), or the
President had indeed read them, agreed to them and signed them, and then between that
date (April 1) 56 and the date on which he read and approved orders for Captain Mercer
from Welles on the 5th, 57 had forgotten the orders he had approved previously. Either
way, Seward certainly knew that the ship he was planning on having Lincoln send to Fort
Pickens, the Powhatan, was the same ship Welles had determined to lead the naval forces
in the relief of Fort Sumter.
On the night of the 6th, when the arguing parties appeared before Lincoln at
almost midnight, Lincoln was surprised and confused by the events, and admitted that he
may have confused the Powhatan with the Pocahontas, 58 but that ship was also to have
been involved in the effort to relieve Fort Sumter. Lincoln also refused to discuss the
matter of Fort Pickens with Welles, which meant that a Naval officer, in command of a
Navy ship, had been given orders over the head of the Secretary of the Navy, who had
not been notified. Nor does Lincoln give any explanation for allegedly putting direct
orders into Lieutenant Porter’s hand. Lincoln was, of course, at the time being inundated
with any number of other important issues at hand, rendering it fairly easy for him to be
confused over officers and ships. Lincoln had agreed to Seward’s request for more
support at Fort Pickens provided it did not interfere with the expedition to Fort Sumter.
The President most likely assumed that Seward would have made certain that no
interference occurred.
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Regardless of the possible excuses he might have made, Lincoln accepted full
blame for the mistake, despite Welles’ suspicion otherwise: “President Lincoln never
shunned any responsibility and often declared that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault
for errors imputed to them, when I sometimes thought otherwise.” 59 Welles believed that
Seward had been deliberately meddling with affairs outside his department, and in his
diary even stated that Seward was conspiring with secessionists (Judge Campbell) in an
attempt to prevent Fort Sumter from being supplied and reinforced. 60 Even in this
accusation, however, Welles was charitable towards Seward, stating that he did not agree
with Seward and his opinions of how to deal with the South, but believed Seward
probably had reconciliation in mind. Seward may have believed reunification possible if
Fort Sumter was given up to the South in a bloodless manner. Welles expressed this in
his musings on Seward’s beliefs in his diary when he wrote, “If not supplied or
reinforced, famine would certainly effect the downfall of the fortress without bloodshed
on either side. Until blood was spilled, there was hope of conciliation.” 61
Following the incident at Fort Sumter, Rowan returned to Washington, where he
waited in the Pawnee for orders. The very same day he reported his arrival at
Washington, he was dispatched again for Norfolk.
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ROWAN AT THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD

The Norfolk Navy Yard, also known as the Gosport Navy Yard, was located
along the banks of the Elizabeth River, and during the time leading up to the Civil War it
was the largest Navy Yard in the country. 1 Although its location had long been a very
convenient one, being roughly in the middle of the Atlantic coast, at the beginning of
1861 its position was a precarious one. As the southern states seceded one by one, the
federal government watched on in concern. Several states teetered on the edge of
secession, and the government was hesitant to make any move that might push them over
the line. Virginia was one such state, and although the Norfolk Navy Yard contained vast
amounts of supplies and several ships, the North did not want to provoke the people of
the state by moving the naval stores to a more stable location or by making an attempt to
reinforce the yard.
This navy yard, at the time of its fall to the Confederacy, held eleven ships, of
which most were present for repairs of some sort. “Undoubtedly the most important was
the modern, powerful 3,200-ton steam frigate Merrimack. It had been sent to the yard to
have its weak, unreliable engines rebuilt.” 2 Welles, concerned about this ship in
particular, ordered the yard’s commandant, Commodore Charles F. McCauley to ready
the ship for service as quickly as possible. He arranged to have two hundred seamen,
complete with a fireman crew and coal heavers, to head to the Norfolk yard to man the
Merrimac, and for Commander James Alden to captain it; Alden’s confidential orders
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were to bring her out of the harbor and take her to Philadelphia. To help prepare her
for sea service, he also ordered Chief Engineer Benjamin F. Isherwood to get the ship’s
engines in working order and to ready her for immediate departure. On the 16th of April,
1861, Welles wrote to McCauley and ordered, “The vessels and stores under your charge
you will defend at any hazard, repelling by force, if necessary, any and all attempts to
seize them, whether by mob violence, organized effort, or any assumed authority.” 4
Welles emphasized the importance of the ship being ready to sail at a moment’s notice,
and that any armament or stores that could be loaded onto the ships should be moved out
of reach of the rebels. He cautioned McCauley to keep watch carefully for any sign of
violence or opposition. The tone of the letter lacked the urgency that it might have
conveyed had not Welles received a letter earlier that day from McCauley which stated
that the Merrimack was essentially ready to sail; all that remained to prepare her was to
finish loading equipment. 5
Welles knew that the number of men at the yard would be insufficient to crew all
of the ships that were fit for sea or that could be made so in short order, and so he ordered
Commodore G. J. Pendergrast, commanding the sloop Cumberland, to sail to Norfolk and
lend assistance in preparing those ships that could be removed from the yard and in
manning them. 6
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On the 18 of April, Chief Engineer Isherwood wrote to Welles, reporting that
his initial inspection of the Merrimack revealed that the ship’s engines “were in a
wretched state,” due to the fact that much of her machinery had been removed with the
intention of replacing it with more powerful equipment. On his orders, men worked
continuously from early Monday morning through Wednesday afternoon in the effort to
make her seaworthy. Though he reported to McCauley that the ship was ready, the
commander said that her departure could wait until morning. In an effort to be ready as
soon as the order was given, Isherwood ordered that a watch be kept in the engine room
all night, and at daybreak the next morning, the fires were lit and the Merrimack was
readied for sea. McCauley again postponed the ship’s departure, and resisted
Isherwood’s call to release the vessel. McCauley stated that he had decided to keep her
at the yard and ordered that the fires be drawn. 7 McCauley had been informed that the
obstructions in the passage that had been placed by the Confederates would prevent the
ship’s escape. He had also been led to believe that any attempt to remove the vessel from
the yard would excite the rebel forces. Despite Isherwood’s protests and his assurances
that the ships were capable of making it over the obstructions, McCauley would not
relent. Isherwood had McCauley endorse his orders, absolving him of guilt of the
situation, and he returned to Washington to report the situation to Welles.
Welles was furious. He ordered Commodore Hiram Paulding to proceed to the
Norfolk Navy Yard to relieve McCauley of his command. His additional orders were
clear:
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“You will do all in your power to protect and place beyond danger the vessels
and property belonging to the United States. On no account should the arms and
munitions be permitted to fall into the hands of insurrectionists, or those who
would wrest them from the custody of the Government…” 8
Welles insisted that government property be destroyed if necessary to keep it out of rebel
hands, but he made it inescapably clear that such a course was to be pursued only in the
event that no other action was possible.
Welles also wrote to Colonel Harris of the Marine Corps to ready one hundred
Marines for service and to place them on the Pawnee upon her arrival, 9 and ordered
Commander Rowan to take the Pawnee, with Captain Wright of the U.S. Army, the detail
of Marines, and Commodore Paulding all on board, and sail for Norfolk. 10
Rowan wrote that on the way Paulding informed him that he intended “to bring
out all the ships at Norfolk.” 11 Upon their arrival at Norfolk, however, it was discovered
that they were too late. Rowan reported, “The Yard was a melancholy sight.
Commodore McCauley despairing of aid and fearing that the insurgents might capture the
Yard had scuttled all the ships that afternoon and when we arrived there we saw nothing
but ruin.” 12
Though McCauley had received multiple letters from Welles indicating the
importance of removing the Merrimack from the yard to keep it out of enemy hands, he
had refused to let her sail, and in the end it was still in the yard when he ordered all the
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ships to be scuttled and burned. McCauley had certainly understood the ship’s
importance, and the government’s desire to move her to a safer place. However, he was
surrounded by men whose loyalty lay with the Confederacy—men whose advice he had
trusted. These men had managed to convince him of circumstances that were not true,
including the effectiveness of the obstructions laid out at the narrowest points of the route
to open sea, and also the number of men who might come down on the yard if any
attempt to remove the ship was made.
While the situation was indeed volatile, the Confederacy would not have been
able at that time to bring any force capable of preventing the Merrimack’s escape to bear.
But McCauley had been duped into believing the rumors; hence, he had prevented the
Merrimack’s departure, and the departure of any other ship that might have been saved,
despite several of the ships being fully prepared and capable of making it to sea.
Paulding, arriving in the Pawnee, reported that these same officers who had mislead
McCauley, “being Southern men, had tendered their resignations and abandoned their
duty.” 13 McCauley, having been deserted by those under him who were loyal to the
South, and under the impression that the yard was in danger of being attacked by the
rebels, had ordered his few remaining men to burn and sink all of the ships in the yard.
By the time he arrived, Paulding had little choice but to finish what had already begun,
and ordered the destruction of everything left in the yard that could not be easily carried
off. "Early on the morning of 21 April the screw sloop Pawnee towed off the sailing
sloop Cumberland. Once they were safe, Paulding gave the signal to torch the yard." 14
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Rowan recorded the incident in his journal, noting that the “destruction of the
yard was as painful to me as it was impolitic on the part of the government.” Rowan,
wanting “to remain with the ships and defend the yard,” believed “we could have held it.
I saw no good reason for burning the ships since it was in our power to prevent their exit
by Fort Monroe.” Rowan insisted that he had “beseeched the Commd. not to burn, and
said a great deal more than justifyable (sic).” In particular, Rowan “did beg hard to spare
the Pennsylvania but to no purpose.” Rowan “returned to Washington with a sad
heart.” 15
Unfortunately, the destruction of the Navy Yard and its contents was not as
complete as the retreating officers thought. Several barrels powder that had been left on
the dry dock failed to ignite. The Confederates wasted no time once the Union vessels
left, rushing into the yard in time to save many supplies form burning. A telegraph to
Secretary Mallory from Confederate Navy Lieutenant G. T. Sinclair the following day
read, in part:
“The Pennsylvania, Merrimack, Germantown, Raritan, Columbia, and Dolphin
are burned to the water’s edge and sunk. All can be raised; the Plymouth easily,
not much injured. The Germantown crushed and sunk by the falling of shears.
Her battery, new and complete, uninjured by fire; can be recovered. The most
abominable vandalism at the yard. Destruction less than might be expected…
About 4,000 shells thrown overboard; can be recovered. The Germantown’s
battery will be up and ready for service to-morrow. In ordnance building all small
arms broken and thrown overboard will be fished up. The brass howitzers thrown
overboard are up. The Merrimack has 2,200 10-pound cartridges in her magazine
in water-tight tanks… Only eight guns, 32-pounders, destroyed. About 1,000 or
more from 11-inch to 32-pounders taken, and ready for our cause. Many of them
are ready in batteries. We saved about 130 gun carriages; all saved at St. Helena
[Va.]. Many thousands of shells and shot, from 11-inch to 32-pounders, safe. All
the machinery uninjured. Magazine captured, with 2,000 barrels of powder and
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vast numbers of shells and quantities of fixed ammunition. An attempt made to
blow up the dry dock failed.” 16

Despite Paulding's assertions that there was no other course that could have been
taken, he received much criticism for his decision to so quickly abandon the yard when
his express orders stated that such a course of action should have been a very last resort.
Many officers believed that much more could have been done; even McCauley, who had
been lied to repeatedly about the power and numbers of the Confederate forces who lay
in wait just outside the yard, believed that the position could have been held until
reinforcements arrived. Rowan was certain that they could have held it. Perhaps
Paulding believed that with the destruction of the yard and the ships already begun, it was
not worth the risk of losing so many men to attempt to hold the yard.
Regardless of what was believed after the fact, Paulding at the time seemed
honestly to have believed his actions were justified. Of course, had Paulding realized
how many guns and what supplies the Confederates would manage to recover from the
ruins of the yard, or if he could have foreseen in what manner the Merrimack would be
resurrected, he almost certainly would have made an attempt to hold the yard. The
cannons, also, were of integral importance to the Confederates, and throughout the war
they would be found on battlefields across the nation. Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen,
musing on the loss of the yard, questioned “the ability of the Confederacy to establish
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defenses against a respectable naval force” had they not acquired these cannons. The
South had the natural resources, but not the means, to produce effective arms.
Rowan remembered the destruction of the yard and the retreat vividly, and years
later, he wrote of it again in his journal. Though it would be difficult to substantiate the
claim, he was still of the very strong opinion that they could have held the yard. Rowan
poignantly wrote of the pain and humiliation he felt: “Was there not reason for
humiliation when I was compelled to retire with a 50 gun frigate fully manned and
equipped with 800 good troops in the Pawnee, besides her own crew and officers?
Notwithstanding this force we were running away as fast as steam could take us.” Rowan
truly believed “we could have held the Navy Yard in spite of all opposition. The
Pennsylvania could have been manned and as she lay in a bed of mud would have been a
perfect floating battery. The Cumberland could have held the upper part of the Navy
Yard and the Pawnee and the tug Yankee could have patrolled the river above and below
the ships and Yard and prevented the enemy from using fireships.” 18
Instead of destroying the yard, wrote Rowan, the Navy should have stood firm
and “we might have been reinforced in three or four days to any necessary extent. As it
was, we met the Keystone State coming in with a number of Seamen coming to join us.
Oh! What a blunder we made in pursuing this course. Had we held the Yard we should
have saved all the cannon, nearly 2000, all the immense store of provisions, clothing,
naval stores, copper, iron, steel, ship timber and drydock and last, but not least, those
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magnificent workshops with the most perfect machinery and tools this country could
produce.” 19

19
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ROWAN AT ALEXANDRIA

On May 24, 1861, Rowan led the Navy half of an Army/Navy expedition to
occupy the town of Alexandria, Virginia. His primary role was to provide transportation
for the Army and to provide cover for them, if needed, with the Pawnee’s guns.
However, Rowan states that, "As soon as the steamers came in full view of the city, and
so near as not to expose the secrecy of the expedition, I sent Lieutenant R.B. Lowry on
shore to demand the surrender of the town.” 1 Rowan waited to demand the surrender of
the town until it was obvious that the Union was going to make a move on it, but it was
still not his place to do so.
Rowan's action resulted in no misfortune for the Union cause, but Welles rebuked
him for it, and rightly so. Rowan's orders had been to provide transportation for the
Army, and to supply what men he could for operations on shore, should the need for them
arise. He was not told in any great detail what the orders of the Army were, and sending
an officer ashore might have ruined carefully laid plans. Welles, expressing his
displeasure, was careful to point this fact out in the letter he wrote to Rowan. Rowan’s
actions, and his compassion, while reflecting well on him as a man, did not reflect well
on him as an officer of the Navy.
Rowan was later praised for this action, which undoubtedly prevented bloodshed.
Indeed, most sources make no mention of the fact that Rowan sent an officer ashore to
demand the town's surrender; those who do mention it treat the incident as if it was a
1
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perfectly standard—or even laudable—course of action. Nonetheless, to Welles,
Rowan had still stepped past the bounds of his authority and acted in an irresponsible
manner; had the Army been carrying out more complex plans than Rowan assumed, it
could have been disastrous for everyone involved.
The troops occupied the town, for the most part, peacefully, with two notable
fatalities, Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth, whose New York 11th Infantry Regiment was
known as the “Zouaves,” and the proprietor of the Marshall House Inn, James W.
Jackson. The Inn proudly displayed on its roof a large Confederate flag that was visible
from the White House, and which Ellsworth removed. Jackson confronted Ellsworth,
whom he shot and killed. One of Ellsworth’s privates immediately retaliated, killing
Jackson. Ellsworth was mourned across the Union as their first notable casualty, but
Jackson would be lauded as the Confederacy’s first martyr.
Rowan, meanwhile, sent Lieutenant Chaplin in one of the Pawnee’s cutters “to lie
off the starting point of the railroad cars, and to jump on shore immediately as the
steamers touched the wharf and cut off the departure of the early morning train then at
that point.” 2 Though the engine of the train escaped, the cars, which were loaded with
railroad iron, were captured. Rowan sent one of the other cutters to reclaim the Collyer
and the Gipsy, two steamers which had been seized by the Confederates. 3 Alexandria
would remain in the possession of the Union until the end of the war.
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ROWAN AND THE UNION BLOCKADE: THE BATTLE OF AQUIA CREEK

On April 19, 1861, President Lincoln had ordered a blockade of the southern
coastal states that had seceded from the Union up to that point—South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas. Eight days later, he added North Carolina and
Virginia. Lincoln’s declaration was met with a sneer from the powers of Europe, who
thought the United States’ naval power to be woefully inadequate to even attempt such an
endeavor. The South had over 3,000 miles of coastline, and at the time the blockade was
declared, the Union had only a handful of ocean-worthy vessels available to enact it.
Welles rectified this problem as quickly as he could, and utilized the vessels available for
the objectives that were most important. One of these objectives was, of course,
protecting the waterways near the capitol.
Following the occupation of Alexandria, Rowan served in the Pawnee in the
Potomac Flotilla on patrol duty in the waters around Washington. The flotilla ranged the
Rappahannock and Potomac Rivers, and the Chesapeake Bay, which was made
increasingly dangerous by Confederate shore batteries. On May 29, three Union vessels,
the Thomas Freeborn, Anacostia, and Resolute, began a bombardment of an enemy
battery at Aquia Creek, which had been erected to protect the Fredricksburg and Potomac
Railroad. On the 31st, Rowan received orders to proceed from his location at Alexandria
to Aquia Creek to help.
Rowan responded quickly, steaming through the night to join Captain Ward, the
ranking officer present, and his little force. He notes that he passed the creek around 3:00
AM, and a few hours later met up with Ward, who had anchored the force ten miles
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below the battery for the night. Rowan participated in the attack the next morning,
utilizing shells and his 9-inch guns. “The battery was twice silenced under the weight of
our fire, but resumed again when our fire ceased.” 2 The Pawnee was struck nine times
during the bombardment, though the only injury reported was to Rowan himself, who
received a minor scrape on his face caused by a splinter of wood thrown up by enemy
shot. The ship itself suffered four shots to the hull, one of which tore through the
bulwarks and the deck; the main topsail yard, mizzenmast head, and topmast, plus the
smokestack, were all damaged. The Confederates had focused their fire primarily on the
Pawnee, the largest ship present and therefore the easiest target.
Despite the amount of fire (Rowan alone reported firing 38 rounds from his rifled
cannon and 155 hollow shot, plus all of the 10- and 15-second shell he had available),
and Ward’s report that “squads were observed from time to time taking to their heels
along the beach with a speed and bottom truly commendable for its prudence and highly
amusing to the seamen,” 3 the battle was inconclusive. Rowan remained to hold Ward’s
place on the blockade while Ward took his ship, the Freeborn, to Washington for repairs,
after which Rowan did the same. 4
The rumor of the Confederates running away from the battle was apparently one
that had been circulated, because Captain Lynch of the Confederate Navy felt the need to
write to the editor of the Fredricksburg News, stating that if Ward had “for once violated
1
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his instincts and been sincere he would have stated that men were seen running toward,
as well as from, the batteries, mostly bearing ammunition.” 5 A report from William B.
Bate of the Confederate Army to the Confederate Secretary of War reported on the 11th
that "Everything is peaceable here now except the Pawnee, which still coils about our
shore like a wounded viper. We have vedettes near her." 6
Rowan’s presence certainly made the Confederates nervous; Captain W. Palmer,
a topographical engineer assisting in the Coast Survey and performing a reconnaissance
on the Potomac River of Lower Cedar, Mathias, and White House Points, wrote to
Professor A.D. Bade, the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, stating that Rowan was
kind enough to lend him one of the Pawnee’s armed boats, which trailed him while he
conducted his survey near the batteries. "The proximity of her guns may have had a good
influence on the rebels there, as, although I landed and scoured the woods at these places
with an escort of two officers and twenty men only, I was not disturbed by them." 7
Rowan continued to blockade the area, relaying any pertinent information either
to the commanding officer in the area or directly to Welles. On June 10th, he reported to
Welles the capture of a rowboat that had appeared to be delivering mail. He also noted
that the rebels were constructing new batteries on the heights above Aquia Creek. 8
Continuing his observation efforts, Rowan discovered a little over a week later a
large quantity of supplies, mostly bacon and whiskey, belonging to a Mr. Carpenter and
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being stored in a fish house near Maryland Point. He wrote to Welles: "I respectfully
request instructions in the premises. I believe they are intended for shipment to Virginia,
but have no proof. I send a description of the articles with the marks, etc." 9 He included
a list of all of the goods and the labels on them, which appear to be the names of intended
recipients. Welles responded that "unless those who have the care and custody of these
stores can satisfy you that [Virginia] is not their destination, but that they belong in good
faith to the citizens of Maryland, and are to be retained and consumed in that State, you
will be justified in seizing them." 10 This communication was delivered the same day,
June, 18; and Rowan seized the goods and sent them to Washington, along with a more
detailed explanation of their origin and the reasons for their seizure, also that same day.
Rowan stated that he had good reason to believe that Carpenter was communicating with
the enemy, and that the goods were almost certainly intended as supplies for the
Confederates. Rowan explained that most of his information was “derived from colored
people, who answer questions without reserve when opportunity offers." 11 A little over a
week later, however, on June 29th, Welles ordered the goods returned: "From statements
that have been made to the Department by reliable parties with regard to the character of
Mr. Carpenter it is disposed to direct the return of the seized articles." 12
On June 21, off Aquia Creek, Rowan picked up a Confederate deserter, John
Dowling, who swam to the Pawnee while being fired upon from the shore. 13 Based on
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Rowan’s correspondence to Welles, Dowling reported what he saw behind the
Confederate lines, including information about earthworks at West Point, the terminus of
the Richmond Railroad, and the four guns that were expected to arrive there any day.
Dowling further reported he saw
“but one company of troops in Fredricksburg. There were no defenses in and
around Richmond when I left on the 16th instant. I heard that a battery was being
erected 10 miles below Williamsburg, between the two rivers. I heard they were
preparing or had a battery near Jamestown. There were some 3,000 troops
between James River and Yorktown, mostly cavalry. There were about 3,000
troops at Richmond, mostly from cotton states.” 14
Dowling noted that in Richmond “the principal crossing place for troops, etc., from
Maryland was at a point about 35 miles below Alexandria.” Moreover, there were a
number of regiments at Aquia Creek,
“about 3,000 men, encamped behind the hills. Forty-two men are stationed at the
depot. The steamboat Page is up the creek and not manned or armed. The new
battery on the north hill has three 8-inch guns; the south battery, two rifled
cannons; the lower battery, one rifled cannon." 15
Rowan noted that Dowling’s report was taken and recorded in his presence. 16
Rowan reported, on June 25, a reconnaissance of Mathias Point, on which he was
accompanied by the steamboat James Guy, which had on board Captain Woodbury of the
Engineer Corps, and Captain Palmer (the same Captain Palmer that Rowan had
previously lent a boat to) of the Topographical Engineer Corps, U.S. Army. They were
attempting to determine whether or not the enemy was erecting batteries there. Rowan
stated that he sent ashore in two boats a party of forty sailors and marines in charge of
Lieutenant Chaplin and Master Blue, all under the command of Captain Woodbury.
14
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Rowan wrote that at least one company of the enemy was present, but that they were
kept at bay by the guns of the Pawnee: "During the reconnaissance [sic] I threw some
thirty shell, which kept the enemy in check, notwithstanding their reported force is 600
men, of whom 100 or more are mounted." 17 A boat was captured, along with a slave,
who told them that "200 troops are kept on the beach constantly, and the remainder in
camps." 18
Two days later, Rowan reported an engagement at Mathias Point and the death of
Commander Ward. He had received an order the evening before from Ward to send him
two boats, armed and equipped, under the command of Lieutenant Chaplin, which Rowan
immediately complied with, and the boats were on their way with the Resolute by 9 PM.
Rowan guessed from the materials requested that Ward was preparing to land a party at
Mathias Point, with the intention of removing the trees and undergrowth, which were
screening the rebels and their work from view of the Union Navy. "At 9 oclock this
evening the Freeborn and Reliance came up, having been repulsed by the rebels at
Mathias Point, in which Lieutenant Chaplin and his command escaped utter destruction
by a miracle." 19 Rowan reports that Commander Ward had been killed, "shot in the
abdomen while in the act of sighting his bow gun." 20
Not all of his report was negative, however. Rowan praised the
“gallantry, coolness, and presence of mind of Lieutenant Chaplin, of the Pawnee,
commanding the party on shore. He remained steady and cool amongst a perfect
hail of musketry from hundreds of men, while he collected his own people and
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made good his retreat without leaving the enemy a trophy beyond a few sand
bags and some axes and, so far as I can ascertain, the muskets of the wounded
men.” 21
Lieutenant Chaplin left the shore with the last man, who was injured and unable to swim.
Chaplin “took him on his shoulders, musket and all, and safely reached the boat without a
scratch, save a musket hole through the top of his cap." 22 Rowan also included the orders
sent to him by Ward and a list of the casualties, which included Ward as the only man
killed, two men "wounded dangerously," and two "wounded severely." 23 The next day
Rowan forwarded a detailed report made by Lieutenant Chaplin. 24
Though the Union troops had lost the battle, the enemy was shaken by the
engagement. In a letter regarding the same event, Colonel Daniel Ruggers of the
Confederate Army stated that though they essentially won the engagement and were able
to push the Union troops back off of the point, he stated the opinion, "in which all the
field officers concur, that without artillery this command can not hold this important
position and prevent the enemy from effecting a substantial lodgment and strike an
irretrievable blow against the interest and material defenses of the State." 25 The
Confederate Colonel warned that the Union forces might return very soon, and in
numbers large enough to retake the point unless reinforcements and artillery were
received.
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On July 9, 1861, Rowan reported the discovery of two Confederate explosive
devices, found two days previously by Acting Master William Budd of the Resolute.
One sprung a leak and quickly sank; the second one, after being disabled, was sent to
Dahlgren on the Freeborn. Budd wrote a report of their examination of it:
“The apparatus in its perfect state consisted of two large oil casks connected by 25
fathoms of 3k-inch manila line, the line being kept on top of the water by corks
secured to it at intervals of 2 feet. Underneath each cask, at a distance of 6 feet,
was slung an iron cylinder, 4 feet 6 inches in length and 18 inches in diameter at
one end and 17 inches at the other. The fuze for igniting the combustible material
contained in the cylinder was placed in the cask in the following manner: The
upper end of the fuze was secured on the top and near the outer end of the cask,
being protected from moisture by a square box and gutta-percha pipe following it
through the aperture it was placed in. It was carefully coiled on a platform
secured on the inside of the cask for the purpose of protecting it from any water
that might lodge in the bottom. From the platform it entered a copper pipe that
connected with a gutta-percha hose, the lower end of which was secured to the
iron cylinder below. In each cask were two fuzes, each about 40 feet in length. All
four had been on fire.” 26

Budd provided a sketch with the distances marked according to measurements he made
when the devices were secured. Rowan guessed that the device was to have been fired
from a distance and was meant to explode once close enough to its intended target. “The
idea was a wicked one,” Rowan wrote, “but the execution clumsy.” 27
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ROWAN AND THE UNION BLOCKADE: CAPTURE OF HATTERAS INLET

As more vessels were built or otherwise acquired and the Navy was strengthened,
the Union was able to be more offensive in its strategy, and one of their main goals was
enforcement of the blockade. To do this, ports along the coast had to be secured. As the
war progressed the blockade grew stronger, but it was met with much opposition. The
South and the nations of Europe tested and tried the blockade throughout the course of
the war, and nowhere were they so unrelenting as the coast of North Carolina. Much of
this state’s coastal region is dominated by the North Carolina Sounds, which are
separated from the Atlantic Ocean by the Outer Banks, a string of barrier islands two
hundred miles long. The shifting sand and bad weather of the area made navigation
notoriously difficult and dangerous; just outside the Outer Banks lay one of the most
treacherous stretches of water on the U.S. coast. Here the icy Labrador Current, which
flows from the Baffin Sea between Greenland and Canada, and the warm waters of the
Gulf Stream, from the Caribbean Sea, clash. The hazardous sailing conditions of the area
have claimed thousands of ships, earning the area the epithet “the Graveyard of the
Atlantic.”
The extreme geography and perilous sailing conditions made the area difficult to
blockade, and the Confederates took full advantage. Indeed, much of North America’s
coastal shipping passed within sight of the lighthouse situated on Cape Hatteras. Much
of the shipping out of the West Indies did, as well. The notion was that nature “seemed
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almost to have designed the North Carolina coast with an offensive defense in
mind.”1 The South, recognizing the area’s importance, made efforts to defend it. The
Confederates constructed forts at the inlets of the sounds. The most successful of these
was Fort Fisher, near the mouth of the Cape Fear River. The port of Wilmington, which
Fort Fisher protected, was the most popular and the most successful port for blockaderunning in the South. Owing to the cover provided by the Fort, Wilmington would
remain an open and integral supply-line for the Confederacy until almost the end of the
war.
North Carolina also scraped together a small navy consisting of five ships, the
Winslow, a side-wheel steamer, and four propeller-driven river boats, the Oregon, the
Ellis, the Raleigh, and the Beaufort. The tiny fleet, collectively nicknamed the
“Mosquito Fleet,” was immediately turned over to the Confederacy, who used the smaller
river boats to patrol the sounds and rivers. These smaller vessels were armed with only
one cannon apiece, and General D.H. Hill, the Confederacy’s commander in that district,
did not think much of any of them:
“In the absence of a regular supply of coal they frequently had to tie up on shore
and cut green wood to keep steam in their boilers. Their crews were not gunners,
but fishermen, soldiers, or farmers, hurriedly taught to fire a gun. Their fuses
were uncertain and their guns liable to burst after a few rounds… If the stakes
had not been life and the issues desperation, blood, [and] death, the laugh of the
satirist would have driven the “mosquito fleet”… from the waters.”2

These vessels, small, light, and with shallow draft, were ideal for patrolling such
an area. The Winslow was a little better off; this ship was faster and more maneuverable,
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and, being a former coastal trading ship, was designed to handle the shallow waters of
the inland regions and also the coastal waters outside the barrier islands. It was armed
was two guns, one a 32-pounder and the other a smaller rifled cannon. The Captain of
the Winslow, Lieutenant Commander Thomas M. Crossan, employed his ship in
privateering during the early part of the war, and “for six weeks in the summer of 1861,
that vessel… reportedly captured sixteen ships traversing the Outer Banks.”3
Early in the war, the shortage of seaworthy vessels prevented the Union Navy
from stationing an adequate force off the coast of North Carolina. May of 1861 saw only
two vessels on blockade for the entirety of the state, and these, owing to the weather,
were forced to stay far out to sea or risk being dashed on the shore.4 During the
following summer of 1862, over one hundred blockade runners passed through Hatteras
Inlet alone. It quickly became clear to the Union that the area was a hotbed for
Confederate privateering and blockade-running; to compel the South and, more
importantly, European nations, to take the blockade seriously, Union forces must secure
the area.
The Blockade Strategy Board, headed by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Samuel
Francis Du Pont, was organized to strategize the most effective method to utilize the
resources available to enforce the blockade on the seceding states. Originally, the coast
of the Tar Heel State received low priority. The plan was to sink stone-filled old vessels
in the channels of the inlets leading into the sounds and leave the rest to the offshore
blockade. Once ‘the Confederate privateers began their sorties into the trade routes and
3
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5

the marine insurance rates in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia began soaring,”

this attitude changed quickly. The privateering had clearly taken its toll on the private
investors and the shipping companies based in the north.
In August after an entire summer of raids by the Hatteras privateers, Lieutenant
Selfridge of the U.S. Navy wrote a letter to Welles explaining the situation there. “It
seems that the coast of Carolina is infested with a nest of privateers that have thus far
escaped capture, and, in the ingenious method of their cruising, are probably likely to
avoid the clutches of our cruisers.” He went on to explain this method:
“Hatteras Inlet, a little south of Cape Hatteras Light, seems their principle
rendezvous. Here they have a fortification that protects them from assault. A
look-out in the lighthouse proclaims the coast clear, and a merchantman in sight;
they dash out and are back again in a day with their prize. So long as these
remain it will be impossible to entirely prevent their depredations, for they do not
venture out when men-of-war are in sight; and, in the bad weather of the coming
season, cruisers cannot always keep their stations off these inlets without great
risk of going ashore.”6
Selfridge also suggested a way in which the Union might be rid of them, but another plan
had been long in the making. The Lincoln administration was itching for a victory. The
Union Army had been encountering much more difficulty with the Confederate forces
than expected, and only a month before they had fought the first major land battle of the
war—and suffered their first defeat. The First Battle of Bull Run (or First Manassas, as
the Confederates called it) left the Union Army in Virginia in no condition to do much
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but recover. Lincoln and his administration were facing the angry outcry of the
American people.
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ROWAN’S ROLE IN CAPTURING HATTERAS INLET

Seeking a badly-needed victory, the Lincoln administration turned to the Navy.
The Union Navy was still struggling to increase the number of adequate ships at its
disposal, and to fill them with able men, but it still held the edge over Confederate Naval
forces. Hatteras Inlet was a prime target; while the location was disturbingly well-suited
for defense, it was known, thanks to letters and reports on the area made by two officers
who had spent time as prisoners in the area, that it was poorly fortified and grossly
undermanned. 1 The Confederates had determined that there was a greater need on the
battlefields in Virginia for troops and arms than virtually anywhere else, and they were
hard-pressed to provide what was needed there, let alone everywhere else. For the rebels,
weapons and ammunition “were too few or too late, their powder and shot too limited,
experienced gunners too rare, and good engineers too overworked or under-equipped to
create any kind of coherent defensive front.” This was the case for the Confederacy on
virtually every battlefield, but, according to historian William Trotter, “nowhere was this
waffling policy of too-little-too-late more dramatic in its failures and more tantalizing in
its might-have-beens than on the North Carolina coast in 1861.” 2
The joint Army-Navy operation that took Hatteras Inlet was commanded by
General Benjamin F. Butler of the Army and Flag Officer Silas Horton Stringham of the
Navy. The goal was to put an end to Confederate raiding in the area and to cut off the
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supply line into North Carolina that was operating through the inlet. Such required
the capture of the two forts located there, Forts Hatteras and Clark. Next the union aim
was to block the channel with the “stone fleet,” requiring a number of old vessels loaded
with rocks to be sunk in the channel, preventing the passage of blockade-runners.
Butler’s command consisted of the Second Regiment United States Artillery and
parts of the Ninth and Twentieth Regiments New York Infantry, totaling just over 860
men. Stringham’s fleet consisted of ten vessels, the steam frigates Minnesota (47 guns)
and Wabash (46); the sloop Cumberland (24); the sidewheel steamer Susquehanna (14);
the gunboats included Rowan’s Pawnee (9), and the Monticello (3), and Fanny (2); the
revenue cutter Harriert Lane (5); and two transport ships, the Adalaide and the George
Peabody, carrying men and supplies. 3
What follows is a detailed account of the Union efforts to secure the area. The
Union force arrived off Hatteras on August 27, late enough in the day that they anchored
for the night, out of range of the Confederate guns and well away from the dangerous
shoals, and waited until morning to attack. Though the original plan had the ships
concentrating their fire on Fort Hatteras to cover the landing of the Army personnel, it
was quickly discovered that the constantly-moving sand in the channel’s current had
made the water shallow enough that the ships drawing more than eighteen feet of water,
including the Minnesota and the Wabash, could not advance any closer than a mile of the
target. Butler thus made the decision to land the troops farther North, and have
Stringham’s ships focus their fire on Fort Clark instead.
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Stringham ordered the Monitcello, the Pawnee, and the Harriet Lane to cover
the landing of the troops, while the other ships engaged Fort Clark. The smoothbore guns
of the Confederate forces were very difficult to aim with enough accuracy to hit a target
the size of a ship, and it was virtually impossible to hit one that was moving; the Union
ships therefore steamed in a circle, “firing their guns in rotation as they came to bear on
the enemy. This was the first recorded use of such a tactic by the U.S. Navy, and later it
would be refined and used to great effect in the attack on Port Royal, South Carolina.” 4
With the Union fleet in constant motion, Stringham later noted that the rebels’ shot fell
short or passed over the ships. 5 Eventually, the smoke from the ships’ fire had thickened
so much that their visibility of the fort was obstructed completely, but by then their
gunners had already pinpointed their target well enough to hit it consistently despite not
being able to see it.
Landing the troops took longer than expected, owing to a southerly wind and
high, rough surf. The ships were forced back by the bad weather and the ebbing tide;
only 318 Union men had been landed on the beach, and they were armed with only two
pieces of artillery, a 12-pound howitzer and a 12-pound rifled gun. To make matters
worse, the carriage of the howitzer had been damaged during the landing, and much of
their powder was soaked. The landed Union troops were cut off from the rest of the
force, had no provisions, no access to drinking water, and were very exposed. Colonel
Max Weber of the Twentieth New York later observed, “The condition of the troops was
of course a very bad one. All of us were wet up to the shoulders, cut off entirely from the
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fleet, with wet ammunition, and without any provisions; but still all had but one
thought—to advance.” 6
The officers of the fleet were rightfully fearful for their comrades and became
even more concerned when a detachment of mounted men was seen charging from Fort
Clark towards the stranded men. Without hesitation, the gunners on the nearest vessels
fired a volley at the advancing cavalry, only to watch the horses scatter haphazardly into
the windswept dunes. It was only after they had fired that they realized the group of
hapless little animals “was no charge of Rebel cavalry but the stampeding of a herd of
terrified Hatteras beach ponies seeking safety from the bombardment.” 7
Colonel Weber, ranking officer ashore, set about making the best of the
unfortunate situation that he and his men had found themselves in. They readied the guns
as best they could, and spread out soaked ammunition and clothing to dry in the sun. At
one point they saw a detachment of Confederate soldiers coming toward them across the
beach, but they quickly turned and headed back to the fort. The fire from Fort Clark had
ceased, but the Union fleet continued their bombardment. It was not until the
Confederates from Fort Clark were seen beating a hasty retreat to Fort Hatteras that the
Union men noticed that neither fort was flying a flag. Weber sent a small detachment of
men to investigate Fort Clark, and upon their arrival they found it deserted, the guns
spiked and all the ammunition used up. At about 2:00 in the afternoon, this small force
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raised the Union flag over Fort Clark. Stringham, in a letter to Welles, noted that the
raising of the flag “was done by a sailor from the U.S.S. Pawnee. (I regret I have not his
name.) He was one of a few from that vessel out of their ship, their boat having been
swamped in landing troops.” 9 If Rowan knew which of his men was responsible for the
deed, he made no note of it.
A few hours passed, and while no formal surrender had been made, the
Confederate flag had been lowered over Fort Hatteras. Stringham ordered the Monitcello
to enter the inlet and approach the Fort, but once inside the inlet and within range, the
Union vessel was fired upon by rebels inside Fort Hatteras. Three Union ships, the
Minnesota, the Susquehanna, and the Pawnee, responded in kind, and they continued
their bombardment until sunset, long after the Monticello was out of range of the Fort’s
guns. Once the sun was down, these three ships, along with the Harriet Lane, moved
north up the coast to protect the Union troops, who remained on the beach for the night;
Stringham ordered the larger vessels to haul offshore for the night. 10 The soldiers on
shore had built a sand battery in which to mount their guns, “and had opened on the
vessels in the sound in communication with the fort, which seems to have materially
disconcerted the enemy.” 11
Colonel W. F. Martin, the ranking Confederate officer present, had sent to
Portsmouth for reinforcements the moment he had sighted the Union vessels off the
coast. The only ship available at the time was a tiny pilot boat, however, and the order
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was not delivered until after the bombardment had begun.

12

Not until after dark on

the 28th did more men arrive, including Commodore Samuel Barron, who was in charge
of the naval forces of North Carolina and Virginia. Barron and the other senior officers
“designed an assault on Fort Clark” for that night, but decided to wait until another
regiment they were expecting from New Bern joined them. 13 Unfortunately for them,
they put off their only chance—slim thought it was—of salvaging the situation. The
awaited force never came.
The following morning, the weather was milder, and Stringham ordered the
Monticello and the Pawnee to make contact with the men on shore, and to “embark them
if they wished to come off; if they did not, to provision them.” 14 The other ships engaged
Fort Hatteras, but when Stringham noted that much of their shot was falling short, he
ordered them to use 15-second fuses only, with the 10-inch guns. “At 9:35 recommenced
firing, our shot now falling in and around the battery with great effect.” 15 Less than two
hours later, at 11:10 A.M., Fort Hatteras raised a white flag of surrender, and Stringham
ordered a cease-fire.
As Major-General Butler, aboard the Fanny, entered the inlet, the Confederate
fleet fled up the Sound. Before ordering the surrender, Commodore Barron had ordered
as many men as would fit on the Winslow, and ordered them to New Bern. The
Confederate officers then sent Butler their terms of surrender, but Butler refused them,
stating that he would accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, knowing that the
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Confederates had no other option left to them. The Fanny fired on the Winslow, but
did not hit her. Commodore Barron, Colonel Martin, and Major Andrews were taken to
the Minnesota by the Fanny, and articles of capitulation were drawn up. It stated that
“the forces under the command of said Barron, Martin, and Andrews, and all munitions
of war, arms, men, and property under the command of said Barron, Martin, and
Andrews, be unconditionally surrendered to the Government of the United States in terms
of full capitulation.” 16 It was signed by the three Confederate officers, in addition to
Butler and Stringham.
General Butler had been told that after the forts fell, he was to evacuate all of his
troops. The victory having been won, however, he saw no sense in throwing away the
strategic location that they had taken. Commodore Stringham, who had been
commanded to block the inlets and sail home after the battle, knew that if the Union
wished to conduct operations in the sounds, the inlet of Hatteras would be an invaluable
asset. After conferring together, they agreed that the place could and should be held.
Troops were left in the forts, and a few of the ships, including the Pawnee, were left to
patrol the area. Within a few days, both commanders received orders to do just this. 17
Once Hatteras Inlet was under the control of the Union, and Rowan had the
opportunity to see the area, he informed Stringham and Welles that if their intent was to
hold the area, then the vessels that had been loaded with stone to sink in the channel
could be put to much better use transporting coal and other supplies to blockading
vessels. Rowan noted that, “In my opinion it is a waste of money to sink vessels in the
16
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channel at the Bulkheads. The flats are quicksand and as soon as the current is
interrupted at one point it will open up a channel in another.” 18 Ammen, in his writings
years later, stated bluntly, “every one acquainted with those waters knew that a few
months at least would be sufficient for the teredo navalis (marine worm) to dispose of
any timber that might be placed as an obstruction.” 19
Butler, in a letter to Major General John E. Wool, expressed his opinion on the
military value of Hatteras Inlet. He noted that the Union would now have easy access to
the entire coast of Virginia and North Carolina. Any ship that could sail over the bar—
and the passage could be widened and deepened, given the time and equipment
necessary—would have a safe anchorage even in winter, when the weather outside the
bar was perilous. The position gave them a base for offensive operations, both along the
coast and inland. Echoing the words of the Confederacy’s Chief Engineer, Colonel
Thompson, Butler called it “the key to the Albemarle.” He continued, stating, “As a
depot for coaling and supplies for the blockading squadron it is invaluable. As a harbor
for out coasting trade, or inlet from the winter storms or from pirates, it is of the first
importance.” 20
Major-General Butler departed the battlefield on the Adelaide on August 30, and
headed for Annapolis with the thirteen wounded prisoners from the battle. He stopped on
the way at Fort Monroe, his old command, to report to Major-General John E. Wool.
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After seeing the prisoners to Annapolis, he headed straight for Washington, very
much desiring to be the first to report the victory. It was, after all, the first important
victory of the war for the Union, despite the fact that it had been won primarily with
naval force. Upon his arrival in Washington, he stopped first at Postmaster-General
Blair’s house, then at the home of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox, and they agreed
that this knowledge was well worth waking President Lincoln over. When Lincoln
learned that the men were there with news of the assault on Hatteras, he came down to
speak with them immediately; he did not even bother to change out of his nightshirt. Fox
hurriedly told him the news, and Lincoln grabbed him up and flew around the room in
excitement. Butler wrote in his memoirs that the whole scene left him overcome “with
irresistible merriment,” 21 especially since Lincoln was so tall, and “Fox was about five
feet nothing.” According to Aryes, nothing excited Lincoln like good news from the
front, and this was certainly some of the best news he had heard since the war began. 22
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IMPORTANCE OF THE UNION CAPTURE OF HATTERAS

This was a small engagement that at first glance does not seem to matter much
when compared with the larger picture of the Civil War. But Hatteras Inlet was the
gateway to the North Carolina Sounds, which would give the Union access to several
important ports and coastal cities, including New Bern, Elizabeth City, and Edenton. The
Sounds were also essentially the back door to Confederate-held ports in Virginia,
particularly Norfolk, which was accessible from the Sounds through the canals. Less
tangible, but no less important, results included the first application of the new naval
tactic of continuous movement, which greatly lessened the advantage shore-based guns
had over shipboard ones; it was the first combined Army/Navy action of the war, and its
favorable outcome set a precedent for future joint operations; and it was the first
implementation of the Naval Blockading Strategy, a good first step in establishing
international recognition of the blockade.
Rowan, in obedience to Stringham’s orders to him, patrolled the area around
Hatteras Inlet and supervised the repair of the guns in the forts. He reported events and
happenings to both Stringham and Welles, writing letters whenever anything of
prospective importance occurred. He reported to Stringham on September 3, 1861, from
Hatteras Inlet, that several men and a few families entered the Sound from the mouth of
the Pungo River the day before in the schooner Enterprise; they told Rowan that they
were Union men who could no longer remain in North Carolina due to Confederate
activity. One of the men had been drafted into a company of cavalry, but had escaped
and afterwards decided to take his family and leave the area. These men reported to
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Rowan that: “Ten miles this side of Washington on the Pamlico river at Malls Point
they met three steamers full of soldiers who hailed them and told them to return as they
had evacuated Ocracoke, spiked the guns and destroyed the state property there.” 1
Rowan countered that when he passed near the island where the fort is located,
and saw no men or any sign of them. Rowan was also informed by Colonel Hawkins of
the U.S. Army that “he has received reliable information that the forts at Oregon Inlet
have been destroyed and the Island abandoned.” 2 According to Rowan, all the evidence
indicated that the men had been withdrawn from the surrounding areas to reinforce
Roanoke Island, and that the Confederates were in the process of fortifying the southern
end of the island as much as possible. Rowan also wrote to Welles relaying this
information, including the statement that if they had “an organized force of small
steamers we could ere this have destroyed a great portion of the commerce and been in
possession of Roanoke Island which is the key to Norfolk and Albemarle Sound.” 3 This
was unfortunately a common theme in the letters of the naval officers of the area to the
commanders and to Welles; the vessels capable of navigating the area were, for the
entirety of the war, too few. Rowan noted that any ships sent to the area should not have
a draft deeper than seven feet, due to the shallow water. More than once were ships sent
to the Sounds that were of no use simply because the amount of water needed to float
them was not to be had. Rowan complained:
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“The tug Tempest of Washington chartered for the expedition at $100 per day,
is useless to me in consequence of her draft of water 9 1/2 ft. I used her in putting
down buoys on the bar which is the principle service that she has rendered.
Five tugs of 4 to 5 ft draft can be obtained for this price and would render
valuable service in this strong tide way and if armed with a howitzer would be
very valuable in the sound.” 4
A number of small schooners had been purchased by the government to sink in the
channels to block them up, and Rowan again suggests that such vessels could be put to
better use in bringing coal and other supplies. 5
Rowan also availed himself of the opportunity to state his opinion of the
importance of the area to Welles, a view that was common among the officers, Army and
Navy alike, who were familiar with the area. Rowan argued that if the War Department’s
aim was to operate offensively on the Southern coast, the following should be observed:
“troops can be encamped in large numbers on a wooded beach of fifteen miles in
length with water I think in sufficient quantities by digging wells three feet deep.
The line of operations can be extended at pleasure to Ocracoke and continued to
Cape Lookout and Beaufort by means of the sound and Neuse river. Once in
possession of Beaufort we have a fine harbor with 15 ft on the bar.” 6
Rowan wrote several other letters, addressed to the Flag Officer, the Secretary of
the Navy, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, relaying information about the area
and rumors heard from locals and pro-Union refugees, and also suggesting areas that
would be vulnerable to Union attack. Rowan noted, as many other officers had, that
attacks should be made on Roanoke Island, Beaufort, and New Bern; he advised the
number of troops that would be necessary and the strategies best applicable. He also
stated that their operations in the area had “spread such consternation through the state
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that ten regiments of North Carolina troops have been ordered home to protect their
homes and soil,” 7 and suggested that more aggressive activity would compel the state to
withdraw even more men from Virginia, leaving it more vulnerable to Union attack.
Rowan commented on the locals in the area, indicating that “[f]rom the most
reliable information I can obtain there are thousands of loyal men residing on the waters
of this sound, who only want protection to make themselves heard and felt in this
struggle.” 8 He observed that most secessionists had left the area for the interior of the
state, and that most of those remaining were of the poorer classes. He noted that many of
the people who lived on the islands had their property destroyed in the Union
bombardment or by the retreat of the Confederate forces in the area. In a letter to
Stringham dated September 5th, 1861, Rowan wrote that many of the poorer people from
the area had returned since Stringham’s departure and had taken the oath of allegiance to
the Union. He adds, “I would suggest the propriety of giving these poor people a little
flour; with this and the fish in the sound they can manage to subsist.” 9
Soon after Hatteras Inlet and the surrounding area fell to the Union, Stringham’s
command, formerly known as the Coast Blockading Squadron, was renamed the Atlantic
Blockading Squadron. After Stringham’s resignation in September, it was split into two
divisions—northern and southern. Command of the Northern division, responsible for
the blockade north of the border between North and South Carolina, was given to Captain
Louis M. Goldsborough. Upon assuming command in September, Goldsborough
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discovered “he had only thirteen vessels to cover the waters of North Carolina and
Virginia, excluding the Potomac River.” 10
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ROWAN AND THE UNION BLOCKADE: ROANOKE ISLAND

Despite advice from multiple high-ranking officers, Navy and Army alike, it was
almost six months before a large-scale operation in the Sounds took place. Winfield
Scott, architect of the Anaconda Plan, had fought in the Mexican War in the Gulf of
Mexico and had a profound respect for the results that could be attained with a joint
Army/Navy movement and had a working knowledge of amphibious landings. The
Burnside Expedition was planned with this overall strategy in mind; the goal was to put
an end to Confederate operations in the Sounds, including privateering and blockade
running. The inland waters of North Carolina also harbored many potential places for the
rebels to construct vessels, and it was known that the South was in the process of building
several ironclads. “It became, therefore, important for the Government, not only to clear
these sounds and their tributary waters of enemies, but to hold possession of them by a
suitable force of our own.” 1
The ships that made up the Union squadron were a strange miscellany, and in a
certain way, they represented one of the biggest changes that had occurred in the U.S.
Navy: a heavily armed little fleet. All of these vessels, which had to have a shallow
enough draft to make it over the bar, were considered small. Belying their size, several
of them were equipped with 9-inch guns; at the time the war began, the heaviest
broadside gun to be found in the English Navy was the 68-pounder—smaller than these
same 9-inch guns. The Confederates on Roanoke Island were miserably unprepared. By
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the time they realized what they were up against, the Confederates found it too late to
do much more than dig in and pray.
The Confederates, short on men and artillery, had little choice when it came to
preparing themselves for the Union attack; either they relinquished control of some of the
smaller forts in order to hold the important position of Roanoke Island, or risk spreading
their forces so thin that they stood no chance against the onslaught of the combined
Union Army/Navy assault. It was with this in mind that the Confederates abandoned
Ocracoke and Oregon Inlets and the fortifications there, and concentrated their forces on
Roanoke Island.
The Naval force consisted of the Philadelphia, Goldsborough’s flagship, the
Delaware, commanded by Rowan, the Henry Brinker, Hunchback, Morris, Southfield,
Commodore Barney, Commodore Perry, Ceres, Granite, Hetzel, William Putnam, and the
Howard. Goldsborough had also ordered five other ships, the Louisiana, Lockwood,
Seymour, Shawsheen, and Whitehall to meet them at Hatteras Inlet, where three
additional ships, the Stars and Stripes, Underwriter, and Valley City were stationed and
waiting. During the battle with force on Roanoke Island, Goldsborough placed all of the
vessels in the naval fleet under the direct command of Rowan. 2
The Army half of the expedition consisted of three brigades of men, headed by
Brigadier Generals Jesse Reno, John G. Foster, and John Parke, totaling over 15,000
men. They, along with their horses, arms, and supplies, were to be transported by twelve
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steamers: City of New York, Cossack, Eastern Queen, Eastern State, George
Peabody, Guide, Louisiana, New York, Pocahontas, Union, Northerner, and New
Brunswick. In addition, the Army had on hand thirty-two sailing vessels, nine armed
propeller-driven gunboats, and five floating batteries. Altogether the Army vessels
mounted a total of forty-seven guns. 3 The Army’s transports remained under the
command of Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside, which rankled Goldsborough; he
believed that during joint operations, the Army should leave the sailing to the sailors. He
expressed this opinion quite strongly in a letter to Fox, in which he stated that, “Duality, I
assure you, will not answer.” 4
In addition to the Navy’s armed vessels, the fleet also consisted of coal schooners
and a number of Army transports; all told, sources indicate the number of vessels was
over seventy, though most were intended to be used only as transports for men and
supplies. There was much public speculation over whether many of the ships in the fleet
were even seaworthy, and in an effort to boost morale among the men, when the force left
Washington, General Burnside chose for his headquarters the smallest ship in the lot of
them, the tug Picket. Early in January, Goldsborough wrote to Burnside that they should
leave as soon as possible, since bad weather could delay the expedition further. He was
also quick to point out that many of the Army’s vessels would not do well in bad weather
at sea. The Army convoy left Hampton Roads, after days of delays and last-minute
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preparations, on January 11, 1862, and as they were met by the Navy ships coming
from Washington.
The ships reached Hatteras Inlet on January 13, just as a severe winter storm hit,
as Goldsborough had feared. There was no anchorage outside of the bar that would have
been safe, but any attempt “to enter the narrow, shallow, crooked channel of the inlet
would only have invited destruction.” 5 They were forced to weather the storm at sea.
The winter weather was merciless. Items not secured well enough were washed
off the decks, the crews fought to keep control of the vessels, and eventually the threat of
running into each other became so great that the ships were ordered to disperse and
spread out until the severity of the weather lessened. For almost two weeks, the storms
continued, one coming right on the tail of the previous. During lulls in the wind, ships
would attempt the channel, and few of them succeeded in getting through. Several ships
were lost during this time, swamped and sunk or run aground and smashed by the surf,
including the Army transport City of New York, the Army gunboat Zouave, and the army
steamer Pocahontas; the latter was driven ashore twenty miles north of Cape Hatteras,
and of her cargo of 103 horses, only 19 were saved. Luckily, her crew of thirty men all
survived. 6 The weather did not abate until the 23rd, almost two weeks later.
Once past the inlet, the ships had to make it over what was called “the swash” or
“the bulkhead”—a wide sandbar the ships had to cross on their way into Pamlico Sound.
Either they had been misinformed about the amount of water on the bar, or the stormy
winter weather had washed much more sand onto the swash; either way, they had been
5
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mistaken on the draft required of the ships to enter the sound. In addition, Army
officials purchasing vessels for the expedition had, in a few instances, been lied to about
the draft of the vessels being purchased. Most of the Navy vessels made it over the
swash without much trouble, but many of the Army vessels simply drew too much water
to make it over, even with lightening their loads.
According to Burnside, they had been led to believe that there was eight feet of
water on the swash, when in reality there was closer to six. Even eight feet would have
been a stretch for many of the vessels in the fleet; six was simply impossible for most.
The channel had to be deepened. Burnside wrote that what saved the whole expedition
was the swiftness of the current on the swash; when the tide rolled out, all of the water
had to flow over the swash which, considering the amount of water, was quite narrow.
Burnside described the process that these circumstances allowed them to utilize:
“Large vessels were sent ahead, under full steam, on the bar when the tide was
running out, and then anchors were carried out by boats in advance, so as to hold
the vessels in position. The swift current would wash the sand from under them
and allow them to float, after which there were driven farther on by steam and
anchored again, when the sand would again wash out from under them. This
process was continued for days, until a broad channel of over eight feet was made,
deep enough to allow the passage of the fleet into the sound.” 7

On January 26, the Union forces managed to get their largest steamer over the barrier,
and it anchored in the sound to await the rest of the vessels. Despite this success, it was
not until February 4 that the entire fleet had finally made it over the swash.
Goldsborough was quick to note, in his report to Welles on January 29 that the
delay was due to the Army vessels, and not those of the Navy, and that this had been the
7
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case since the 19 . He wrote that if the Army troops were not absolutely necessary
for the conquest of the island and for occupational purposes afterward, “I should have
moved off alone with my own branch of the expedition more than a week ago.” 8 By the
time all of the vessels were finally over the swash and into Pamlico Sound on February 4,
the adverse weather and the issues with the draft of the vessels had cost the Union force
nearly a month in delays.
Though the Confederates knew that an attack on Roanoke Island was imminent,
little was done to prepare for it. Brigadier General D. H. Hill had been entrusted with the
defense of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds; he had repeatedly insisted that more men
were needed, and better arms, but the Confederate government did very little to help.
Confederate forces were stretched too thin as it was, and President Davis believed it
would be foolish to withdraw troops from Virginia to defend the North Carolina coast.
Hill did his best he could with what he had. He ordered a line of earthworks to be
constructed across the island and a fort to be relocated to the southern half of the island,
but he was transferred back to Virginia before these orders were carried out. 9 Brigadier
General Henry A. Wise was then given charge of the area from Norfolk to Roanoke
Island. He, too, lobbied the government for additional men and artillery for the defense
of the area, even traveling to Richmond himself when Burnsides’ forces were tenaciously
inching their way into Pamlico Sound. Wise was also denied assistance.

8
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Moreover, Wise had surveyed the island personally, and stated bluntly in a
report that “Not a fort was in the right position” 10; in this he was very much in agreement
with General Hill on the folly of not having a single gun on the southern half of the
island. He stated that if the five batteries had been placed on the islands in the marshes at
the channel through which the Union fleet would eventually pass, and flanking the
channel on the eastern side of the island, the Confederacy would have had every possible
approach to the island guarded and would have been able to prevent any landing on the
island.
While Wise was unimpressed with Lynch’s Mosquito Fleet, he regarded the two
North Carolina regiments on the island, the Eighth and the Thirty-first, along with three
companies from the Seventeenth, as woefully inadequate. He reported later than when he
arrived on the island, the infantry was “undrilled, unpaid, not sufficiently clothed and
quartered, and were miserably armed with old flint muskets in bad order.” He reported
that the defenses on the island “were a sad farce of ignorance and neglect combined,” and
inexcusably weak. He characterized Lynch’s “Mossquito Fleet” as nothing but “imbecile
gunboats.” 11
The lack of defenses on the entire southern half of the island is perhaps the most
shocking neglect the Confederates made in terms of preparation. Neither Hill nor Wise
could fathom why all of the forts were placed on the northern half, and Wise made
particular note of the singular battery on the eastern side. He stated that the Union “could
10
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have taken the island in two hours easier than they did in two days” had they only
landed on the eastern side of the island in the rear of all the batteries. The only defense
located on that side of the island, Ballast Point, was equipped with only two guns. 13
The rebels mistakenly assumed there was only one way for the enemy to approach
once ashore: along the road leading over the narrowest stretch of the island between
Ashby’s Harbor, where the Union soldiers landed, and Fort Bartow at Pork Point. The
little battery there had only three guns, but the Confederates were unconcerned because
they believed the territory along either side of the road was impenetrable; both sides were
flanked by dense swamp, and trees were felled directly along the road. The rebels
believed the enemy would be forced to approach directly up the road and would be
bottlenecked in the face of their guns. This was their undoing; two Union Army officers
led forces up either side of the road through the swamp, while the main force advanced
directly up the road. Though their movements were not coordinated, the two forces
emerged almost simultaneously from the swamp and attacked in a pincer movement that
dissolved the Confederate defense and forced them to retreat.
Meanwhile, the defenses along the water were faced with the Union Navy. There
were four Confederate forts on the western side of the island: Fort Bartow, on Pork Point,
mounting eight 32-pounder smooth-bores and one 68-pounder rifled gun; Fort Huger, on
Wier’s Point, mounting ten 32-pounder smooth-bores and two 68-pounder rifles; Fort
Blanchard, between the two, mounting four 32-pounder smooth-bores; and Fort Forrest,
situated on the mainland across Croatan Sound opposite Fort Blanchard. Fort Forrest had
12
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been built to serve primarily as a defense of the obstructions that blocked Croatan
Sound, which consisted of two rows of sunken vessels and piles placed at an angle. The
Confederate Navy force, drawn up behind these obstructions, consisted of eight gunboats
mounting a total of seventeen guns, and was commanded by Commander Lynch.
Despite the fact that Wise maintained the batteries were misplaced, they were still
arranged in a manner that defended that particular area well. The rebels were
experienced with the terrain and had their guns trained on the areas where the Union
Navy would be forced to sail through the sound. The shallow water and the narrow strait
left little room for maneuverability, even for vessels considered small. In addition,
several of the Union vessels, though well-armed, were not sturdy enough to endure the
fire of the rebels’ heavy guns, and all had suffered from the journey and its necessary
extended exposure to the elements, as had the men.
Before the Union advance, Goldsborough had reported to Welles that “We have
no very recent intelligence from Roanoke Island, nor can we, despite our efforts, procure
any.” 14 There was concern over whether or not the rebels had managed to place artillery
in two specific areas that had previously been undefended: at the marshes, where the
navigable waterway was narrow, and near Ashby’s Harbor or Sandy Point (roughly half a
mile north), where they intended to land the Army. Rowan, commanding the naval
division under Goldsborough, wrote to his commanding officers on February 2nd
regarding their advance; he warned them of the possibility of meeting the enemy vessels
near the marshes, and the possibility of a battery placed at the narrow part of the river.
He included a map of the area, on which he had marked the location where they feared a
14
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battery might be located and the route the vessels were to take and in what manner.
Rowan wrote that his objective was,
“to preserve the order of advance in three columns abreast till we approach the
pass, where the leaders of the columns will so arrange themselves on a bow and
quarter bearing on the Stars and Stripes which will enable each of the three
vessels to keep up a fire on the fort in approaching and passing it. Having passed
the battery, the order abreast will be restored, after which we must be governed by
circumstances.” 15
Early on the morning of the 5th of February, the vessels prepared to advance, the
Navy vessels leading the way in the previously arranged three columns, and the Army
transports following behind. The three columns were headed by LieutenantCommanding Reed Werden in the USS Stars and Stripes, Lieutenant-Commanding A.
Murray in the USS Louisiana, and Lieutenant-Commanding H.K. Davenport in the USS
Hetzel. Commander Rowan, Goldsborough’s tactical commander, had chosen the
Delaware, one of the smallest armed vessels in the fleet, as his flag-ship, and was on
board that vessel. Due to the complications of moving so large a force, progress was
slow, and the vessels anchored, still in formation, off Stumpy Point near sundown.
The following morning was foggy, and though visibility was limited they pressed
forward. Goldsborough moved from the Philadelphia to the Southfield before they left
their anchorage, a move that he had notified Rowan about in a previous letter. 16 Two of
the Navy’s smaller vessels, the Putnam and the Ceres, steamed a mile or so ahead of the
main body of the fleet, on the lookout for enemy vessels and obstructions that might be
concealed in the water. At roughly nine in the morning, Goldsborough reported, the
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weather cleared just long enough for them to see the enemy’s vessels anchored close
to the shore of the island, near Fort Blanchard. An hour and a half later the weather
worsened, and the combination of the fog, wind and rain forced them to anchor for the
night, still as near in formation as they could be. Goldsborough stated that “one of the
enemy’s steamers approached the marshes for the purpose, no doubt, of reconnoitering
our force. She met with no opposition from us, simply because we were not unwilling
that she should accomplish her wishes.” 17
By the next morning, the weather had cleared, and the signal was given once
again to move. The Underwriter was sent ahead in addition to the Ceres and the Putnam,
for the purpose of determining whether or not a battery had been placed on Sandy Point,
near where they intended to land the Army. On approaching the marshes at the southern
tip of the island it was discovered that, contrary to their fear, no fortifications of any kind
had been erected there. As the passage was narrow enough that only two ships abreast
could pass at one time, two of the columns steamed ahead through the channel into
Croatan Sound, and then waited for the third, as Rowan had previously ordered them to
do if the point was unguarded.
The enemy vessels, Commodore Lynch’s “Mosquito Fleet”, were still drawn up
where they had been sighted previously, behind a double row of obstructions that
stretched across the sound. These were composed of sunken vessels and pilings set at a
45-degree angle and cut off below the waterline. As the Union vessels came into view,
one of the Confederate steamers fired a single shot, probably intended as a warning for
the troops ashore that the Union was advancing. The Underwriter, well ahead of the
17

Goldsborough to Welles, 18 February 1862, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 6, 550-5.

135
main body, fired at Sandy Point, and when she received no answer, signaled that there
was no battery there. 18 Had the Confederates placed fortifications at that point, the
landing of the Union Army would have been much more difficult.
The combined force of Navy and Army vessels moved slowly forward, and began
to fire on the enemy vessels, the battery located between Pork and Wier Points, and the
battery positioned on Redstone Point, though most of their fire was focused on Fort
Bartow on Pork Point. A letter from Colonel Shaw, a replacement for Wise, who had
fallen ill, revealed that at that time, the only battery able to return fire was Fort Bartow,
and that “at no time could more than four guns of that battery be brought to bear upon the
enemy, and that when he left, at 4 p.m., two of the guns there had been disabled.” 19 At
about 1:30, Goldsborough reported that the barracks behind Fort Bartow caught fire due
to the shelling. By this point, the ships had all moved into prime positions for firing on
the fortifications, and by 3:00 PM the Army transports were moving in for the landing.
Goldsborough reported shallow water even at a mile distant; he reported,
“scarcely a general depth at low water of more than 7 feet is to be found. With one or
two exceptions none of our vessels drew less than 7 feet, and some of them drew rather
more than 8.” 20 Owing to the shallow water, most of the Navy vessels were forced to
remain more than a mile out, but the little Delaware, with Rowan on board, drew a mere
six feet of water, and was able to get much closer. 21 Goldsborough reported that the
landing site of Ashby’s Harbor was guarded by a group of rebels with a field battery, but
18

Ibid.
Charles B. Duffield to Benjamin Huger, 8 February 1862, in ORA, ser. I, vol. 9, 153-4.
20
Goldsborough to Welles, 18 February 1862, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 6, 550-5.
21
Naval Historical Center. “Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships.”
http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/d3/delaware-iv.htm
19

136
Rowan, who had positioned the Delaware just south of Pork Point, “immediately
turned her guns toward the harbor, and with some 9-inch shrapnels soon cleared the
way.” 22
At 4:30, the battery from the fort was silenced, the Confederate fleet retreated out
of the line of fire, and the Union Army immediately began to land their force. Each of
Burnsides’ three brigades were equipped with a shallow-draft, quick little steamer, which
each speedily towed around twenty surfboats, packed with as many soldiers (and as few
sailors to maximize the force being landed) as each craft could manage, in a long line
toward the shore. When signaled, the surfboats cast off the towline, and used their
momentum to arc toward the shore in a line, and as soon as the water was shallow
enough, the men leaped out of the boats, leaving the sailors to return the surfboats to the
main naval force. General Burnside noted in his report,
“In less than twenty minutes from the time the boats reached the shore 4,000 of
our men were passing over the marshes at a double-quick and forming in most
perfect order on the dry land near the house; and I beg leave to say that I never
witnessed a more beautiful sight than that presented by the approach of these
vessels to the shore and the landing and forming of the troops.” 23

This landing was covered by Rowan’s guns from the Delaware and by Captain T. P. Ives
aboard the Picket. Brigadier General John G. Foster, commanding one of the brigades,
wrote in his report, regarding Rowan and Ives covering the landing, “This was
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handsomely done, although it required but a few shells to accelerate the retreat of the
force from Ashbys.” 24
At 5:00, the rebel batteries began firing again, and the enemy vessels reappeared,
but in short order the Union Naval vessels had them again retreating, and the Confederate
steamer Curlew, having been injured in the engagement, was forced to take refuge under
the guns of the Fort Forrest on Redstone Point. The Captain of the vessel, Commander
Thomas T. Hunter, had intended on grounding her to keep her from sinking; in this he
succeeded, but, unfortunately for the Confederates, he grounded her directly in front of
the Fort, rendering several of her guns useless against the enemy. 25 The Forrest was also
forced to retire from the battle, having had her propeller displaced, 26 and the rest
remained engaged until they ran out of ammunition, at which point Commodore Lynch,
unable to find ammunition on the island, left for Elizabeth City, with the Forrest in tow,
intending to resupply and return. There he found enough ammunition to arm two of his
steamers, but as he was heading back on the 9th, he learned that Roanoke Island had been
lost. 27
Six of the Navy’s launches landed their howitzers under the command of
Midshipman Benjamin H. Porter and joined the army. When the sun began to set,
Goldsborough ordered a cease-fire; the fire from the battery at Pork Point had abated, and
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he did not wish to waste ammunition. Rowan, in the Delaware, landed 800 men from
the Hossack around 10:00 PM, and by midnight roughly 10,000 Union troops were
ashore. 28
The Army spent a wet and miserable night ashore, and, as Burnside had ordered,
was up and moving early the next morning. Since the path the Army was to take would
undoubtedly led them straight through the Navy’s line of fire, Burnside and
Goldsborough had agreed the night before that, until the latter had received word that the
men were out of range, he would give no order for the Navy’s vessels to fire upon the
rebels. 29 However, Goldsborough reported that by 9:00 AM a continuous fire could be
heard coming from the interior of the island, and, assuming that this meant the Union
men were well out of the way, he gave the order to engage the forts again without waiting
for word from Burnside. When the sounds of fire from the interior abated, he gave the
order to cease firing, “taking it for granted that our troops were carrying everything
before them, and thus fast approaching the rear of the batteries.” 30 Goldsborough was
about to order to resume firing, but Rowan came aboard the ship and recommended that
they desist for the time being. 31
Meanwhile, the Navy turned their focus on the obstructions across the Sound and
on Fort Forrest, which had its eight guns positioned to defend them. The steamer Curlew
was still grounded in front of the fort, masking several of its guns from firing on the naval
force behind the line of obstructions, but vessels crossing the barricade could be
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vulnerable to others. Crossing could also put the vessels in range of the other
batteries on the shore of Roanoke Island. As soon as Goldsborough felt it safe to make
the attempt, he gave the order for the Underwriter, Valley City, Seymour, Lockwood,
Ceres, Shawsheen, Putnum, Whitehead, and Brinker to attempt to find a way over; once
one ship found a navigable way across, the rest quickly followed, leading the way for the
Navy’s advance into Albemarle Sound. Almost simultaneously, Goldsborough reported,
“the American flag was hoisted over the battery at Pork Point, and in a few minutes
afterward the enemy himself fired the works at Redstone Point, and also the steamer
Curlew. Both blew up in the early part of the evening.” 32 Roanoke Island had been won.
Confederate Brigadier General Wise in describing the loss, was quoted thusly:
“[S]uch is the importance and value, in a military point of view, of Roanoke
Island, that it ought to have been defended by all the means in the power of the
Government. It was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two
sounds (Albemarle and Currituck); eight rivers (the North, West Pasquotank,
Perquimans, Little, Chowan, Roanoke, and Alligator); four canals (the Albemarle
and Chesapeake, Dismal Swamp, Northwest, and Suffolk); and two railroads (the
Petersburg and Norfolk and the Seaboard and Roanoke). It guarded more than
four-fifths of all Norfolk’s supplies of corn, pork, and forage, and it cut the
command of General Huger off from all of its most efficient transportation. It
endangers the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the navy-yard at Gosport,
and to cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communications
with the South. It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras,
gives them a rendezvous, and large, rich range of supplies, and the command of
the seaboard from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have been defended at
the expense of 20,000 men and of many millions of dollars.” 33

32

Ibid.
Report of the investigating Committee in the Confederate House of Representatives,
regarding the capitulation of Roanoke Island, 10 February 1862, in ORA, ser. I, vol. 9,
183-91.
33

140
As it was, the island had fallen to the Union at surprisingly little cost of life. The
Army reported 37 men killed, 214 wounded, and 13 missing; 34 and the Navy 6 killed, 17
wounded, and 2 missing. 35 Goldsborough noted that, given the heat of the enemy’s fire
and the number of times the vessels had been struck, it was remarkable that there were
not many more casualties. Noting the same reasons, he stated that it was equally
remarkable that the ships themselves had not suffered more. He was generous in his
commendations of the officers and men, but none more so than Commanders Rowan and
Case:
“It is really difficult for me to state in adequate terms how largely I feel myself
indebted to Commanders Rowan and Case for their constant and signal services
throughout, from the very inception of the expedition to the consummation of the
achievement in view. They, hand in hand, with their marked ability and sound
sense, and in the absence of all ordinary facilities, brought about, at Hampton
Roads, the arming, manning, and equipment of the many vessels sent to us, from
necessity, in an unprepared condition; and subsequently, they both labored most
conspicuously and faithfully, in their respective spheres of action, to vanquish
difficulties at the inlet and the enemy at Roanoke. In short, their assistance to me
has been invaluable.” 36

The conquest of Roanoke Island on February 7-8, 1862, left Wilmington the only
Confederate port on the entire North Carolina coast that had not been taken by the Union.
Combined with Flag Officer Du Pont’s victory along the coast of Florida and Georgia
shortly after, this left only Charleston and Wilmington open to blockade runners.
Goldsborough wasted no time in tying up loose ends, the most obvious of which was
Commodore Lynch’s Mosquito Fleet, which had disappeared the day before to acquire
more ammunition for his guns, missing the surrender of Roanoke Island.
34
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ROWAN’S DEFEAT OF THE “MOSQUITO FLEET”

Rowan, following the fall of Roanoke Island, set off through Albemarle Sound in
pursuit of Lynch's fleet. He took with him all the ammunition they could scrape together,
and fourteen vessels of the Naval force, all crafts with, he hoped, light enough draft for
them to be navigable in the river. They were, with their commanders, the Louisiana,
Lieutenant Commanding Murray; the Hetzel, Lieutenant Commanding Davenport; the
Underwriter, Lieutenant Commanding Jeffers; the Delaware, Lieutenant Commanding
Quackenbush; the Commodore Perry, Lieutenant Commanding Flusser; the Valley City,
Lieutenant Commanding Chaplin; the Morse, Acting Master Hays; the Seymour, Acting
Master Wells; the Whitehead, Acting Master French; the Lockwood, Acting Master
Graves; the Ceres, Acting Master MacDiarmid; the Shawsheen, Acting Master
Woodward; the Brinker, Acting Master Giddings; the Putnam, Acting Master Hotchkiss.
Rowan kept the doughty Delaware as his flagship, and commanded the force from that
vessel. 1
As they proceeded through Albemarle Sound toward the river, two enemy
steamers were sighted along the shore. Lynch's report reveals that these two steamers
were the Sea Bird and the Appomatox, with Lynch himself commanding the former. 2
Rowan gave the order to pursue them, but after entering the Pasquotank River he
1
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withdrew the order; night was falling and he desired to keep the fleet together as
much as possible. They steamed over the bar, slowly so as to keep everyone together,
and made their way upstream to within ten miles of Fort Cobb, on Cobbs Point, and at
around 8:00 PM they anchored for the night. Lynch continued on the Elizabeth City and
made what preparations he could for the battle he knew was coming.
That night Rowan called all of the commanding officers to his ship, and he
informed them that the enemy ships had either drawn up behind the battery on Cobbs
Point and were preparing to fight, or else they had fled to Norfolk by way of the canal.
Rowan reminded them of their low ammunition supply, having but twenty rounds for
each gun. He laid out a plan that would bring them in close to the enemy to reconnoiter;
no one was to fire a shot until the order was given. To further economize ammunition,
Rowan directed that each vessel, in approaching the enemy, “should run him down and
engage him hand to hand.” 3
At sunrise the next morning, the flotilla proceeded up the river in the manner
Rowan had ordered the night before; the Underwriter, the Perry, the Morse, and the
Delaware led the way, the Ceres on the right flank, with the rest of the force following
behind. At 8:30 AM, the enemy fleet was sighted, drawn up behind the Fort Cobb
battery as had been suspected. The seven vessels were lined up across the river in front
of the town, with the schooner Black Warrior moored on the far side of the river from the
Fort. As soon as the Union flotilla was within range, the fort and gunboats of the enemy
opened fire on them, but none was returned, as Rowan had commanded. "Our force how
ever,” Rowan wrote, “moved on silently and steadily, shot and shell passing over the
3
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vessels in advance and falling thick and fast among the vessels in the main columns.”
When Rowan’s forces came within three-quarters of a mile of the battery, he signaled,
“’Dash at the enemy.’ Our fire was then opened with telling effect, and our vessels put to
their utmost speed." 4
The Confederates had known, thanks to Commodore Lynch's narrow escape the
day before, that the Union flotilla was on its way, and who was in command. Captain
William Harwar Parker of the Beaufort recollected later, "Commodore Stephen C. Rowan
was in command of the Federal vessels, and we knew him to be a dashing officer." 5
They had done what they could to prepare, dividing their limited supply of ammunition
as equally as possible between the vessels, and had anchored in their positions across the
river. Not much else could be done. When it was reported to Lynch that Rowan's force
had been sighted coming up the river, he hastened to Fort Cobb, which he found was not
garrisoned, and manned by a civilian and a mere seven militiamen. "As the battery was
our principal reliance, and the enemy must pass it before reaching the gunboats, I
determined to defend it in person." 6 He sent orders to Lieutenant Commanding Parker of
the Beaufort, and told him to bring to the battery his ammunition, officers and crew, save
for just enough to take the Beaufort up the canal. In his writings later in life, Parker
recollected his response, and the answer of the messenger: "'Where the devil,' I asked,
'are the men who were in the fort?' 'All run away'." 7 Of the men Lynch found manning
the battery, only the civilian remained; the militiamen deserted, leaving Lynch and the
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men from the Beaufort with enough manpower to bring only two of the 32-pounders
to bear on the advancing Union vessels.
Lynch reported, "The enemy advanced very boldly and, contrary to my
expectation, instead of taking position as he did at Roanoke island for the purpose of
shelling the battery, he continued to press on; in one hour and five minutes succeeded in
passing it, and, with full compliments of men, closed upon our half manned gunboats." 8
Once the Union vessels were past the battery, the Valley City and the Whitehead turned
and opened on the fort from behind, as Rowan had ordered them to do. Lynch spiked the
guns and withdrew; the guns had been mounted in such a way that they could not be
turned to face upstream.
Lynch had ordered his men to remain until their ammunition ran out, and then to
attempt to escape through the canals. If they could not escape, they were to burn their
signal books, set fire to the vessels, and abandon ship. In the face of Rowan's aggressive
advance, however, the rebel forces panicked. The Union flotilla tore relentlessly into the
Confederate squadron. "The enemy seemed to become demoralized at this unexpected
and determined movement." The crew of the Black Warrior set her on fire and
abandoned her. The Commodore Perry ran down Lynch's flagship the Seabird and
rammed her, sinking her; her officers and crew were taken prisoner. The Ellis was
boarded by the crew of the Ceres, and was captured, in part thanks to a slave who had
been pressed into serving as a coal heaver on the vessel; Lieutenant Commander J. W.
Cooke had ordered the vessel to be set on fire and abandoned, but the slave prevented the
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vessel's destruction. The Fanny was run aground by her crew, who set fire to the
ship before abandoning her; despite the ship being in flames, men from the Delaware
boarded her for the purpose of retrieving the Confederate flag the fleeing rebels had left
flying. The Appomattox and the Beaufort managed to escape up the canal, but only the
Beaufort made it to Norfolk; Captain Sims, on making it to the canal's lock, found that
his vessel was a mere two inches too wide to make it through. Sims ordered the ship
burned. 10
Rowan led several of the ships to the city, and they sighted a battery of field
artillery fleeing. A party from the Union flotilla sent to investigate came upon "a
mounted artillery officer of the Wise Legion, who, in obedience to orders from General
Henningsen, was compelling the defenseless people to set fire to the houses... No other
houses were destroyed besides those set on fire under the direction of Lieutenant Scroggs,
of the Wise Legion." 11 Scroggs was arrested and brought to Rowan, but not before ha
had managed to convince the inhabitants to set several buildings on fire. "A curious
incident, truly, in war," Ammen wrote, "when the enemy becomes the protector against
the senseless injuries inflicted by pretended friends." 12 Rowan's force prevented any
other buildings from being set on or catching fire, but he did not allow the men to attempt
to put out the fires that had already been set, knowing that "we would be charged with
vandalism as incendiaries." 13
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Rowan ordered the Confederate storehouses emptied, and fresh beef, bread,
and flour were taken. Three vessels, including the Forrest, which had been disabled
during the battle at Roanoke Island, were found at the shipyard, and, none being worth
salvaging, were burned. An attempt was made to save both the Fanny and the Black
Warrior, but to no avail. The Union force salvaged what they could from the wrecks, and
fished up artillery from the sunken vessels. Rowan sent engineers to destroy the
machinery and boilers in the shipyard, along with the railway line. Lieutenant
Commanding Flusser was ordered to destroy the battery at Cobbs Point, which was done
after he had everything of value removed, including armament and supplies, all of which,
Rowan stated, had been taken from the Norfolk Navy Yard.
Rowan received much praise for this bold and decisive victory. Daniel Ammen,
naval historian and a Rear Admiral who fought in the Civil War himself, stated, "Nothing
more brilliant in naval "dash" occurred during the entire civil war than appears in this
attack." 14 Admiral David Porter was also impressed, and wrote in his history of the Civil
War,
“Although this was comparatively a small affair, it was one of the best conceived
and best executed battles of the war... The attack of the Union vessels was like the
spring of a pack of greyhounds upon a brood of foxes—it was just such a scene as
naval officers delight in.” 15

Rowan was also very pleased with the conduct of his commanders, and after the
battle he issued a commendatory order to the entire little fleet:
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“The commander of the flotilla in Albemarle Sound avails himself of
the earliest moment to make a public acknowledgment of the coolness, gallantry,
and skill displayed by the officers and men under his command in the capture and
destruction of the enemy’s battery and squadron at Cobbs Point.
“The strict observance of the plan of attack, and the steady but onward
course of the ships, without returning a shot until within three-quarters of a mile
of the fort, excited the admiration of our enemies.
“The undersigned is particularly gratified at the evidence of the high
discipline of the crews in refraining from trespassing in the slightest degree upon
the private property of defenseless people in a defenseless town. The generous
offer to go on shore and extinguish the flames applied by the torch of a vandal
soldiery upon the houses of their own defenseless women and children is a
striking evidence of the justness of our cause, and must have its effect in teaching
our deluded countrymen a lesson in humanity and civilization.” 16
One incident in particular that Rowan made special note of was the action of John
Davis, the gunner’s mate of the Valley City, who prevented an open barrel of gunpowder
from igniting by sitting on it. Lieutenant Commander Chaplin, in his report of the
engagement, wrote,
“I take pleasure in again bearing testimony to the gallant conduct of the officers
and crew of this vessel; and particularly I desire to bring under your notice the
cool intrepidity and thorough practical seaman-ship displayed by Masters Mate J.
A. J. Brooks in maneuvering this vessel while under the hottest of the enemys
[sic] fire. Also to the undaunted presence of mind of the gunners mate, John
Davis, who, while at his station in the magazine, when the shell penetrated the
side and ignited the berth deck, as above reported, did cover a barrel of powder
with his own person, thereby preventing an explosion, while at the same time
passing powder, providing for the gun divisions on the upper deck.” 17
Directly following the defeat of the Confederate squadron and the capture of
Elizabeth City, Rowan wrote to Goldsborough reporting the victory. He sent word by
way of the newly captured Ellis, which he had placed under the command of Acting
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Master Chase of the Delaware, “whom I hope you will confirm in the command.”

18

He stated that the Ellis was the only ship from the enemy squadron that they were able to
capture, along with the captain of that ship and several other prisoners. He also stated
that he intended to leave a small force at Elizabeth City and “visit the canals and take a
look into the other places before I return.” 19
Flag Officer Goldsborough was appointed commander of the North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, and he left Rowan in charge of the Federal Flotilla in the Sounds
of North Carolina. Two days after the capture of Elizabeth City, on February 12, 1862,
Rowan sent a force of four ships, consisting of the Underwriter, the Commodore Perry,
and the Lockwood, and led by Lieutenant Murray of the Louisiana, to occupy Edenton.
The few Confederate troops that were there, estimated to be between 100 and 300 men
from a flying artillery regiment, left before Union forces landed. Many of the
townspeople followed not far behind, as a result of “a vile rumor having been put in
circulation by the panic-stricken enemy that our havoc was indiscriminate at Elizabeth.” 20
Murray destroyed eight old cannon and a schooner that was on the stocks, and talked with
the remaining townsmen, who claimed to be Union men. They collected a half-dozen
bales of cotton that had been left in the custom house by the wharf. Finding no evidence
of other Confederate stores, they headed back to report to Rowan. On the way they
encountered two schooners, and captured them both, one of which was carrying a cargo
of 4,000 bushels of corn. 21
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The following morning, Rowan sent Lieutenant Commanding Jeffers of the
Lockwood to obstruct the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, plus the Shawsheen and the
Whitehead. They towed with them two schooners to sink in the canal. When they
arrived at the lock, they could see several Confederate vessels a little over a mile up the
canal, but found that the mouth of it had already been blocked by the Confederates, who
were afraid that the Union fleet would pursue them. The Whitehead fired on them with a
IX-inch gun, and they disappeared. A local revealed that the men, roughly 600 in
number, were of the Wise Legion, commanded by Wise himself. The obstructions, a
sunken schooner and a row of pilings, were inspected, along with “a fine, large dredging
machine” that was in the process of sinking. It had been “entirely destroyed by the
working party, the hull above water burned and entirely consumed.” 22 These
obstructions were fortified with the two schooners, gathered supplies and tools left by the
fleeing rebels, and headed for the mouth of the North River to report.
Rowan’s report to Goldsborough described both incidents, and included the
recommendation that Lieutenant Commanding Jeffers be sent to destroy two reported salt
works in Currituck Sound. 23 On the 18th, Goldsborough ordered Jeffers to do so. The
latter was supplied with an Army side-wheel steamer and two armed launches, manned
by an Army force of around 300 men. 24 Jeffers reported of the expedition that the rumors
of the salt works had been “greatly exaggerated… a few miserable sheds and hovels
sheltered some kettles in which the people of the surrounding country make a small
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supply, principally for their own use.”

25

Jeffers stated that these “salt works” could

be destroyed with ease, if Goldsborough desired it, but the fact that he sought to confirm
his orders indicates that he did not believe that it needed to be accomplished. He also
stated in the same report that the inhabitants of the area were undoubtedly Unionist, but
that they feared to ally themselves with them until it became clear that they had a strong
hold on the area.
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ROWAN’S ATTACK ON WINTON

Concurrent with Jeffers’ orders, Goldsborough authorized Rowan to embark on a
joint expedition with Colonel Rush Hawkins and his Zouaves. Their goal was to destroy
two railroad bridges of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroads crossing the Blackwater and
Kottoway rivers near the town of Winton, and to investigate reports of loyal Union men
in the area. 1 Hawkins joined Rowan on the Delaware, and, with the Commodore Perry,
Barney, Hunchback, Lockwood, Louisiana, Morse, and Whitehead close behind, they
steamed up the Chowan River toward Winton.
Unbeknownst to them, however, the Confederate government, in the wake of the
Roanoke Island disaster, had determined that Winton was a likely target for the Union
forces, and had rushed to fortify the little town. Lieutenant Colonel William T. Williams’
First Battalion of North Carolina Volunteers, together with several companies of militia
and a four-gun battery under the command of Captain J. N. Nichols, was sent to prevent
it from falling into enemy hands. As the Union flotilla was steaming up the river toward
the town, Colonel Williams and his force hid on the high bluff separating Winton from
the river, and bribed a mulatto woman named Martha Keen to go down and stand on the
wharf and signal to the vessels. It was Williams’ hope that the Union forces would
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believe the town to be unoccupied, and be lured to the wharf and be trapped under the
fire of Williams’ force. 2
The morning of the 19th, Rowan sent Murray in the Lockwood to reconnoiter the
area around Plymouth, and, leaving the main body of the force at the mouth of the
Roanoke River to await his return, he steamed up the river with the Perry, headed for
Winton. They had believed the town was inhabited by Union men. At 4:00 PM the town
was in sight, and the Delaware steamed toward the wharf, where Martha Keen was
standing, waving a handkerchief at them. They were within 350 yards of the landing, and
preparing to let go the anchor, when Hawkins, who was in the rigging acting as a lookout,
saw the glint of sunlight on the barrels of the guns trained on the ship from the high
bluff. 3 He shouted a warning, but the enemy force had opened fire on them long before
the pilot of the ship was able to alter the course. Hawkins scrambled down out of the
rigging amidst the fire of the enemy, descending so quickly—and so ungracefully—that
the Confederates reported that he had been hit and had fallen, and was thought to be
dead. 4 The ship was too close to be able to bring her guns to bear on the enemy, who
were elevated too high over the river. The Perry, however, had been far enough behind
the Delaware at the time of the attack that Flusser was able to fire shrapnel among the
forces on the bluff. As soon as the Delaware was capable of doing so, fire was returned.
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Rowan regrouped his forces and anchored about 7 miles below the town for the night,
and prepared to return the following morning.
Rowan, inspecting Delaware, found “185 bullet holes in and around the ship,
damage sustained from the enemy.” 5 Luckily, however, no one was injured, since most
of the men were below decks. In addition, though they had suffered damage from the
enemy’s musketry, the artillery had overshot them completely. Burnside elaborates in his
report, noting that “Several of those on deck had ball-holes through their clothes. Captain
Rowan, who was on deck, and Colonel Hawkins, in the rigging, made most miraculous
escapes.” 6
In Winton, Williams’ men celebrated what they thought had been a decisive
victory; the following morning, when Rowan’s force returned, they were completely
unprepared. When it was heard that the small naval force was steaming quickly up the
river, Williams’ force beat a hasty retreat. The vessels in the lead opened fire on the
shore to cover the landing of the troops, and Hawkins’ Zouaves leapt ashore. They met
with no opposition, and in short order had possession of the bluff and the town behind it.
Hawkins reported, “I then ordered that every building containing stores for the enemy
and occupied by them as quarters should be fired, and placed guards in the others to see
that they were not disturbed or destroyed.” 7 He maintained that his reasons for this were
twofold; one, “retaliation for trying to decoy us into a trap at the time of the firing into
the Delaware,” and secondly because the buildings that he ordered destroyed had been
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used by a rebel force that “had been raised, supported, and used by the States in
rebellion for the purpose of subverting the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.” 8 His injured pride, thanks to his embarrassingly clumsy descent from the rigging
the day before, might have had something to do with it as well.
Burnside reported that the Blackwater River had been blocked by fallen trees,
preventing the vessels from steaming further upriver, and so they were unable to
complete the other object of the expedition. 9 After the troops had embarked, Rowan took
in tow a schooner found along the wharf, dispatched the Perry and the Whitehead to
Elizabeth City, and returned to Croatan Sound. Rowan had attempted to destroy the
locks on the Dismal Swamp Canal, 10 but had been unable to do so; he reported to Flag
Officer Goldsborough:
"In consequence of the failure to destroy the locks in the dismal Swamp Canal,
and the report that the canal is being deepened for the purpose of bringing through
some iron clad vessels, one of which is now completed, another nearly so, and a
third is being built out of sight in deep creek, I deem it advisable to keep all the
force I can off Elizabeth City." 11
General Burnside spent most of the month after the attack on Roanoke Island
dealing with logistical issues of victory, which included the arrangement of the parole of
upwards of 2,500 Confederate prisoners and dealing with runaway slaves. With the
Federals in possession of the island, slaves in the state began fleeing to it in droves.
There were so many “contrabands,” as they were frequently called, that Goldsborough
8

Ibid.
A. Burnside to L. Thomas, 23 February 1862, in ORA, ser. I, vol. 9, 193-4.
10
Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers, M180”], vol. 4, 83-4.
11
Ibid., vol. 4, 91.
9

155
had to issue an order to the vessels of the Navy that they had neither the room nor the
resources to support any more of them, and that “no more of them are to be received on
board any vessel of the Navy now in these waters.” 12 Burnside, much to the dismay of
the slave owners, would not force any of the runaway slaves that made it to Roanoke
Island to return to their former masters. Instead, he gave every able-bodied slave a new
job—one with pay. They were offered the sum of $8.00 a month and a full set of
clothing in return for manual labor performed on the island. 13 After he had restored some
semblance of order to the island, he turned his eyes on New Bern.
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RIVERINE ACTION AND ROWAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS
AT THE CONQUEST OF NEW BERN

New Bern was one of the primary targets of the Burnside Expedition; it lay on the
southwest bank of the Neuse River, just under forty miles from its mouth in Pamlico
Sound. The river leading up to the town was broad and deep, making it ideal for a
combined Army/Navy attack. The Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad, which was the
area’s primary connection between the North Carolina coast and the interior of the state,
passed through the town of Goldsborough (also spelled “Goldsboro”), where it
intersected the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, a connecting lifeline for the
Confederate forces in Virginia.
Though Goldsborough had intended on being present to head the Navy’s side of
the expedition, he was called away to Hampton Roads at the last minute as a result of the
threat of the Merrimac. This left Rowan in command of the naval forces for the
expedition. He chose as his flagship the Philadelphia, and had also with him the Stars
and Stripes, the Louisiana, the Hetzel, the Delaware, the Commodore Perry, the Valley
City, the Underwriter, the Commodore Barney, the Hunchback, the Southfield, the
Morse, the Henry Brinker, and the Lockwood. These vessels met Burnsides’ force,
consisting of three brigades of roughly 11,000 men, which had embarked from Roanoke
Island, at Hatteras on March 12, and they sailed for the Neuse River.
The Army under Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside embarked on the 11th,
boarding the transports in anticipation of leaving the following morning. They met
Rowan's force near Hatteras Inlet at 7:30 the next morning, and set off for the Neuse
River. Burnside requested that Rowan send one of the gunboats to guard the mouth of

157
the Pamlico River, owing to intelligence “that two steamers were in that river."

1

Rowan dispatched the Lockwood to remain there for the night. A small enemy steamer
was sighted up the Neuse River, and Rowan sent the Delaware after it; the ship returned
after the enemy vessel ran up under the guns of one of the batteries. A little after six that
evening, within the sight of New Bern, the Union forces arrived at Slocum's Creek, some
16 miles from the town, the site Burnside had selected for the Army's landing. The Naval
vessels anchored in three columns, and preparations were made for the landing.
At 8:30 AM, Rowan gave the order for the Delware to begin shelling the area
around Slocum's Creek, some 15 miles from New Bern, to clear the way for the landing
of the troops. An hour later, the Army began to land, along with six naval boat howitzers
under the command of Lieutenant H.S. McCook of the Stars and Stripes. Because the
Confederate commander, Brigadier General Lawrence O’Brian Branch, had received
false intelligence on the Union landing, the actual landing was unopposed. 2
As soon as all of the Army was ashore, Rowan went upriver in the Delaware to
investigate the battery at Fort Dixie, which opened fire. Rowan returned fire, as did the
Perry. Rowan went aboard the Southfield, leaving the Delaware and the Lockwood "to
amuse themselves with the battery till night," 3 and doubled back toward the landing site
at the request of General Burnside. The two determined a system of signals to use so that
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Burnside could notify Rowan of the troops' progress. As the Army progressed toward
New Bern, the fleet shadowed them, shelling the road in advance. The enemy's batteries
opened fire on the gunboats at around 4:15, as soon as they were in range. The Union
vessels returned fire until sundown, when they anchored in a position that would allow
them to cover the troops on shore. 4
The men passed a wet and miserable night on shore. The continuous rain had
made the ground muddy, hindering the progress of the men and especially the guns.
Burnside states in his report that the naval battery under Lieutenant McCook and the two
guns landed by Captains Bennett and Dayton did not reach the site where Burnside had
ordered a halt for the night until three in the morning. He blamed the "shocking
conditions of the roads" 5 for the delay. Burnside later stated that the men responsible for
the artillery could not be praised enough for the harrowing service they had performed for
the force, "as these eight pieces constituted our entire artillery force during the
engagement of the next day.” 6
Burnside had the men up and moving early the next morning. As soon as Rowan
heard firing from inland, around 6:30, he ordered the vessels to open fire ahead of the
troops’ position. Owing to the fog, the signals between the two commanders were at
times rendered useless. Throughout the battle, the fog would remain, at times "so dense
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that the position of the enemy could only be ascertained by the rattle of their
musketry and the roar of artillery." 7 As a result, the naval vessels sometimes had to guess
where their Army force was located by the sounds of the battle. Rowan knew there was
danger in continuing to shell the area; but rather than leaving them to fend for
themselves, he kept up the fire as best as he could determine.
Burnside reported the Army's advance, writing that "after an engagement of four
hours we succeeded in carrying a continuous line of field work of over a mile in length,
protected on the river flank by a battery of thirteen heavy guns and on the opposite flank
by a line of redoubts of over a half a mile in length for riflemen and field pieces, in the
midst of swamps and dense forests, which line of works was defended by eight regiments
of infantry, 500 cavalry, and three batteries of field artillery of six guns each.” 8 Burnside
and his men were able to gain access to the rear of these batteries by “a most gallant
charge” up the main road and railroad. Aiding the Union forces was the naval fleet,
“pushing its way up the river, throwing their shots into the forts and in front of us.” 9
While the Army was slowly fighting its way toward New Bern, the Navy inched
its way up the river. The Delaware and the Southfield advanced on Fort Dixie, and were
soon joined by the heavier gunboats. When no response was given, Rowan sent a boat
party ashore. They found it deserted, and wasted no time in raising the flag there.
Rowan pressed on toward Fort Ellis, where exploded magazines enabled Rowan’s men to
take the Fort. In a letter to Goldsborough, Rowan joked that one of his officers "swears
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his Stilton cheese did it."

10

Rowan had the ships line up abreast and advance on Fort

Thompson, and they opened fire on the Fort. Soon after, "an officer from General
Burnside came down to the beach and informed me that our shells were falling to the left,
and near our own troops." 11 Rowan quickly corrected the issue, continuing to fire on the
fort as the vessels advanced to the first line of obstructions in the river.
The Confederates had placed barriers at two places along the river, the first
consisting of rows of pointed pilings sunk at a 45 degree angle downstream and cut off
just below the waterline, followed by a similar row of pilings that had been capped with
iron points. This was followed by "a row of thirty torpedoes, containing about two
hundred pounds of powder each, and fitted with metal fuzes connected to spring
percussion locks with trigger-lines attached to the pointed piles." 12 When Fort Thompson
ceased firing, Rowan gave the order for the other vessels to follow, advancing through
the two barriers. The Army then raised the American flag on the fort. As they were
approaching the torpedoes, Rowan's pilot said they had to stop or risk being blown up, to
which Rowan replied that they must run some risk, and he hoped their machines would
not go off. Ayres later wrote of the exchange, "If he had only said, 'Damn the torpedoes,'
as Farragut did two years later, he would have immortalized himself." 13 Three of the
ships were slightly injured by the pilings during the advance, but none of the torpedoes
exploded. The second barrier, which was about a mile above the first, consisted of a row
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of sunken vessels, "closely massed, amid cheval-de-frise, leaving a very narrow
passage under the battery." 14
The Union vessels pressed on past the batteries along the river, firing on them and
sending landing parties on shore to raise the flag over them as they were deserted. As
they approached the wharves of the city, Rowan opened fire from the Delaware on three
steamboats, one of which had a schooner in tow, that were attempting to escape upriver.
Two of the steamers were captured, along with the schooner, and the other was run
aground and burned. 15
At about noon, Rowan brought the Delaware in along the wharf, and told the
inhabitants of the town that the Union meant them no harm. The retreating Confederates
had set multiple fires in the town, but Rowan and other naval officers managed to
convince the people there to help them extinguish the flames. A floating raft in the Trent
River, stacked high with bales of cotton soaked in turpentine, was set on fire and pushed
downstream, setting fire to the railroad bridge. Also destroyed was the draw of the
country road bridge. Rowan correctly surmised that the Confederates were trying to slow
the Union troops’ advance. General Foster's brigade, under Burnside's orders, took
"possession of the town by means of the naval vessels, which Commodore Rowan had
kindly volunteered for the purpose." 16 Rowan reported that he sent vessels at about 4:00
PM to carry the brigade of General Foster to the town so that the Army could occupy it. 17

14

Rowan to Goldsborough, 10 March 1862, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 7, 110-2.
Ibid.
16
A. Burnside to L. Thomas, 16 March 1862, in ORA, ser. I, vol. 9, 197-9.
17
Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
15

162
Rowan ordered the Louisiana and the Barney to secure any munitions and supplies
that might be found, and the Army seized the town's printing press.
Rowan reported on the forts that had been captured, both by the Army and the
Navy, of which there were nine, six of which were located along the Neuse River and the
approach to New Bern. Rowan described these six forts as "well constructed
earthworks... mounting in all thirty-two guns, ranging from 32-pounders to 80-pounders
rifled, all in barbette, with the exception of one casemated fort mounting two guns." 18
Burnside, in his report, gave a list of the results of the battle:
“The capture of nine forts, with forty-one heavy guns; two miles of
entrenchments, with nineteen field pieces; six 32-pounders not in position; over
300 prisoners; over 1,000 stand of small-arms; tents and barracks for 10,000
troops; a large amount of ammunition and army supplies; an immense amount of
naval stores, for which I refer you to Commodore Rowans report; the second
commercial city in the State of North Carolina; the entire command of the
Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds; the capture of Beaufort, Carolina, and Morehead
Cities, and the complete investment of Fort Macon, which we hope soon to
reduce.” 19
General Burnside’s generous praise of Rowan and the Navy was appropriate. He
correctly noted that Commodore Rowan and his command had provided “timely”
assistance and “great service in the accomplishment of our undertaking.” 20 In a later
report, he wrote of the telling effect that the combined Army/Navy attack had on the
Confederates. He stated that the combined movement of the Union Army and Navy had
forced the enemy to flee in the “greatest confusion.” 21 He believed that the two arms of
the service had worked together effectively and efficiently since the capture of Hatteras
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
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Inlet. Burnside praised the brave officers and sailors of Rowan’s command, and
expressed the firm conviction that they were “bound to us by the strongest ties of
friendship and companionship in arms.” 22
Rowan continued to serve on the flotilla in the Sounds, and enjoyed a congenial
relationship with the army officers, especially General Burnside. In a letter to
Goldsborough, relaying the goings-on of the area, he wrote, “I travel charmingly in
harness with the generals, particularly the chief, who is a trump.” 23 He also stated that
Burnside offered to put his vessels under Rowan’s command. 24 Burnside expressed his
desire to keep the Navy flotilla close at hand, and, after two vessels were transferred from
Rowan’s command, Burnside wrote a letter to Seward, the Secretary of War, in which he
asked him to “remind” Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, how vital Rowan’s force was
to maintaining control over the area. Burnside suggested that the naval force under
Commodore Rowan be “strengthened rather than weakened.” 25 This desire, on the part
of both Rowan and Burnside, to keep the naval force there well equipped, was fueled by
the rumors that three Confederate ironclads were near completion, and might at any
moment appear in the Sounds.
Rowan’s contributions were acknowledged on July 11, 1862, when the
Commander received the thanks of Congress, at the request of President Lincoln himself,
“for distinguished services in the waters of North Carolina and particularly in the capture
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of New Berne, being in chief command of the naval forces.”

26

This same month,

Rowan was detached from the command of the flotilla in the Sounds and ordered to
command the Powhatan, and on the 16th he was commissioned as a Captain. 27 Whereas
Rowan’s promotion was well-deserved, other officers’ promotions were questioned. For
instance, John A. Dahlgren was appointed commander of the South Atlantic Blockading
Squadron on July 6, 1863 at the request of Lincoln. He was promoted to rear admiral,
and relieved Samuel F. Du Pont as commander; many officers were rankled by his quick
and easy promotion. Du Pont himself had previously written to Fox expressing his bitter
feelings about Dahlgren:
He chose one line in the walk of his profession while Foote and I chose another;
he was licking cream while we were eating dirt and living on the pay of our rank.
Now he wants all the honors belonging to the other but without having
encountered its joltings. 28
When he heard that Du Pont was to be relieved, the first commanding officer of the New
Ironsides, Thomas Turner, who had previously been Dahlgren’s superior, also asked to
be relieved. A testimony to Rowan’s Commanding skills can be seen in his election to
command the New Ironsides. Welles recognized that Rowan was an officer with a level
head who would not likewise resent the promotion of an officer whom many felt did not
deserve it. Thus, Welles detached Rowan from the Roanoke and sent him to command
the New Ironsides.
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ROWAN AND THE UNION BLOCKADE: CHARELSTON

Fig. 4: USS New Ironsides under sail.

The New Ironsides had been one of the Union’s three original ironclad vessels; of
the three of them, she was “the least revolutionary,” but “in almost every respect, by far
the most successful.” 1 This was the only ironclad of a broadsides design during the war,
mounting a battery of two 150-pounder muzzle-loading rifles and fourteen XI-inch
smoothbore Dahlgren guns. She was 230 feet long, with a beam of 56 feet and a draft of
15 feet, 8 inches. 2 Her bulky hull made her slow, but her armor more than made up for it.
A belt of iron four and a half inches thick below her waterline encased her entirely, and
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another above it spanned 170 feet of her length. While the armor of the Monitor was
laminated, that of the New Ironsides was solid plate, which proved much more resilient.
She also proved to be much better suited to blockade duty at sea due to her height above
the waterline; monitors of early design had only one or two feet of freeboard, and even
the ones that had been built with coastal sea service in mind had a mere “2 feet, 7 inches.
The New Ironsides had a full 13 feet of freeboard, putting the bores of her guns 9-10 feet
above water, where there was no fear of interference by the sea.” 3
It was the manner in which her guns were mounted, in the manner of the old
broadside ships, that made the New Ironsides such a danger to the Confederate forts in
Charleston: her “quick-firing broadsides of 11-inch shell guns” were more effective than
the slower discharges of the other ironclad turret vessels. With the guns arranged in such
a manner, Rowan’s vessel “was more troublesome to Fort Wagner than all the monitors

Fig. 5: USS New Ironsides, on blockade, c. 7 April, 1863.
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combined.” Hence, Rowan served his time on the New Ironsides blockading
Charleston. The harbor there was naturally a defensible position and was protected by a
number of forts and batteries on the mainland lining both sides of the channel and on
Morris Island. In conjunction with the Army’s second attempt on Fort Wagner on Morris
Island, the Navy began a bombardment of the island which continued until September 8th.
During these fifty-two days, Rowan was engaged with the New Ironsides for twenty-five
of them. During the course of the action, he directly engaged Fort Wagner fourteen
times, Fort Sumter four times, Fort Gregg five times, and Fort Moultrie two times.
Rowan kept careful record of the ship’s firing throughout the bombardment, and in his
report he stated that he had fired 4,439 shots, ranging in distances from 1200 yards (as
close as her draft would allow) to 2500 yards. He also kept careful record of the number
of times the ship was hit and the damage done; she was struck 164 times, “mostly by
solid 10 in shot fired with very heavy charges,” 5 and though she did suffer some damage,
due to the strength of her armor it was not enough to force her out of action for repairs.
Admiral David Porter praised Rowan and his command of the New Ironsides. He,
too, noted that there “was no vessel the enemy so heartily dreaded as the Ironsides. Her
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well drilled crew and expert gunners made her anything but welcome when she
brought her broadsides to bear upon any of the forts.” 6
Perhaps the most notable engagement Rowan participated in was the last, on
September 8th. During the course of the battle, the Weehawken grounded between Sumter
and Cummings Point and was helplessly exposed to the fire of Fort Moultrie. Rowan
steamed the New Ironsides between the fort and its target, completely covering the
Weehawken. He anchored with his port broadside bearing on the fort, and over the next
two hours and fifty-five minutes, Rowan fired 483 at the various forts and batteries. In
his report to Dahlgren, he stated:
“I soon discovered that we suffered severely from their other batteries of X-inch
guns, between Moultrie and Beauregard, when I directed two guns to open on
each of them. One of the heaviest guns in these works was dismounted and the
fire of the others sensibly slackened. I then directed one gun to continue rapid fire
on each of these forts and directed the remaining five to open on Moultrie.
The fire of all the forts slackened down to an occasional gun, when I directed a
slow fire to be kept up to economize shell. The moment the enemy discovered
this, he jumped from behind his sand bags and opened fire rapidly. I renewed our
rapid fire and silenced him again.” 7
Rowan did not withdraw until he had a mere thirty shells left, and he continued
firing these on Fort Moultrie as he weighed anchor. The Weehawken was off soon after.
She needed repairs, but was back on blockade duty by October. The carpenter’s report
stated that “Seventy hits can be counted, but the woodwork on the spar deck is so much
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cut up that we were probably struck near a hundred times.” There were a few
injuries, but no one was killed. Likewise, Commander Edmund R. Colhoun, commander
of the Weehawken, reported three injuries, but no deaths. 9 Commander Stevens, in his
report to Welles, referred to the incident as “the most formidable and severe action which
has occurred between ironclads and land batteries.” 10 Welles commended Rowan and his
crew for their defense of the ship, and wrote, “it was gratifying to them [all present] to
observe, and the Department is equally gratified to learn of, the gallant manner in which
the Weehawken was defended.” 11
The Confederates recognized the danger that the New Ironsides posed, and
frequently she was the main target of their fire during engagements. Several attempts
were made on the vessel, none of which succeeded. General Beauregard himself
advocated a torpedo attack on her, firmly of the belief that the loss of the New Ironsides
would have a demoralizing effect on the Union fleet. 12 During Rowan’s time as her
commander, two separate attempts were made by the Confederates to blow her up using
vessels equipped with torpedoes. The first occurred in August, during the middle of the
bombardment of Charleston, on the night of August 20 at around 10:00 PM. Ensign
Benjamin H. Porter sighted a low, quick-moving craft coming toward the New Ironsides,
and hailed it. The vessel was a torpedo craft called the Torch, and it was captained by
James Carlin, who called out claiming that the vessel was the U.S.S. Live Yankee. Carlin
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had ordered the engines to be turned off when he believed the vessel’s course would
take them directly by the New Ironsides, but they would not start again. Carlin
misjudged the vessel’s course, and they passed harmlessly by. He had intended to attempt
another pass if the first attempt to hit the vessel with a spar torpedo failed, but after the
trouble with the engines, he decided against it. 13
The second attempt was a little more advanced; the C.S.S. David was built
specifically for torpedo attacks. Her single spar torpedo packed roughly 100 pounds of
gunpowder. 14 Her commanding officer, Lieutenant William T. Glassell, approached the
New Ironsides on the night of October 5, 1863, with the intention of disabling the vessel
with the torpedo. The sentinels stationed on the deck spotted a small, low object in the
water, approaching the ship. Acting Ensign Charles W. Howard, officer of the deck,
called out, but he received no answer. He ordered the sentinels to fire on the object, and
directly after he gave the order, he was shot by one of the men on the David. The
sentinels fired on the vessel, “and immediately the ship received a very severe blow from
the explosion, throwing a column of water upon the spar deck and into the engine
room.” 15
The sentinels continued to fire on the craft, and Rowan dispatched two cutters to
look for it. The plume of water thrown up by the explosion, however, also hit the
Confederate vessel, and their engine fires were put out. Glassell and the other three men
on board were compelled to abandon it and swim for shore. Rowan remarked in his
report that “Glassell hailed one of our coal schooners as he drifted past, and was rescued
13
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Fig. 6: CSS David attack on the New Ironsides.
from a grave he designed for the crew of this ship.” 16 Glassell and another man from the
vessel were captured, and, having been made prisoners on the New Ironsides, revealed to
Rowan that the David was a torpedo steamer roughly fifty feet long and five feet in
diameter. The vessel looked small because the only part of it visible was “the coamings
of her hatch, which were only 2 feet above the waters edge and about 10 feet in length.” 17
There was a bit of concern that the ship might be sinking, but an initial
investigation of the damage revealed that the ship had not been harmed much. A better
look in the following days, however, revealed it to worse than originally suspected. The
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carpenter’s report turned up a long list of repairs that needed to be made, but none
that were immediately necessary. Dahlgren was reluctant to let the ship go off blockade
to sail north for repairs, and so the new Ironsides remained.
Of all the services performed by Rowan during the time he served in the Navy,
serving in the New Ironsides on the blockade of Charleston was the most trying, but also
one of the most praised. Due to the New Ironsides’ effectiveness on the blockade and her
coppered bottom, she served continually throughout Rowan’s entire service aboard her.
While the other vessels on the blockade were cycled through Port Royal so their crews
could go ashore for exercise and relaxation, the New Ironsides, “was the only vessel
never permitted the recreation and refreshment of leaving behind for a few days the
wearing and unceasing strain of the blockade.” 19 An indication of Rowan’s concern for
his men can be seen in his request to Dahlgren that the pay of the petty officers of the
ship be increased to the same amount as the pay of the other monitors. 20 He wrote that
“the berth deck is dark and too hot to be occupied; the thermometer running from 90 to
103 during warm weather.” 21 Conditions were cramped and uncomfortable, especially
due to certain measures that had to be taken in light of the danger posed by the David
vessels.
To illustrate the poor conditions, Rowan wrote that the men slept on the deck at
their guns. He reported that hammocks could not be used because the gun deck was too
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low and “too much lumbered by the gun slides.”

22

Rowan, who made two requests,

was denied; “If the increased allowance be extended to her crew,” Welles wrote, “there is
no good reason why it should not be extended to all others.” 23
Rowan was the second highest ranking officer in the Squadron, and so whenever
Dahlgren was away, he was the Commander of the naval forces in Charleston. On
February 5, 1864, Dahlgren notified Rowan that he would be away and gave him
instructions for commanding the blockade while he was away. 24 While he was gone, on
February 19, Lincoln nominated Rowan to be made a Commodore on the active list,
dating back to the 7th (his first whole day in charge of the squadron). 25 Dahlgren returned
on May 2, and resumed command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. After
relaying all pertinent information and papers to the Rear Admiral, on May 3, 1864,
Rowan wrote to Welles and asked to be relieved:
“I respectfully request that I may be relieved from my command with orders to go
North for the purpose of recruiting my health which is breaking down from a long
confinement of 10 months to this ship without opportunities of visiting the shore
for necessary exercise.” 26
It was not until June that Rowan was relieved; on the 8th of that month he was ordered to
take the New Ironsides to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, where he was to report to
Commodore Stribling. 27
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On September 1, 1864, the naval force in the Sounds of North Carolina was
made a command separate from the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and Rowan
was appointed to command it. 28 Rowan wrote to Welles and thanked him for the honor
of being considered fit for the position, but respectfully asked to have the orders revoked.
Rowan had suffered three and a half years in constant wartime command on the water,
and was still recovering health-wise from eleven months confined on the New Ironsides.
Welles responded on the 22nd of September, revoking the orders and telling Rowan to
considered himself as waiting orders. 29 This ended Rowan’s active service during the
war.
The Navy played an invaluable role during the Civil War. Though its worth has
been contested, some historians have called the Union blockade “the great fact of the
war.” 30 Historian Robert A. Doughty wrote that, according to one estimate, “84 percent
of the runners that attempted the port of Wilmington made it through (1,735 out of
2,054), with a similar ratio prevailing along the rest of the Confederate coastline." 31
Critics of the blockade have pointed to these numbers to prove its ineffectiveness. A
better estimation of its value can be made, however, if one takes into consideration the
comparison of sea trade during the war and what it had been prior to the blockade.
Before the war began, the number of vessels carrying goods in and out of Southern ports
was averaging around 5,000 a year; during the war it was closer to 1,600. The blockade
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runners also had to be small and light enough to evade the Union vessels, and so they
were undoubtedly carrying less than the merchant vessels of previous years. With these
particulars taken into consideration, the true effect of the blockade becomes more
apparent.
Upholding the blockade was certainly not the Navy's only role in the Civil War,
however, and it was arguably not even the most important. The contribution that the
blockade made to Union victory is very difficult to gauge; it is much easier to measure
the contribution the Navy made in its role regarding the support of the Union land forces.
While there was naturally very little interaction between the army and the bluewater
navy, "the army and the brownwater navy worked hand-in-glove throughout the war." 32
Joint Army/Navy operations were frequent, with the Navy primarily landing troops and
covering the Army’s landings and advances. Union control of navigable waterways by
riverine forces also facilitated the transportation of troops and supplies, and impeded
similar efforts by the Confederates. In a letter to James C. Conkling, Abraham Lincoln
wrote of the Navy, "At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the
deep blue sea, the broad bay, the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, and
wherever the ground was a little damp, they have made their tracks." 33
For the navy, the Civil War marked a number of important technological changes,
one of the most notable without a doubt being the introduction of ironclad vessels. At the
beginning of the war, the Navy had no armored vessels of any kind; throughout the
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course of the conflict, the Confederacy built twenty-one ironclad vessels, most of
which were built much like the CSS Virginia, and the Union built fifty-eight, most
patterned after the USS Monitor (the most notable exception being the New Ironsides).
Many more had been planned for, but were not completed. 34 The ironclad vessels, even
the smaller ones, were superior to older wooden ships in many ways, and, at least when it
came to coastal and riverine warfare, rendered them obsolete. Though they were not
designed for travel on the open ocean, any one of them could reduce a much larger
wooden vessel to kindling in a short amount of time. In a few short years, armored
vessels had become the norm.
At the outbreak of the war, the Union Navy had forty-two vessels in commission,
with 1,300 officers and 7,500 seamen to crew them. Little more than four years later, the
Union Navy boasted 671 ships (58 of them ironclad), 6,700 officers, and 51,500 seamen.
The Navy had made incredible advancements in technology and engineering; they had
gone from being a motley mess of mismatched vessels to one of the most powerful naval
forces in the world. Rowan played an important role in this process.
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ROWAN’S COMMAND OF THE ASIATIC SQUADRON

Soon after the end of the Civil War, on July 26, 1866, Rowan was promoted, by
selection, to the rank of Rear Admiral. 1 After a little over a year serving as the
Commander of the Norfolk Navy Yard and Station, in September of 1867 he was ordered
to command the Asiatic Squadron. He had been notified over the summer that he should
hold himself in readiness for the position, and during the interim had written to Welles,
requesting that Captain Daniel Ammen be given the command of his flagship. 2 Welles
granted the request, and on September 10th, 1867, Rowan reported to ready his ship, the
Piscataqua, for service. The ship left the Navy Yard November 5th, headed for the coast
of Japan, where Rowan spent most of the next three years.
They stop in Hong Kong on the way, and Rowan paid a visit to Richard Graves
MacDonnell, the British Governor. “I dined with him, and found him rather pompous,
but a good fellow, and Lady MacDonnell is charming. She would redeem twenty faults
in her better half.” 3 Rowan wrote that the colony of Hong Kong, which was supposed to
be self-sustaining, in theory, was “embarrassed financially.” There was tension between
the Governor and the Chinese population of city, as a result of MacDonnell’s method of
attempting to solve the problem: “the governor is working out of debt by means of a large

1

Stephen Cooper Ayres, “Sketch of the Life and Services of Vice Admiral Stephen C.
Rowan, U.S. Navy” (read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, Cincinnati,
Ohio, 1910), 16.
2
Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers, M180”], vol. 4, 242.
3
Ibid., vol. 3, 200.

178
4

revenue derived from gambling licenses.” The Chinese government was working to
put a stop to it.
The Piscataqua arrived at Nagasaki in June of 1868. Rowan was fascinated by
the history of Decima (or Dejima, as the Japanese called it), a small artificial island in the
bay. It was built by the Japanese during the Edo period to serve as the single place of
direct trade between the nation and the rest of the world, though the Dutch had a
monopoly on their trade for many years. “I took some pains to visit the island of Decima
where the Dutch were permitted to live and trade with Japan, sending two ships a year for
that purpose.” 5 The island was small; Rowan estimated it to be one hundred yards long
and fifty feet wide, and covered with small dwellings and warehouses, where, Rowan was
told, the Dutch trade agents “remained year after year and day after day, shut up on an
Island not larger than a good sized kitchen garden without the privilege of stepping a
cross the bridge on to main land.” 6 The Dutch traders were not allowed off of the island,
and the bridge that linked the little island to the mainland was guarded at all times.
Rowan admired much about the nation of Japan, its people and culture. He was
struck by the honesty of every Japanese citizen, the respect they showed for all other
people, and the tireless manner in which they devoted themselves to their work. He
expressed profound regret over the fact that so many Western nations sought to
“improve” their way of life. Rowan observed the lack of poverty and filth in Japan. He
found the Japanese to be “industrious good natured people.” He described their lives as
“simple and natural,” and believed their manners were “distinguished for politeness, and
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grace, and kindness.” Rowan was impressed with the literacy of the Japanese, saying
that “Every one (as a rule) can read, and most can write.” Rowan noted, “They have a
religion which they value… The poorest laborer is always spoken to civilly, and gives a
civil answer. These are the half civilized Asiatic we propose to convert to white ways,
and persuade to follow our example!! Perhaps if we knew more we should be more
tolerant.” 7
With an honesty somewhat unusual for Americans at the time, Rowan observed
that every nation is prone to conceit, and all seek to glorify themselves even at the
expense of other nations. “England is beyond all others, and America not far behind,” 8
he wrote, though he admitted that Japan was no exception. The rate of crime was low,
but it existed, though Rowan observed that it might have something to do with the strict
laws regarding punishment: “What ever the crime the punishment is retaliatory. A
murderer is killed, an incendiary is burned, there is no mercy.” 9
Rowan referred to women as “the most intricate of all subjects,” and the women
of Japan were perplexing, indeed. Rowan wrote that it was permitted for parents to sell
their daughters into prostitution for a predetermined amount of time, “and it is not
disgraceful.” A certain part of the city was set aside for them, and they could be visited
by their friends and family, “and it is not uncommon for men to seek wives from these
houses.” Despite this, Rowan observed, the condition of women in Japan was superior to
that of other Asian countries, and even to that of many women in America and European
nations. “She is subject to no seclusion, she shares the amusements of her husband. She
7
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is almost sure of marriage. Infidelity in the married state is rare.”

10

Rowan wrote less about China, but he was no less intrigued by it. He noted that,
contrary to “Empires” in the Western world, the Chinese emperor was “absolute but not
despotic.” Rowan was taught that the emperor delegated his powers “to ministers, who in
turn delegate to subordinates, descending down through who are as absolute in their
sphere, as any other. This power being infinitely divisible is not dangerous, and public
opinion is always ready to check any abuses on the part of the Emperor.” 11
Rowan described the main religion o the Chinese, Buddhism, and he contrasted
the story he was told, involving a virgin birth and a man who was regarded as divine,
with Christianity. Despite the similarities Rowan noted that the Christian missionaries, in
1723, had been declared by the Emperor to be “disturbers of the public peace,” 12 and had
been banished. Another aspect of Chinese life, which Rowan found appalling, was the
practice of foot-binding. He stated “Small feet became the fashion in remote antiquity,
and no Chinese woman can hope to marry unless she has been tortured in infancy by
compressing to keep her feet nearly the size they were at her birth.” 13
Rowan and his crew on the Piscataqua returned to New York in November, 1870.
In his absence, Rowan had been promoted to Vice Admiral by the President of the United
States, Ulysses S. Grant, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, George M.
Robeson. Robley Dunglison Evans, a sailor who served under Rowan, wrote of his
service in the Navy, and of his time spent on the Asiatic Squadron. He wrote that when
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Ibid., vol. 3, 220-1.
Ibid., vol. 3, 227.
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Ibid., vol. 3, 231.
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Ibid., vol. 3, 229.
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they returned to New York, on their approach to the Navy Yard, they met the
Guerriere on its way out.
“She saluted us with seventeen guns, which was the first intimation we had that
Admiral Rowan had been made vice-admiral. Our officers and crew were wild
with delight, and cheered until the admiral showed himself on deck. It was a
splendid reward for his magnificent conduct during the civil war, and made solely
on his merits. At the time it was done he was at sea, out of reach of anything like
political influence, and not even where he could be communicated with. Once in
our history, anyhow, the man who deserved it was made vice-admiral.” 14

14

Robley Dunglison Evans, A Sailor’s Log: Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1908), 153.
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ROWAN’S CONTINUED SERVICE

The command of the Asiatic Squadron was Rowan’s last service performed at sea,
but he continued to serve in the Navy for another eighteen years. He served in command
of the New York Navy Yard from 1872 until 1876, and as Port Admiral until 1877. He
was appointed to several boards, including one created to “examine cases of officers who
may deem themselves to have been unjustly passed over” 1 for promotions, and one to
examine the system of education of Midshipmen at Annapolis.
On January 14, 1871, Rowan wrote to the President, forwarding the application of
his son Hamilton for an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point; 2 President
Grant issued the appointment. The following May, Rowan was appointed to the Board of
Visitors to the Military Academy by the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap. Rowan
of course accepted the position.
In 1877, he was appointed the President of the Examining and Retiring Boards at
Washington. On September 22, 1881, Rowan was ordered to command the Naval Guard
that was detached to accompany the remains of President James A. Garfield to Cleveland,
Ohio. The following summer, he was ordered to the Naval Observatory to serve as
Superintendent, and in 1883 he received an appointment for duty as Chairman of the
Lighthouse Board, on which he served until his retirement six years later.
He retired voluntarily in 1889, and he passed away the following year on March

1

Private Journal of Stephen C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, Microfilm 180, Papers of Stephen C.
Rowan, August 27, 1826-March 28, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereafter cited as
“Rowan Papers, M180”], vol. 4, 289.
2
Ibid., vol. 4, 246.
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31, 1890, at the age of 82, having served faithfully in the Navy for 64 of those years.
He was buried in Oak Hill Cemetery in Georgetown, D.C., next to his wife.
Rowan had progressed through the ranks of the Navy on his own skill and merit,
and had been well liked by other officers and the men that served under him. He had an
easy nature and a good sense of humor—one that allowed the sailors serving under him
to affectionately call him “Paddy Rowan.” Enough letters praising him during the Civil
War made it home to sisters and mothers and wives that in 1864, when the Sanitary
Commission of New York awarded a sword to the most popular Naval Officer, Rowan
was selected as the recipient.
Admiral T. H. Stevens, regarding Rowan and his services to his country, wrote,
“In reviewing this brilliant series of successes and victories, of paramount value…
we cannot fail to recognize the fine skill, untiring energy, cool and tempered
judgment, quick perception and dash of Rowan, which fully establish his claims
to rank with the leading naval commanders of the day. No grass grew under his
keel; no victory was gained until all its fruits were fully garnered. Like the waves
of the sea, success followed success, and while there was work to be done he
rested not, nor allowed others to rest. This was war never better illustrated.” 3
Rowan had served his adopted country through turbulent periods of expansion
(the Second Seminole War, the Mexican War), overseas explorations, and civil conflict
(the Civil War). When he retired in 1889, his nation—and the US Navy—were on the
verge of another round of expansion and conflict (Spanish-American War, World War I).

3

T.H. Stevens, A Naval Encyclopaedia: Comprising a Dictionary of Nautical Words and
Phrases; Biographical Notices, and Records of Naval Officers (Philadelphia: L.R.
Hamersly & Co., 1881), 705.
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CONCLUSION

When Rowan joined the Navy at the age of eighteen, he could not have fathomed
the extent to which it would shape his future. On one of his very first voyages, Rowan
circumnavigated the globe; in an era when travel was arduous and dangerous, he had seen
more in five years than most people today will see in a lifetime. During the Second
Seminole War, Rowan had experienced riverine warfare for the first time, and had
participated in and contributed to the development of techniques that would be utilized as
far into the future as the Vietnam War. Most of all, perhaps, these formative years served
best to prepare Rowan for a greater role in larger conflicts in his future.
During the Mexican War, Rowan had started out as the executive officer of the
Cyane. This role required great responsibility on his part, and through it he earned the
respect of his peers and many of his superiors. Later in the war, he was entrusted with
several authoritative positions, afloat and ashore. Rowan and other navy personnel
served alongside men of the army throughout the conflict, many of them spending as
much time serving on land as they did on their vessels.
The Mexican War served as a training ground for many of the key military
players who served in the Civil War, and Rowan, while certainly not as influential as
some, was no exception. These experiences no doubt played a role in preparing him for
his cooperation with the army during the Civil War. Seeing first hand the way land forces
operated, and being in a position where these operations were undoubtedly explained to
him in great detail, certainly gave him a fundamental understanding of the army and how
best the navy could support it. This understanding served him well in his later roles of
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command during the Civil War, and it was recognized by officers such as General
Burnside, who praised Rowan for his invaluable service and skill. During the previous
war, Rowan had also witnessed how detrimental infighting between the Navy and the
Army could be, and this surely contributed to his determination to work well with the
army.
Rowan's role in the Civil War was most prominent in the attack on Roanoke
Island (and his assault on the Mosquito Fleet in the days after), his command of the Naval
forces during the joint attack on New Bern, and his command of the New Ironsides
during the siege of Charleston. During the joint operations Rowan particularly
distinguished himself, drawing praise from officers from the army and navy alike.
Rowan was rewarded for his faithful service by receiving the thanks of Congress,
at the request of Abraham Lincoln, and through his promotion by selection, both to a
higher rank and with the selection to command the Asiatic Squadron. On that foreign
station, Rowan represented much that his country wished to portray: a staunch leader
with a forward-thinking perspective, loyal to his country and devoted to the Navy.
Rowan's family carried on a strong military tradition; his son, Hamilton, joined
the army and retired at the rank of Major. He and his wife, Frances, had two sons,
Stephen Clegg and Hugh Williamson. Stephen, named for his grandfather, quite fittingly
entered the United States Naval Academy in 1899 at the age of 17, and graduated on
February 2, 1903, 5th in his class. He served as Commander and Executive Officer of the
armored cruiser the USS Frederick during World War I, and retired at the rank of
Captain. Hugh followed in the footsteps of his father and joined the army, from which he
retired as a Brigadier-General. He was buried in Oak Hill Cemetery, in the same plot as
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his parents and grandparents. Four US Navy ships have been named in honor of the
Rowan family, a torpedo boat and three destroyers.
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APPENDIX
Rowan’s Logbook and Nautical Navigation
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Fig. 7: Sample page take from Rowan’s logbook

This is a page from Rowan's log book. It lists in the columns the date, latitude,
longitude, the temperature of the air and water, and remarks about the weather, wind, and
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currents, along with any other relevant information. The column on the far right lists
the barometric pressure. He kept similar records for several of his other cruises,
occasionally including other information, but he always included the date, the latitude,
and the longitude.
Determining the date and the temperature were easy enough; latitude and
longitude were a little trickier. At sea, latitude and longitude could be determined with
the use of a sextant and a chronometer.
The sextant was a device used to measure the angle between two visible objects.
These instruments were very sensitive and had to be aligned very carefully. Any error
made by an improperly positioned mirror was automatically doubled in magnitude, due to
the fact that it utilized two mirrors. For navigational purposes, it was used to measure the
angle between a celestial body, such as Polaris or the sun, and the visible horizon. This
angle is directly related to the celestial body's geographic location—the point on the
earth's surface that it is directly over. Knowing the angle and the time it was measured,
one can calculate a position line on a nautical chart. A sextant could also be used to sight
the sun at solar noon, and this reading, along with a similar measurement of Polaris,
could be used to find one's latitude (this, of course, only worked in the Northern
Hemisphere; other navigational stars could be used elsewhere). Polaris was used most
frequently, when available, because it is always within one degree of the celestial north
pole, making calculations much easier.
Once the latitude was known, it could be used, along with a chronometer, to
determine the longitude. A chronometer was a clock which kept the time of a specific
place at a specific location, the longitude of which was known. Vessels sailing from
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Washington set their chronometers to the time kept by the Naval Observatory. The
United States Naval Observatory was created in 1830, and was used as a base for
navigational tools such as charts and instruments. It also made the astronomical
observations necessary to properly rate and set the Navy's chronometers.
Knowing that the earth rotates at 360 degrees a day, and that the sun therefore
appears to move through 15 degrees each hour (one degree every four minutes), one can
compare the time the sun reaches its zenith at the present location (local noon) with the
time on the chronometer, and mathematically derive the longitude of the vessel.
Accuracy of this method varies, due to the elliptical shape of the Earth's orbit of the sun,
making the sun appear to move slower or faster depending on the time of the year. This
can be taken into consideration through the use of a nautical almanac, and calculated into
the results for a much more accurate result. A nautical almanac has been published
annually in Great Britain since 1767; the US Naval Observatory published its first
nautical almanac in 1852.
It was through records like these that sailors learned of currents and weather
patterns, hazards that should be avoided, and the best routes to travel at certain times of
the year. This information could also be used to update charts and maps, if a vessel
discovered something that was not included in the data already known. This information
was compiled at the Naval Observatory, and could be passed on to vessels making future
trips, making their voyage easier and less risky.

